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ABSTRACT

Recognizing the Twentieth-Century Love Story
by
Angela Francis

Advisor: Nancy K. Miller
Recognizing the Twentieth-Century Love Story investigates an alternative framework
through which we can understand the form and function of love stories in the twentieth century.
While the love story has previously been understood in terms of a requirement that the lover
renunciate passion in order to enjoy a positive narrative outcome, I suggest that some love
narratives instead center mutual and “accurate-enough” recognition as a requirement of the
desired happily ever after. In addition to requiring that the characters “know themselves,” such
recognition goes beyond framing the loved other as an independent subject by also recognizing
the beloved in ways that are acceptable to them: ways that are, in other words, accurate enough
in terms of how they view themselves.
This shift toward recognition as a crucial aspect of the love story reflects cultural changes
in the way we envision romantic love and relationship more generally. It also has implications
for the way the love story treats its heroines as well as the men who desire them. Aligning
themselves more closely with the characteristics Hélène Cixous ascribes to l'écriture féminine,
these love stories privilege characters who know and are true to themselves in all their
uncontained, expansive, complex glory and punish those who withhold recognition of
themselves or others in an attempt to craft artificial stories of self. Thus, if the love story
iv

previously required the renunciation of passion, this subset of the form instead requires we be
true to ourselves, including to our passionate desires, without allowing them to dominate the
ones we love.
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A Passionate Introduction
To try to write love is to confront the muck of language: that region of hysteria where
language is both too much and too little, excessive . . . and impoverished.
—Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments
The existent succeeds in finding himself only in estrangement, in alienation; he seeks
through the world to find himself in some shape, other than himself, which he makes his
own.
—Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex

To begin this project: a myth. Aristophanes’s myth in Plato’s Symposium portrays the original
humans as round, with four legs, four arms, and two faces on opposite sides of a single head.
Powerful and too big for their breeches, they threatened the gods and Zeus ordered for them to be
chopped in half: to have them literally be cut down to size. As a result, we are now each only
half of our selves, faced daily with the fact that we are not one with our soulmates.
The humans who knew what it was like to truly be whole behaved as one might imagine:
they searched relentlessly for their other halves. Those who found one another wrapped
themselves around each other and refused to let go despite hunger, danger, or threat of death.
Zeus, looking down, witnessed the ravaged soulmates and realized he had made a mistake. His
solution, perhaps unsurprisingly, was sex. He repositioned humans’ genitals to enable sexual
union and, having done so, considered the situation handled. We continue to move through the
world as only half of our original selves but, through sex, can temporarily achieve our ancestors’
previous state of wholeness.
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This myth is sometimes used to illustrate the destructive power of passion allowed to run
unchecked. Humans were so engrossed in their own desires, searching as they were for their lost
halves, that society would have been at threat of collapse. Even the apparent satisfaction of
human desire—here locating one’s soulmate—would have led directly to death if not for godly
intervention. Yet while passionate love clearly plays a role in Aristophanes’s myth, it is not the
reason Zeus saw fit to punish humans (that was hubris) nor does it dictate the end of the myth.
Instead, it is the moment of recognition that is all-powerful in this narrative. It is joyous
recognition that throws soulmates at each other. It is the fear of losing the soulmate once they
have been recognized that is more powerful than even the emptiest of stomachs. Perhaps most
important, it is this act of accurate and mutual recognition that is rewarded at the end of the
myth; humans’ sexual organs are moved explicitly for both procreation and enjoyment, and this
transforms the myth from a potential tragedy to what might be considered akin to a love story.
I begin with Aristophanes’s myth for several reasons. I’ve already gestured to the first—
the main argument of this project: that the act or lack of recognition has the power to determine a
love story’s narrative outcome. In fact, as I will argue in this dissertation’s first chapter,
recognition has also largely become the way we define love itself. But for this first assertion to
be accurate, a second point must also be true: a character’s cleaving to passionate feeling, even to
the detriment of society, does not always lead to negative narrative outcomes. This statement
does not go without saying. Instead it must be acknowledged that choosing to remain true to
one’s passions has led to death or exile for many literary characters—particularly female
characters—within the pages of their love stories. This project therefore ultimately explores two
questions: what does it mean to “write” love, and what kind of love—which variety, to who and
from whom—can be written into a satisfying, positive conclusion? While both questions have
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been asked before, the answers to each necessarily change as we redefine what it means to love,
actively, in the world.

Passion, the Lover’s Tribute
It is important to pause here to define passion, both in terms of what it is and what it is
not. Elaine Hatfield and G. William Walster describe passionate love in A New Look at Love: A
Revealing Report on the Most Elusive of All Emotions as a “wildly emotional state, a confusion
of feelings: tenderness and sexuality, elation and pain, anxiety and relief, altruism and jealousy”
(2). Ultimately, they refer back to Aristophanes’s myth, suggesting that passion itself is
characterized by the strong desire for union with the object of one’s affections. While such a
whirlwind of emotions can be overwhelming, it differs from obsession in no small part due to the
individual’s relationship to this experience. While obsession is primarily distressing, leading the
individual to attempt to neutralize their often-racing thoughts, passion is often seen as
enlivening: the grass is greener, the sky clearer, the birdsong more beautiful, all because of
passionate desire. It is for this reason that obsession is pathologized (see, for example, the
definition of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders) at the same time that rekindling passionate desire remains the frequent topic of selfhelp books and magazine articles.
However, while the presence of passion has also played an obvious role in many a
romance plot, its renunciation is written into some definitions of the love story itself. Notably,
Roland Barthes defines the love story within the early pages of A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments,
ascribing to the abandonment of passion the position of key requirement for all love stories and
claiming that it is only through this act of rejection that the lover can be reunited with society. He
3

describes the love story as an act of translation where amorous outbursts and remembrances
called “figures” are forced into a narrative form. It is indisputable that passion is the driving
force behind these figures. They “occur to the lover without any order . . . they stir, collide,
subside, return, vanish with no more order than the flight of mosquitoes,” and they constitute
purely affective outbursts that “explode” forth without any communicative concerns (6-7). To
Barthes, the lover’s amorous discourse constitutes an encyclopedia rather than a novel. The
figures become established when a witness to the lover’s speech can recognize within it some
facet of the common experience of love, but there is no narrative for that witness to follow.
The love story requires the lover provide these outbursts with easily discernable meaning
and a form that guides the reader to a moralized conclusion through recognizable structures of
traditional narrative such as linear plot and stable tone and style. In short, it requires that the
lover diminish the force of their passion, not in the service of their relationship with the love
object but as part of the membership dues required in order to return to society. As Barthes
writes:
This is the love story, subjugated to the great narrative Other, to that general opinion
which disparages any excessive force and wants the subject himself to reduce the great
imaginary current, the orderless, endless, stream which is passing through him, to a
painful, morbid crisis of which he must be cured, which he must “get over” (“It develops,
grows, causes suffering, and passes away” in the fashion of some Hippocratic disease):
the love story (the “episode,” the “adventure”) is the tribute the lover must pay to the
world in order to be reconciled with it. (7)
Failing to transform the lover’s thesaurus of figures into a recognizable narrative results in a lack
of reconciliation—one that may take the form of an exile, which is a sort of social death, or of
4

biological death itself. Nancy K. Miller describes such a conclusion as “dysphoric” in The
Heroine’s Text: Readings in the French and English Novel, 1722-1782. There she highlights two
types of plots centered around female characters, each defined in large part by the fate of the
heroines. The “euphoric” texts conclude with the heroine’s integration into society while the
“dysphoric” texts close with the heroine’s death.
I want to focus on Miller’s characterization of the dysphoric text, which she defines as
one of “the exclusion of the heroine from (and through) the social violence of the world; the
scenario of illicit love fatally punished” (66; emphasis added). The heroines Miller reads are
indeed punished for their passionate sins within a patriarchal society, sins that are either so dire
that they cannot “be redeemed by marriage” (70) or that the heroine refuses to wholly denounce,
and it is for such heroines that “the dialectic of l’amour-passion ends only in death” (109).
Miller’s close readings therefore underscore the role of passionate desire in the dysphoric text,
doing so while emphasizing the importance of context. The texts she investigates, among them
Moll Flanders and Clarissa, necessarily reflect and reinforce issues of gender and power: of
women’s roles and possibilities within particular societies at particular historical moments. It is
the women who are called to sacrifice their desires if they want to achieve a positive narrative
end, and it is for them that “happily ever after” carries a steep price tag.
Miller does not mince words about the gendered nature of this sacrifice. Instead, the
importance of gender—of both the fictional subject and the novel’s author—is writ large in The
Heroine’s Text, beginning with its very title. Far from positioning the plot of such novels as
somehow intrinsic or necessary, Miller asserts that there are very specific motivations for how
the love story has taken form, and the interplay of heroine and male author is particularly
important in this context:
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if the valorization of innocence is what underlies the potency of the “old plot,” and gives
it meaning, by the same token that meaning is produced in the eighteenth-century novel
only when the innocence at stake is female and threatened. What is one to make of this
plot to undo feminine virtue beyond observing its recurrence and its literariness?
Paradoxically, it would seem to be a working out of an unsaid ambivalence on the part of
male writers toward the very existence of female desire, and an unsayable anxiety about
its power. (134; emphasis added)
Miller’s argument therefore is not only about the love story’s structure in isolation but also how
the novel has served as a stage for men to engage and prescribe the acceptable limits of female
desire through the structure of love stories and the novel. Female passion, then, is punished
because of its possible power: its refusal to be contained or constrained and its transgressive
potential.
While the renunciation of passion and illicit love is key for Barthes as well, Miller’s
constructions represent a departure from Barthes’s formulation, where the love story’s demands
stem not from patriarchal power structures but from the more nebulous “world.” While his
formulation also pits the passionate lover against the demands of society, Miller’s argument
regarding the nature and cause of the euphoric and dysphoric plots suggests that the love story
does not need to be a weapon against feminine desire but that it has become one in the hands of
its authors. On a more basic level, the very presence of explicitly feminine desire marks an
additional difference between Miller and Barthes; notably, the lover in Barthes is consistently
described using masculine pronouns, but more than this, the lover is also positioned as an
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author. 1 In Barthes, the lover is being commanded to write his own story, and he is therefore in
full control over his representation and the shape of the story he chooses to tell. This is a
privileged and explicitly gendered subject position, and not all living subjects occupy such
positions of power.

First Comes Love…
Within social discourse, some combination of Miller’s contextualized plots and Barthes’s
blanket definition of the love story has taken hold. From popular articles like The Atlantic’s
“Making Peace with Jane Austen’s Marriage Plots” to Harlequin Romance novels and their
Rom-Com film equivalents, the idea that society demands a happy ending allude to marriage for
women in particular persists. Such an ending, which could be termed as a return to society and to
cultural roles, has been said to endure potentially because of the public’s response to it.
Specifically, within the popular sphere, some argue that “pop-culture consumers have been
drawn to stories about female protagonists who find ‘happily ever after’ in marriage and
motherhood,” perhaps due to the form of fairytale plots they are exposed to in their youth (Beck).
Marriage and motherhood would suggest the elevation of commitment over uncontrollable
passion, particularly when passion is formulated as needing to be constrained in the service of
the love story as it is by Barthes. Simultaneously, both marriage and motherhood also represent

1

I recognize the possibility that Barthes’s homosexuality influenced his choice of pronouns for
the lovers in his text. However, this decision—regardless of the motivations behind it—remains
significant as it relates to and fits within the differences in how lovers are portrayed depending
on their gender.
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the rise of companionate love as the long-term ideal and the protection, and elevation, of
monogamy.
I borrow the term “companionate love” from Sternberg’s work on the triangular theory of
love. Developed during the 1980s, Sternberg’s theory defines three components of loving
feeling: passion, intimacy, and commitment. 2 These combine to result in 7 possible types of love
(Fig. 1). Most relevant to this project are infatuation, or passion alone; romantic love, the
combination of passion and intimacy; consummate love, which is influenced by passion,
intimacy, and commitment in roughly equal parts; and companionate love, or the combination of
intimacy and commitment in the absence of significant degrees of passion.

2

The theory was first published in 1986 in an article, “A Triangular Theory of Love,” that
appeared in Psychological Review but interestingly enough was developed because of the
apparently imminent failure of Sternberg’s own relationship at the time (“Understanding Love”,
27).
8

Fig. 1. A diagram of the Triangular Theory of Love.
Sternberg proposes that loving relationships that persist follow a predictable pattern,
moving between types of love: from infatuation to romantic love with the rise of intimacy, then
to consummate love when commitment becomes more secure, and lastly settling in
companionate love in long-term relationships after the fires of passion have burned out. It is the
last shift—toward companionate love through the decline of passion—that is required by
Barthes’s formulation of the love story; however, I question if this continues to hold in the
contemporary moment. Indeed, I would argue that the mandate against passion has been lifted, in
no small part due to shifting concepts of marriage and monogamy.
Surprisingly, changing ideas about intimacy have helped to create a pathway for the
freeing of passion. Esther Perel discusses intimacy in Mating in Captivity: Unlocking Erotic
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Intelligence (2006). She suggests that while previous generations demanded respect from their
spouses, intimacy has replaced respect as a requirement. Indeed, intimacy has “shifted from
being a by-product of a long-term relationship to being a mandate for one” (40). Perel suggests
that this change is a result of industrialization, which altered the way we engage our communities
and led to increasing feelings of isolation. At the same time, our expectations of intimacy—and
therefore a of successful marriage—have also shifted as a result of women’s growing
independence, both financially and through the rise of divorce. In particular, as a result of
women’s rights, “non-negotiable drudgery became unacceptable. It was replaced with the
expectation of a mutually satisfying emotional connection,” and when this expectation is not
met, women were suddenly able to free themselves from the social contract altogether (41).
However, even beyond this, monogamy itself was being thrown into question by the end
of the twentieth century. Adam Phillips wrote in 1996, “not everyone believes in monogamy, but
everyone lives as though they do,” and the forward march of time has proven him right on the
first point but wrong on the second (1). Gallup polls over the past 15 years have charted an
increase in the number of Americans who believe “polygamy” is acceptable when it is defined as
when “a married person has more than one spouse at the same time.” Specifically, the percent of
Americans who view such an arrangement as acceptable has shifted from 7% in 2003 to 17% in
2017.
I raise this statistic not to suggest that polyamorous couples are any less likely than
monogamists to experience companionate love. Instead, such statistics gesture toward
monogamy’s gradually losing its status as a mandate for loving relationships in America. If the
requirement that the lover sacrifice passion in the favor of a linear narrative stemmed from a
perceived threat to monogamy and monogamy is losing its hold on love, passion can be freed to
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run unchecked without significant risk. This may be one reason why the apparent embargo
against strong and enduring passionate feelings is lifting. Of course, another possibility is that
companionate love, with its remove from the enlivening forces of passion, is simply no longer
the ideal.
The first chapter of this dissertation, “Permanent Damage: Marital Transgression without
Bounds,” explores both of these possibilities. It focuses on the ways that the marriage plot—and
through it a monogamous construction of companionate love—has been troubled by examining
the way marriage functions or fails to function. In particular, it does so through close
examination of very different texts that each remove marriage from its position as signifying the
successful end of a love story. Instead, they position it as a setting for or beginning of intimate
marital transgression. The first, Hanif Kureishi’s 1998 novel Intimacy, portrays adultery in
relation to intimacy and self-recognition, ultimately questioning if remaining faithful to the
marriage contract is always the “right” decision to make. While such a narrative has an
established place in the tradition of failed marriage plots, which focus on the transgressive space
written directly into the marriage contract, Georges Bataille’s formulation of boundless
transgression allows us to explore how marriage is being further troubled by transgressions that
are not so “bounded” by their contract: by actions and narratives that exit the established space of
bad behavior within a marriage and instead break new ground outside of the contract. To explore
this space, I perform two additional close readings: the first of Chris Kraus’s 1997 I Love Dick,
where a husband’s deliberate participation in his wife’s adulterous infatuation for another man is
perhaps even more transgressive than her desires themselves, and the second of Susan Choi’s
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2013 novel, My Education, where questions of recognition, misrecognition, and transgression
combine to culminate in an ambiguous ending. 3
The love story’s mandate against passion is not a natural one, nor is it necessary when its
narrative power is divorced from acts of domination. Therefore, the role of Chapter 1 is to
examine the way marriage, passion, and intimacy connect in stories of love and relationship in
this time of weakening mandates regarding marriage, passion, and monogamy. The privileging
of intimacy has been accomplished through the unspoken assumption that without passion in the
way, kicking up affective dust, intimacy is what remains, always there to bind us to each other
and through that to society. Too much passion leads to tragedy. Yet the workings of this contrast
and indeed the existence of society’s stake in our enduring intimate (though not necessarily
passionate) relationships with one another have been underemphasized in past popular culture.

Privileging Passion
The rest of this project operates in the space freed by these narrative possibilities and
enforced by the mandate that has risen to take marriage’s place: the requirement of mutual and
accurate-enough recognition. Just as Barthes’s definition of the love story-as-passion-sacrifice
cannot rationally be expected to fit all work written before a certain point in time, ultimately it is
safe to assume it will eventually cease to fit work written after a certain period as well. I believe
we are in that moment of transition; that this shift is powered in part through changes in societal
ideals about love, marriage, and the stories we tell about both; and that we are instead returning

3

It is worth noting that the majority of texts explored in this chapter will be from the 1990s.
Similarly, many of the texts explored throughout this project that appear to be troubling the role
of passion in the love story were written during the 1990s or in the decades that follow, likely as
a result of the combination of forces gestured toward by Perel and Phillips.
12

to a moment where proper recognition plays a much more determining role in the course and the
conclusion of a love narrative.
Of course, such a statement requires defining proper recognition. Often portrayed as a
“shock,” moments of recognition in narratives that center around passionate desire may quickly
be accompanied by the protagonist’s belief that they have learned a deep and previously hidden
truth about the object of their affections, themselves, and the nature of their relationship to one
another. This “truth” about self, other, and relationship may then be used to justify the
characters’ actions moving forward and, through this, may become the driving force of the
passionate plot. Therefore, for example, the people in Aristophanes’s myth have truly recognized
their soulmates in each other—their recognition is both accurate and mutual—and it is rewarded
in the myth through godly intervention that enables their love: a euphoric plot, and a happy
ending.
When looked at more closely, however, it must be said that recognition is never entirely
accurate; the fact that we relate to one another through our internal objects makes perfect
accuracy impossible. As a result, what is truly required is not perfect recognition but accurateenough recognition. In particular, recognition is “accurate enough” when it not only involves an
understanding that the beloved is an independent individual who has the necessary agency
needed to bestow recognition in return but also when it recognizes the beloved in a manner that
is acceptable to them; the beloved must be seen in way that is close enough to how they think of
themselves. 4

4

With the understanding that perfect accuracy is impossible for the reasons explained here, I will
often refer to such accurate-enough recognition as, simply, accurate: it affirms the way the
beloved views themselves.
13

One might assume that passion prevents genuine (though imperfect) recognition, and
texts like Dorothy Tennov’s Love and Limerence: The Experience of Being in Love detail the
way that infatuation, which is primarily passion in Sternberg’s formulation, can lead to an
inaccurate understanding of the loved object. It may seem as though relying on the aspect of love
with the lowest stability would create a shaky platform for enduring love. Yet while passion is
frequently thought of in sexual terms, Sternberg describes it in a remarkably different fashion.
Instead, his definition of passion is steeped in references to recognition. In addition to the
strength of feeling that it is known for, he suggests that needs for self-actualization, support, and
self-esteem can contribute to passionate feelings, as can the desire for an engagement with
chosen subject positions, dominance and submission among them. Thus, while at first glance
intimacy seems as if it would be the most likely site for recognition to occur, one’s desire for
recognition can drive feelings of passion, and intimacy can then result from of having received
that recognition. It is for this reason that, far from passion being uncomplicatedly dangerous and
destabilizing, passion and recognition build upon one another to create enduring attachment; in
general, “the passion component of love will almost certainly be highly and reciprocally
interactive with intimacy,” the latter of which stems directly from the former’s needs being met
(122).
This weakening of the moral stance relating to the roles of intimacy versus passion is
furthered by changing beliefs about what the passions are and how they relate to our identity. In
particular, we are in the process of moving from a belief in the hydraulic model of the passions
to an understanding of our passions as an integral part of ourselves and perhaps even as a facet of
our personalities. Robert C. Solomon defines the hydraulic model in his aptly-named book, The
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Passions (1976). 5 Still present in our criminal justice system (consider, for example so-called
“crimes of passion”), the hydraulic model suggests that strong, passionate feelings such as those
of anger or lust exist outside of us and overwhelm us, like a stream of water that overflows a
bucket. True to the saying of “what goes in must come out,” according to the hydraulic model,
we cannot help but act when the passions overwhelm us. Yet while it can be comforting to
absolve ourselves from responsibility for our actions, this belief also requires that we withhold
full agency from ourselves as subjects, and it is this aspect of the model that has come under fire.
During the twentieth century, this view of passion began to be replaced by a view of the
passions that considers them to be crucial part of ourselves. Teresa Brennan discusses this in The
Transmission of Affect, suggesting that “rather than pacifying forces that have to be struggled
with in an attempt to assert the voluntary course of the soul over them, the passions [became]
gradually equivalent to our true nature” (105). 6 In short, Brennan argues remarkably that the
passions became the ego, and if this is true it has therefore also become an important facet of
personality. While this shift is clearly important in terms of the ways we imagine ourselves, it is
crucial to also consider how this might affect the way we think of love and the love story. Recall
the love story’s mandate according to Barthes: that the passions be abandoned in favor of a
return to society. If the passions are uncontrollable thieves of our agency, their sacrifice hurts no
one. Instead, one might posit their abandonment is good for the loving subject. Yet when the
passions are a part of the self, this mandate takes on a much different significance. If the passions
are so crucial to the self’s composition that they can be labeled the ego, then the love story is

Interestingly, an abridged version was printed by a different publisher in 1993, placing it within
the same 10-year timespan as many of the texts that will be discussed in this project as attempts
to trouble the love story’s treatment of passion.
6
Brennan does not single out romantic passions here but instead discusses passionate emotions
more generally, explicitly including love in their number.
5
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requiring that lovers abandon themselves. It is demanding self-alienation. And what does it mean,
then, if the successful end to the love story is signified by marriage?

The Rise of Recognition
If Miller’s argument from The Heroine’s Text can be applied more generally, one might
ask what marriage requires the heroines sacrifice—and if they are allowed to acknowledge that
marriage requires it without falling into a dysphoric plot. In particular, if passion can be read as
the abovementioned theorists describe, any narrative form that requires its sacrifice also requires
that one give up the opportunity to be recognized accurately. Of course, in order to have this
choice at one’s disposal, the lover must have agency and some ability to shape one’s own story.
It is important to consider how this formulation changes when agency over one’s story is thrown
into question or, in a fictional form, when another character uses the power of narration in an
attempt to control the reader’s experience of the heroine.
The second chapter of this project, “Trauma and Transference Love: Refusing to
Recognize the Durassian Heroine,” begins to explore the role of recognition in love and
relationship from this standpoint. In particular, it examines the film and screenplay for
Hiroshima Mon Amour and the novel The Ravishment of Lol Stein in order to examine the ways
in which recognition plays a role in relationship—and stories about relationship—through
psychoanalytic concepts such as trauma, transference, and “wild” psychoanalysis. Ultimately, I
suggest that attempts to construct a desired relationship without actively and genuinely working
to recognize the object of one’s desire must necessarily end in failure.

16

This is not the same failure seen in the texts that Miller explores. It does not lead to the
heroine’s death, psychic or otherwise; to the contrary, the heroines seem to end the texts in a
better state than they began it. At the same time, Hiroshima Mon Amour in particular also
encourages us to look beyond the ways characters’ recognition of each other can be written into a
narrative plot by also exploring how the audience’s recognition can affect the way a narrative is
received and experienced. In both its screenplay and film forms, Hiroshima Mon Amour
deliberately uses the audience’s moments of uncertainty and misrecognition to align them with
the heroine, a move that has implications for the way we approach the narrative. By throwing
into question the audience’s ability to recognize the events unfolding before them, the narrative
implicating them in the construction of the story’s meaning and the significance of its ending.
These explorations of recognition and love in narrative continue in the third chapter of
this project. “This was a Love Story: False Recognition and the New Death Plot” delves more
deeply into the relationship between recognition and the love story while also demonstrating the
cruel optimism of passionate attachment when that recognition goes awry. However, intent is
important with regard to such failures of recognition. Therefore, I use the space of this chapter to
first distinguish accidental forms of misrecognition from what I am calling “false recognition”—
or the deliberate and purposeful creation of meaning around a fictionalized version of the love
object. From that position, we can then chart the effect of false recognition on the love story’s
plot and conclusion.
Using a combination of theories of recognition by Lacan, Hegel, and Benjamin, among
others, and a trio of close readings of three novels written during the 1990s—Josephine Hart’s
The Stillest Day and Damage, and Jeanette Winterson’s Written on the Body—Chapter 3
demonstrates the way that recognition rather than passion can be read as the novels’ driving
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force, drawing them ever closer to their conclusions. These three texts center on very different
characters about whom the reader knows progressively little: a female protagonist, an unnamed
male protagonist, and a protagonist of unknown sex and gender. Combined, the novels illustrate
the potential for the price of false recognition to affect lovers of either sex or gender.
Furthermore, like the texts by Duras in the previous chapter, these novels increasingly implicate
the reader in questions of recognition—including what we must know, and how we can know it.
Unlike the Duras texts, however, these novels position their protagonists in such a way that we
can witness the refusal to force the lover to sublimate their experience into a narrative form that
mandates passion be sacrificed in order for the lover to be reunited with society through the
happy ending.
I recognize that the three texts discussed within this chapter are outside of the canon,
something that some might suggest weakens their impact in my argument. Though I would argue
their exclusion from the scholarly canon does not limit their ability to demonstrate the ways we
think, talk, and write about love in the contemporary moment (Harlequin novels and much of the
pulp fiction of the 1950s are similarly rarely considered canonical, and yet each could also tell us
much about the narratives we craft about love and desire), I follow this chapter with an interlude
entitled “Lolita, a Case Study in Recognition” in order to further indicate the range of narratives
where we can see the effects of recognition on narrative in action. Delving first into a close
reading of Nabokov’s novel, Lolita, and careful attention to its infamously unreliable narrator, I
demonstrate the ways in which recognition can shape the plot of a novel and how the reader too
can be implicated in misrecognition (that is, simple and genuine error) if not false recognition.
The 1962 and 1997 film adaptations of Lolita then provide a lens through which we can see the
enduring effects of false recognition. In particular, they each to varying degrees engage in the
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creation of meaning by encouraging and perpetuating the false recognition of Dolores Haze as
Lolita.
Thus, through the trifecta of the novel and its two film adaptations, we are able to read
not only the effects of recognition on the ending of a passionate text but also the degree of harm
and the lasting impact of a narrative that, through the use of false recognition, inscribes a false
narrative into our larger culture. In short, we can see what is at stake with regard to issues of
recognition and the love story. Just as with the mandate of passion, the manipulation of meaning
and recognition into narrative simultaneously depicts and shapes what we think about love.
When it comes to love, the love story reports the news at the same time that it creates it.
The final chapter, “Recognizing the Black Heroine,” addresses how the existing
formulation of passion as determining the narrative ending did not necessarily apply to canonical
texts of African American Heroines written by African American women authors due to the
influence of historical beliefs about African Americans’ capability for love and higher-order
emotions. Due to this difference, it is not necessarily enough in these novels to follow social
norms or renounce passion if one wants to secure a happy ending. Likewise, following passion
does not necessarily lead to societal death, and physical death is not always a negative narrative
outcome. Instead, I suggest that twentieth-century texts such as Their Eyes Were Watching God
and Sula highlight the difficulties involved in balancing the demands of community with
individual passions and desires of the self and elevate the success of that endeavor as a more
positive, if not happy, conclusion.
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Permanent Damage: Marital Transgression without Bounds
Two’s company, but three’s a couple.
—Adam Phillips, Monogamy

Passion occupies a conflicted space within the love story. It provides the driving force that
powers characters’ efforts to overcome the obstacles that plot throws in the way of successful
relationship while simultaneously serving as one of the primary wedges that can break those
same unions apart. It is therefore unsurprising that passion also features heavily in novels about
failed marriages, either through its role in encouraging or maintaining adulterous behavior or
through its very absence in the marital bed.
Failed marriages are not a new topic for the novel. The range of particular plots that focus
on the failures of marriage and raise the specter of divorce are wide and varied, and many of
them can be seen in texts that written long before World War II. For instance, James H. Barnett’s
1939 book, Divorce and the American Divorce Novel, 1858-1937, focuses on texts where
characters divorce at the beginning of the novel, become divorced over the course of the novel,
or move through the proceedings to obtain a divorce despite ultimately failing in the attempt.
After having established such scenarios as the domain of the divorce novel, Barnett later expands
this definition in an article co-written with Rhoda Gruen entitled “Recent American Divorce
Novels, 1938-1945: A Study in the Sociology of Literature.” There, the authors claim to have
surveyed at least 50% of the divorce novels written in the 7-year period. They conclude that
novels featuring the “temporary alienation of spouses, domestic crises, and separations, whether
legal or informal,” should also be included under the umbrella of the divorce novel (322). These
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additional novels focus on at least one of several topics: the effects of divorce on children, the
“psychological permanence” of marriage even when it is legally dissolved, and the manner in
which alienation can lead to divorce. In short, the divorce novel when so defined focuses on the
wide range of ways that relationship and the social structures built on its back can—and do—
collapse.
Unsurprisingly, failed relationship plots extend even further back than the texts that
Barnett and Gruen explore. One more common in film was dubbed by Stanley Cavell as the
“comedy of remarriage.” These narratives are comedies rather than dramas or tragedies and
focus on spouses who, after initially considering marrying other people, ultimately instead opt to
be reconciled with or remarried to one another. While Cavell traces this tradition back to
Shakespearean romantic comedies, others such as Charles Musser and Billy Budd Vermillion
focus exclusively on the way this plot appears in the early 20th century. Musser and Vermillion
both cite the shifting social mores of the 1910s as the reason for the comedy of remarriage’s
increased popularity despite the plot’s roots in centuries past. Indeed, during that decade, divorce
became far more common in part because of the changing ideals related to marriage. By the end
of the 1910s, marriage had become increasingly expected to serve as “a union that offered
friendship, love, romance, happiness, sex, and personal fulfillment for both spouses” (Riley 145).
When it was unable to live up to these demands, divorce increasingly became the answer, and
government records note that divorce rates increased from of 3 couples per 1,000 in 1890 to 8
couples out of every 1,000 in 1920 (“100 Years of Marriage and Divorce Statistics: United
States, 1867-1967” 9).
Yet literary interest in the failures of marriage persisted in other forms as well. Focusing
on the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries, Kelly Hager discusses what she labels the “failed-
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marriage plot,” which she defines as the second, often-omitted half of the courtship narrative.
Such narratives differ from those mentioned above because of the political motivations involved
in their telling. Specifically, failed-marriage plots opt to purposely circumvent the love story in
favor of a gendered plot about agency, where the primary focus of these novels is “the matter of
female agency [that] tends to revolve around a wife leaving her husband” (8). Through this focus
and rather than seeking to extend the courtship plot, the authors of such narratives work to
expose the faults in marriage on both the micro, individual scale and as a societal institution. As
a result, unlike many of the abovementioned texts, the failed-marriage plot also extends beyond
marriage and divorce as a theme, telling a story that occurs outside of that framework rather than
to focusing on the varieties of melodrama that marriage and divorce can sometimes involve.
I do not want to embark on a full literary review of the subject; however, considering
even just this selection of scholarship makes it clear that although different frameworks for
writing about failed relationship enjoyed popularity at various historical moments, novelists and
authors have long shone a spotlight on the aftermath of both marriage and relationship. Taken as
a collective, texts concerning adultery or divorce work—deliberately or otherwise—to trouble
the love story’s waters. At times, this work takes place through the depiction of events that
would occur after the usual point of a love story’s conclusion. Often, it is undertaken using
methods that do not distinguish the events contained within the text’s plot from marriage as
either a setting or theme. What unites the narratives is therefore the use of marriage’s potential or
actual dissolution as one of their main points of conflict. When the aim of the text is political,
such a focus does not prevent them from commenting on the faults of marriage as an institution,
nor does it stop the texts from exploring the nature of desire and the myriad of ways that
marriage and desire can conflict and coincide. To the contrary, it is this act of exploration that
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renders passion as an integral part of the narratives and, as in love stories, they frequently use the
nature of passion and desire to drive their plots forward.
As a result, in this chapter I will focus on the role of transgression as it can be seen in
texts about marital disruption. While more straightforward novels of common adultery like Hanif
Kureishi’s Intimacy (1998) are not deeply transgressive, they do explore the effects that viewing
passion as a key aspect of one’s personality can have on the breakdown of individual marriages,
and as a result they raise questions about what constitutes the greatest betrayal: committing
adultery or failing to be true to one’s desires. I will follow this with an exploration of how one
might write the breaking of the marriage contract—the true transgression of the contract’s
boundaries—rather than simply a marriage’s breakdown. It is by troubling both passion’s role in
the love story and the symbol of “happily ever after” that these two types of narratives that help
create space for a new kind of love story not built around the relinquishment of passion.
My interest in these texts centers around how they reflect our conceptions of passion and
marriage as well as how those conceptions then alter the nuances of what stories we tell about
love and marriage and how we opt to tell them. This chapter therefore does not constitute an
attempt to suggest the broad plot strokes of novels featuring failed relationship have radically
changed in the contemporary moment, nor does it argue that the themes of passion and adultery
are somehow new to literature. Clearly, they are not. However, the idea of passionate love or
desire as part of the ego and therefore as a key part of one’s personality is a fairly recent
development, as is the continued loosening of the marital mandate, and I argue that both can be
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read within literature though themes of transgression and the testing of what it means to push
marriage to its limits. 7

Adultery and Betrayal
It likely comes as no surprise that adultery often plays a starring role in novels depicting
failed marriages. Hanif Kureishi’s Intimacy (1998) is such a novel, and it demonstrates one way
that changes in how we think about love, marriage, and the relation between passion and the self
can affect the way we portray the death of a marriage. The text consists of the narrator’s thought
processes during his final evening at home after he has decided to leave his wife. While he has
clear hopes of finding love and passion with a woman named Nina, Nina is but the latest woman
involved in a series of affairs that spans much of the length of the narrator’s marriage. Her
unimportance is underscored through her relative absence from the text; she appears only
occasionally in the narrator’s memories.
The protagonist portrays his life with his wife as one that has made him unhappy for a
number of years, and the text makes it clear that he has long been unable to force himself to
participate fully in married life. Indeed, he admits in the privacy of his thoughts that he has not
7

While this framing of romantic passions and ego appears to be relatively recent, it is
reminiscent of the way passion for activities was viewed during the early 20th century and is
mirrored by an ongoing debate about how to view passionate activities presently. Indeed, recent
studies have explored how such interests and activities are likely to be internalized and
incorporated into the self as well as how different methods of internalization can lead to various
affective and cognitive outcomes (see for example Robert Vallerand’s “On the Psychology of
Passion: In Search of What Makes People’s Lives Most Worth Living”). In particular,
Vallerand’s formulation of two types of passion for activities—obsessive passion, which is
associated with rigid persistence and dependence on the activity, and harmonious passion,
associated with the “autonomous internalization of the activity into the person’s identity” (2)—
could have implications for the way we discuss romantic passion and differentiate it from
romantic obsession.
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been intimately involved in even the most major of milestones during his marriage. This lack of
engagement is not limited to his relationship with his wife. For instance, he chose to leave
immediately after the birth of his first child, opting to splay over the sheets of his then-lover’s
bed rather than bond with his newborn. Unlike his attachment to his own feelings of passion, it
ultimately took him years to fall in love with any of his children.
In Against Love: A Polemic, Laura Kipnis uses a strangely parenthetical note in order to
draw attention to the way that passion is historically relegated to the space outside of marriage
(60). This is the world inhabited by Intimacy’s narrator, and he makes it clear throughout the text
that a marriage that excludes passion is one in which the spoils of monogamy could never been
enough. Instead, he labels his marriage as a sort of psychological death from which not even his
adulterous interludes can save him. If one considers the form of Barthes’s love story, Intimacy
illustrates the potential impermanence of any happiness in the story’s aftermath. Of course, to be
fair, Barthes does not promise the lover a happy ending but only a reunion with society. It is this
arrangement that the narrator in Intimacy rejects through his rejection of monogamy: in choosing
to follow his passions, and his desire for passion, over the opportunity to remain in his marriage
with its long chain of adulterous supplements, the narrator is also choosing self over his family
and the expectations of society.
Indeed, the narrator’s previous and seemingly constant string of marital transgressions is
still not sufficient for his marriage to avoid being compared to death. While at first this seems
like it is simply a rather melodramatic excuse for the narrator’s bad behavior, this can
simultaneously also be viewed as an illustration of Adam Phillips’s assertion that a key aspect of
monogamous relationship concerns the mapping of where danger lies. When Phillips suggests
that while adultery is frequently thought to be a site of danger, “this is where infidelity can let
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people down,” he is not discussing personal danger but rather risk to the relationship (34). Yet as
in the narrator’s habitual unfaithfulness, adultery itself does not always end a marriage, with
some going so far as to suggest a marriage can emerge stronger in infidelity’s wake through
counselling and deliberate repair.
This lack of danger and the resulting disappointment can be traced to the nature of
transgression and its inability to extend beyond its role in its associated contract, an inability that
relates to the nature of the taboo. To understand the role of transgression and the taboo, it is of
course useful to begin with Freud’s “Totem and Taboo.” It is there that Freud famously discusses
taboos partially in terms of their resulting prohibitions. Speaking not about marriage but about
“primitive” civilizations, Freud asserts that the taboo signifies
the original pleasure to do the forbidden [that] still continues among taboo races. They
therefore assume an ambivalent attitude toward their taboo prohibitions; in their
unconscious they would like nothing better than to transgress them but they are also
afraid to do it; they are afraid just because they would like to transgress, and the fear is
stronger than the pleasure. (832)
Although Freud then proceeds to connect ancient taboos specifically to neurotics, other theorists
have instead focused on the connection between taboos and wider society. For example, Georges
Bataille discusses taboo in Eroticism: Death and Sensuality, suggesting that on their surface
taboos “appeared in response to the necessity of banishing violence from the course of everyday
life” (55). However, Bataille proceeds to argue not only that taboos are meant to be violated but
that it is the very act of transgression that both transcends and completes the taboo. As a result of
this relation, the rules governing the taboo’s prohibition often include a prescribed space for a
degree of transgression. For instance, if taboos exist to make work possible (68), they fulfill their
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purpose by allowing carefully moderated methods, spaces, and times for transgressive
unproductivity—moments where we can disregard work, rules, or roles—that ensure the larger
structures of society can remain undisturbed. You might play “hooky” from work one day, but
doing so does not disturb the larger structures governing labor in this country or in your own life.
The role of prescribed transgression is twice demonstrated in Freud’s discussion of
sacrificial ceremony in totemic religions. The initial demonstration is through the clansmen’s
imitation of the totem in the course of the ceremony, which Freud describes as each man’s
recognizing that such a performance is both generally forbidden and also allowable only through
the full clan’s engagement. Freud’s second example is the festival that concludes the period of
mourning after the sacrifice is completed. This celebration is an event during which
[e]very instinct is unfettered and there is license for every kind of gratification . . . A
festival is a permitted, or rather an obligatory, excess, a solemn breach of a prohibition.
It is not that men commit the excesses because they are feeling happy as a result of some
injunction they have received. It is rather that excess is of the essence of a festival; the
festive feeling is produced by the liberty to do what is as a rule prohibited. (499;
emphasis added)
This scheduled, socially approved breaking of the taboo constitutes a bounded period of
transgression that exists and is often in fact mandated. It creates a sense in its subjects that they
have liberated themselves from the prohibition without actually threatening the organizing
structure of the taboo. As a result, when Bataille asserts that “the taboo is there to be violated,”
he alludes to this careful regulation (64).
Indeed, the parameters that outline when and how the socially sanctioned breaking of a
taboo can occur are so specific that Bataille suggests transgression often involves observing just
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as many rules as observing the taboo would have required (65). Consider, for example, marriage
and infidelity. The consequences of any unfaithful act are often determined by how deeply it cuts
the wronged partner, and that cut is often dependent on how sharply it deviates from the agreedupon rules of relationship, often through the degree of intimacy involved in the extramarital act
or, in monogamous marriages, the extent that it enters a third party into the relationship. Thus, a
drunken tryst might be considered less serious than an ongoing affair. Multiple affairs at a time—
the complete rejection of monogamy even within the context of the affair itself—is still worse.
Yet even these actions would not allow you to escape the contract; the adulterer may destabilize
their marriage, but there are rules governing what should come next (therapy, for example). Even
the wronged spouse’s response is governed by rules: what it is acceptable to do when the
adultery has been discovered, how long one can behave in such a way, and how long one can
“punish” an adulterer for their actions before society begins to label those punishments
“unreasonable.”
Common adultery is therefore the marital equivalent of a festival: an apparent breach of
the prohibitions involved in marriage that simultaneously breaches nothing. While the adulterous
husband may, on the surface, break the terms of his marriage contract by engaging in an affair,
the expectation of such a possibility is integrated into the contract itself; as Tony Tanner argues
in Adultery in the Novel: Contract and Transgression, contracts are created in part through their
associated transgressions, and marriage and adultery define each other. Intimacy fictionalizes this
through the narrator’s portrayal of his marriage in that he considers his adulterous acts of
betrayal to be a necessary part of his marriage, and his string of exploits therefore do not
constitute a genuine escape from his marriage. Instead, they are incorporated within it, and as a
result they are unable to prevent him from viewing his marriage as a long, slow death.
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Bataille speaks at length about transgression within the context of interpersonal
relationships, and in particular suggests that this incorporation is due to the very nature of love.
Specifically, he discusses marriage in terms of “deep love” and posits that it may not be possible
to maintain such a love “without the contagion of illicit love, the only kind able to give love a
greater force than that of law” (112). Yet Tanner’s description of marriage and adultery suggests
that both are governed by contracts and may shed some light on why adultery is not a panacea
for waning feelings in a relationship. It is impossible to truly escape the contract of marriage by
entering into the subcontract of adultery when “anywhere the commitment to monogamy reigns,
adultery provides its structural transgression” (Kipnis 15). In short: by committing an adulterous
act in an attempt to escape their marriage, the adulterer is simultaneously dooming that very
same effort, closing the door on escape from the marriage contract.
While Intimacy is but one of many texts to illustrate this aspect of adultery or depict the
adulterer as he strives to justify his behavior to his audience, the narrator’s view of infidelity as
the lesser betrayal is more unconventional. Specifically, despite the agony he has caused his wife
through his chain of infidelities and regardless of the pain he is likely to cause his children by
abandoning the family, the narrator positions remaining in the marriage as the greater act of
infidelity. At the heart of such a claim is the belief that remaining in his marriage would require
that he lie about who he is—that it would be unfaithful to his desires and, therefore, to his true
self. As a result, the narrator suggests that it is worse not to be oneself in the relationship than it
is to find a sexual or romantic connection outside of it.
The narrator does experience a degree of uncertainty, but it is ultimately with this
justification firmly in place that he finally makes the decision to leave his marriage in favor of
pursuing the relationship at the center of his affair. This does not make the narrator a particularly
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sympathetic character even during the depictions of his more uncertain moments when he wavers
in his choice to finally leave his marriage. During those moments, he is afraid, plagued by what
he describes as the feeling of sitting in a plunging airplane, the urge to scream, and the bodily
manifestations of his nerves and his doubts, which he ultimately compares to the effects of a fatal
wound: “A nerve in my eye is throbbing. My hands seem to be shaking. I feel hollow and my
nerves raw, as if I have been pierced by something fatal. My body knows what is going on. If I
am frightened now I will feel worse tomorrow, and the day after, and the day after that. All this,
in the name of some kind of liberation” (23).
Yet despite this, there is barely any doubt that he will continue with his decision, even as
he positions his choice to leave as a sacrifice. Perhaps this is because any moments of indecision
are never truly about the effects of his actions on the lives of the people around him; they do not
concern his wife nor his children, though he eventually admits he will miss them. Instead, they
concern the need to be brave. The betrayal involved in leaving his wife is justified in his mind
because it is not simply a matter of passion or desire but of life and death. To stay in his current
relationship, even to the degree that he has, strikes him as being akin to committing suicide (14).
Thus, his repeated acts of adultery and, now, his abandonment of his marriage are
simultaneously betrayals and necessary actions in the effort to save a life—his own: “Perhaps
every day should contain at least one essential infidelity or necessary betrayal. It would be an
optimistic, hopeful act, guaranteeing belief in the future—a declaration that things can be not
only different but better” (Kureishi 6; emphasis added).
Underpinning all of this is a view of love that privileges passion as a way of being true to
oneself. Such a construct of love does not require sustained effort—that is, it is not “work”—
because one should not need to work at being oneself. As such, Kipnis suggests that “happy”
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states of monogamy are by definition ones in which work is not required, and she positions
companionate love, the maintenance of which is often said to require effort, as being highly
undesirable. 8 Indeed, once effort enters into fidelity, she suggests it becomes “alienated,
routinized, [and] deadening” (Against Love 17). Phillips takes this idea one step further when he
asserts that it is impossible to sustain a relationship simply by working on it: “it is no more
possible to work at a relationship than it is to will an erection, or to arrange to have a dream. . . .
the good things only come when [effort] stops—affection, curiosity, desire, unworrying
attention” (62). However, none of this enables the adulterous lover to break the marriage
contract—not the refusal to work at a relationship nor the mental gymnastics that the narrator
uses in Intimacy in order to justify his behavior. It could be said that his decision to dissolve his
marriage is in reality the decision to maintain what that marriage was meant to protect:
monogamy. By cheating and then leaving, the narrator is simply playing by the rules.

Breaking the Rules
If adultery constitutes a bounded transgression of the marriage contract, this raises the
question of how one might escape those boundaries to engage in boundless transgression. When
Bataille discusses moments of boundless transgression, he relies on terms such as disorder,

8

In his triangular theory of love, psychologist Robert Sternberg describes the various types of
love in terms of the amount of passion, intimacy, and commitment they involve. Companionate
love is described as a love which is driven by more intimacy and commitment than passion. He
suggests that in western courtships, passion is often a motivating factor for the earlier stages of
loving relationship but that it is natural and likely that many relationships ultimately become
more companionate as time passes and passion fades. Kipnis’s unflattering portrayal of
companionate love can therefore be viewed as further evidence of the privileging of passion in
her formulation of love and closely resembles what Sternberg suggests about contemporary
views of love: consummate love (containing roughly equal measures of passion, intimacy, and
commitment) is not only the contemporary ideal but also the expectation.
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rupture, and frenzy. Such transgression exists without limits beyond those of duration; within a
set period, transgressive behavior supersedes any rules meant to contain it within the boundaries
of the contract. Providing the example of the death of a king whose social position was supposed
to guarantee his safety, he suggests the result is a disorder that “knows no bounds” (66) and is
both violent and sacrilegious in nature:
When [man] confined the violent urges of his own nature within bounds he thought he
had done the same for the violence in the world outside himself. But when he saw how
ineffectual was the barrier he had sought to set up against violence, the rules he had
meant to observe himself lost their significance. His suppressed urges were unleashed,
thenceforth he killed without hesitation, ceased to control the sexual exuberance and
feared no longer to perform publicly and unrestrainedly acts which hitherto he only
performed in private. (67)
Such transgression without bounds involves a disregard for and a suspension of
boundaries and consequences, with the suspension coming as a direct result of the disregard. To
return to “Totem and Taboo,” taboos persist because of the observant subject’s anxiety; we
observe the taboo not because of any external threat of punishment but because the knowledge of
the taboo’s forbidden nature is accompanied by the assumption of catastrophic consequences
were we to disregard it. In this way, the taboo, much as the love story, is perpetuated largely
because of the self-policing subject. This contrasts with the bounded transgression (the festival),
where the taboo’s suspension is initiated and governed from without. However, even here
transgression is portrayed as a temporary state: it ends once the king’s body has fully
decomposed. As a result, boundless transgression in Bataille still contains temporal boundaries
even as it exists outside of its contract.
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If eroticism, as Bataille suggests, is indeed a “desire that triumphs over the taboo,” its act
of triumph requires it take the form of boundless transgression but its transgressive nature also
requires that force of desire be temporary (256). At the same time, it is through such boundless
transgression—both in eroticism and following the death of the king—that we once again
encounter the language Barthes uses to describe the emergence of the lover’s discourse. Much as
the figures, “underlying eroticism is the feeling of something bursting, of the violence
accompanying an explosion” (Bataille 93). Bataille gives a nuanced example of such a state, in
which the details of the desiring subject and the transgressive even layer upon themselves and
highlight the differences between bounded and boundless transgressions:
A rush of blood upsets the balance on which life is based. A madness suddenly takes
possession of a person. That madness is well-known to us but we can easily picture the
surprise of anyone who did not know about it and who by some device witnesses unseen
the passionate lovemaking of some woman who had struck him as particularly
distinguished. He would think she was sick, just as mad dogs are sick. Just as if some
mad bitch had usurped the personality of the dignified hostess of a little while back.
Sickness is not putting it strongly enough, though; for the time being the personality is
dead. For the time being its death gives the bitch full scope, and she takes advantage of
the silence, of the absence of the dead woman. The bitch wallows – wallows noisily – in
that silence and in that absence. The return of the personality would freeze her and put an
end to the sensual delight she has abandoned herself to. (106)
That this experience is unsanctioned is important. Much as in the case of the dead king,
this transgressive state comes upon the woman suddenly and organically rather than according to
the schedule of a festival. As a result, the specifics of this instance could not be bound within the
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text of the contract. While the madness is first said to affect “a person,” the fact that it possesses
a distinguished and dignified woman is also significant; each of these characteristics—her
gender, her manner, and her reputation—position the hostess as someone from whom such
behavior would be completely unexpected. Bataille’s description then moves beyond the
common language of illness associated with love and passionate desire, instead proceeding to
first dehumanize her (she is a dog, then a “mad bitch”), to describe her personality as dead and
silent, and to finally render the woman herself as both dead and absent, replaced with the “mad
bitch” as a separate entity.
All of this is meant to describe the force of desire that makes transgression possible—the
“passionate lovemaking” of a distinguished woman. In this scene, she is completely
unrecognizable. For her to be recognizable would require that she relinquish her passion. It
would end the transgressive moment. Yet this is not necessarily because the distinguished woman
is not truly herself in this scene despite her linguistic transformation into a dog. All of this is
witnessed by a specifically masculine-gendered “anyone” who, through his difference, remains
external to the woman’s experience. He cannot know it for himself, though he presumes to do so
in order to encode it with meaning, and it is to him that she is unrecognizable.
Therefore, this is a distinction between acceptable “transgression”—in quotation marks,
built into the contract, and not actually transgressing anything—and the gendered transgression
that is so disturbing it cannot be the direct object of our gaze. We can also see it in the cultural
expectation that men are more desiring of adulterous affairs, a belief that could be positioned as
the simultaneous cause, symptom, and result of a contract that is built to include the relative
acceptability of men’s infidelity. In short: men’s cheating is so integrated into the marital
contract as its bounded transgression, especially when the “other woman” is coded as holding no
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emotional significance, that as a result it is often hardly transgressive at all.

The Transgressive Husband in I Love Dick
If male adultery is so written into our narratives about marriage that it has lost its
transgressive power, one must ask how a man might still enter into a state of boundless
transgression of the marriage contract. When it comes to the question of whether adultery and
extramarital desire can be the scene of such an act, we can recall Phillips’s description of
mapping danger as a central task in the practice of monogamy while also considering the specific
position granted to adultery within the marriage contract. Phillips accurately suggests that
romantic relationship is established and maintained in part through external objects of desire.
This is not quite equivalent to René Girard’s concept of mimetic desire, where the love object
gains value through the existence of a desiring rival, but it does suggest a similarly triangular
structure of relationship. According to Phillips, “coupledom is a sustained resistance to the
intrusion of third parties the couple needs to sustain the third parties in order to go on resisting
them . . . after all, what would they do together if no one else was there? How would they know
what to do?” (Monogamy 94). Here, the third party does not provide value as much as structure.
The direction of the desire—from third party to spouse or from spouse to third party—is not
specified, nor is it crucially important. What is vital, however, is that the desire exists so that it
can be the resisted: so that the dangerous spaces can be identified and noted—mapped. As a
result, the transgressive potential exists in wrecking the balance between sustaining the third
party and resisting him. To refuse to resist the apparent disruption of the contract, to exhibit no
impulses to protect or preserve it despite (rather than because of) loving feeling, is an action that
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is not written into the contract. Akin to idly standing by and watching the robbers raid your
storehouse, such a response goes against all expectations of how to behave in married life.
Chris Kraus’s 1997 book I Love Dick portrays an imbalance between sustaining and
resisting the third party in desire. A text separated into two parts, it opens with “Scenes from a
Marriage,” the first scene of which begins with Chris and her husband Sylvère having dinner
with one of his acquaintances, Dick, who has generously invited them to spend the night at his
house after dinner. That night house does not culminate in a tryst or the beginning of an affair.
Instead, Chris and Sylvère wake on the couch to find Dick gone from the house, and they return
home themselves. Yet this scene, so banal that it features breakfast at an IHOP, enables more
powerful transgression than an affair an ultimately leads to the death of the marriage. While the
narration suggests there was little more between Dick and Chris than some drunken flirting and
her holding her tongue about the quality of his film, Chris tells Sylvère that she believes she and
Dick have shared what she labels “a Conceptual Fuck” (22). Rather than resist the triangle Chris
works to establish through such a label, Sylvère—initially not seeming to take her feelings
seriously—invites her to further close the distance between her and Dick by beginning to write
letters to him. More than this, to help her get started he writes one first.
This sets the tone for the rest of the first part of the text, which is largely populated by
Chris and Sylvère’s writing to and about Dick. It is initially not quite clear which letters they
send to Dick and which they keep to themselves as though they were writing in a journal with
Dick’s name. It is clear, however, that Sylvère leaves Dick several messages, none of which
Dick returns. Because Sylvère also is the first to write a letter to Dick, he is ultimately the one to
instigate each attempt to narrow the distance between Dick and the couple. Dick does not write
back, and his continued silence enables Chris and Sylvère to write into the space of his absence,
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providing that silence with meaning and holding one-sided conversations with him, a man that
neither of them knows well enough to even guess at a hypothetical reply. The result, then, is that
the marriage is overrun by desire, becoming an impossible love triangle despite the fact that the
third party refuses to enter into the relationship in reality.
While most scholarship about I Love Dick understandably focuses on Chris’s feelings and
letters toward their silent recipient, I suggest it is Sylvère’s engagement in and encouragement of
his wife’s infatuation for another man that could be seen as exiting the bounds of the marriage
contract. This is no mere adulterous dream; Sylvère does not demonstrate any sign of having
fantasies about his wife with another man, nor does he seem to be interested in having sex with
Dick himself. He also does not seem to genuinely want Chris to have an affair. Indeed, any of
these scenarios would remove much of the transgressive potential from the text. Yet despite this,
Sylvère’s letters are arguably more transgressive than Chris’s. While her writing initially
contains the expected missives that would be written by a nervously infatuated individual to the
largely unknown object of their desire, Sylvère’s first letter contains a closing paragraph that
would have been more expected in Chris’s instead. He writes: “I want to talk about that evening
at your house. I had a feeling that somehow I knew you and we could just be what we are
together. But now I’m sounding like the bimbo whose voice we heard, unwittingly, that night on
your answerphone…” (26). The text never clarifies just what he means by this statement. There
is no complete description of what he believes he and Dick could be to one another, of what
exactly is at risk of not “working out.” Instead, Sylvère places himself in a strange position vis-àvis Dick through his vague descriptions of how he felt during the night of their meeting, which
he frames as a moment of accurate recognition of his and Dick’s significance to one another.
This is a connection he contextualizes only by comparing his missive to the message a young
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woman, Kyla, left for Dick: an apology for repeatedly calling and for things not “working out”
the other night, her suggestion that Dick is a nice guy and her statement of forgiveness. From the
reader’s position, the message is coded as one potential response to a sexual tryst gone awry,
particularly after Dick mumbles about his embarrassment at having it be overheard. However,
ultimately it will contain many similarities to Sylvère’s position to a silent Dick—a man to
whom Sylvère has repeatedly reached out and with whom things have not “worked out” by the
end of the book despite their apparent continued working relationship.
The text itself highlights the unusual nature of Sylvère’s behavior, with Sylvère himself
asking: “Do married couples usually collaborate on billets doux?” (25). While Sylvère’s use of
the term suggests he is being playful at that moment, the second letter to Dick seems entirely
serious. There, Sylvère admits to potentially wanting to be like Dick before explaining his
behavior in terms of jealousy, specifically the feelings of jealousy that he does not have:
I guess in some dark corner of my mind I realized if I wasn’t going to be jealous, my only
choice was to enter this fictional liaison in a sort of perverse fashion. How else could I
take my wife having a crush on you? The thoughts that come to mind are pretty
distasteful: ménage à trois, the willing husband…all three of us are too sophisticated to
deal in such dreary archetypes. Were we trying to open up new ground? . . . The fact that
you don’t return messages turns your answerphone into a blank screen onto which we can
project our fantasies. (29)
While the archetypes he describes would not be particularly transgressive—they are established,
old ground, codified into tropes—the depth of Sylvère’s involvement in fostering his spouse’s
burgeoning desire for another man may indeed be quite transgressive. More than simply writing
his own letters to Dick, Sylvère is also closely involved in Chris’s letters, typing them for her

38

and providing his feedback. While she may ignore his suggestions regarding the content of her
letters, the fact that he is the one writing the letters literally inserts him into her missives. Her
thoughts are forced to pass through her husband in order to get to Dick, and it is worth
considering what degree of shared authorship Sylvère has over not just the letters but also over
the extramarital relationship that they encourage and encode. For example, Sylvère himself
aligns himself with Chris’s position even as he tells Dick he fantasizes about being him. He
suggests that they had written their letters in a such a state that they were akin to “masturbatory
passion,” that both he and Chris had “caught the Western bug. Your [Dick’s] bug” (34-5).
The specific nature of Sylvère’s desires are never made explicit in the text, but if the
information we do have can be taken at face value, it appears that there has been a transmission
not of affect but of the force of feeling that accompanies Chris’s desire. I allude here to Teresa
Brennen’s book, The Transmission of Affect, which discusses the way that feelings can be
passed, virus-like, from one person to the next. In this case, however, it is not the affective
content of Chris’s experience that has transferred or been transmitted to her husband. It is merely
the strength. Thus, Sylvère eventually writes: “Dear Dick I think you won. I’m totally obsessed
with you. Chris will be driving across America. We have to talk this over” (37). While it is
possible that Sylvère means little to nothing of what he writes and perhaps likely that he never
intended for Dick to see his letters (as he was astounded when Chris gave Dick copies of them),
one must ask how much this would ultimately matter. In the end, his behavior continues to upend
any balanced distance between their coupledom and Dick, the third. By the time Sylvère yearns
for that distance, it is far too late.
Sylvère finds himself longing for the acceptable, safe confines of their marriage contract
as Chris’s desire continues to spin out of control. He expresses this in the form of a short story
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that he knows Chris will read rather than speaking to her directly: “Sylvère also longed for an
elegant conclusion to this adventure; didn’t the form dictate that Chris end up in Dick’s arms?
And it would end there. Dick and Chris wouldn’t need to ever do this again; Sylvère would never
have to know” (67). Sylvère’s desire here is for a transition from their current situation to a state
of bounded transgression. He desires the same “dreary archetypes” he derided in one of his first
letters to Dick, the sort of marital transgression dictated and controlled through the very marriage
contract: adultery instead of this inelegant obsession that he himself stoked and enabled.
Sylvère does not get what he wants. Instead, it is not much later that Chris gives their
letters to Dick, who graciously promises to read them. This promise is more damaging to their
marriage than an act of adultery would have been. Whereas before, Chris and Sylvère were able
to speak to one another by addressing Dick, Dick’s promise constitutes the destruction of the
structure that they had created, where Chris and Sylvère seemed to bond in the space of his
absence. While their joint letters had initially been a self-indulgent, self-absorbed exercise for
Sylvère, that Chris delivers them to Dick dissolves the illusion that she shared the sense of
intimacy Sylvère experienced. In short, while for Sylvère the letters were largely to one another
about Dick, for Chris the letters were ultimately to Dick, even in the moments where she and
Sylvère addressed one another in writing.
It is no surprise that Chris and Sylvère’s marriage dissolves soon after. Instead, Chris
reconsiders the context of their relationship and the sacrifices it required of her in order to
support Sylvère, his career, and his desires: “she remembered all the times they’d worked
together when her name had been omitted . . . She remembered the abortions, all the holidays
she’d been told to leave the house so Sylvère could be alone with his daughter. In ten years,
she’d erased herself” (116). I am not attempting to blame Chris and Sylvère’s separation on
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Dick. It is apparent that their relationship had already been troubled, even before they inserted
Dick into their marriage. However, I would suggest that Sylvère’s refusal to recognize the danger
Chris’s desire for Dick’s represented to their union sped their arrival to a crisis. It is in contrast to
Dick’s promise to read what she has written with Sylvère, a deliberate act of acknowledgement,
that Sylvère’s previous behavior becomes unacceptable.
Earlier in the text, Chris and Sylvère briefly transition from writing Dick to writing to one
another, opting to do so rather than speaking to each other out loud. During this conversation,
Sylvère asks Chris what would have happened if Dick had been willing to have sex with her
when they met. The answer is rooted in bounded transgression:
C: I would’ve fucked him once and then he’d never call.
S: But what makes all this legitimate is that you didn’t. What thinking about it’s
brought up is the essential thing. (64)
Sylvère does not realize just how accurate his statement is in this moment. Whereas previously,
their marriage did not include space for Chris to recognize her desires or to be recognized by
Sylvère or by others, the combination of Dick’s silence and Sylvère’s refusal to mind the dangers
of unchecked desire provided this space of exploration. It is ultimately unimportant that Chris’s
desire for Dick never moves beyond fantasy or that Dick ultimately responds to their letters with
a blunt rejection. The very lack of a sexual encounter between Dick and Chris combined with
Sylvère’s refusal to map the danger her desire represents to their marriage is what enables her
desire to escape being bounded—enables it to be legitimately transgressive—and ultimately
leads to divorce.
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Boundless Transgression in My Education
Attempting to create a sense of the lover’s discourse within the shape of a novel requires
that such narratives straddle a careful line. In contrast to nineteenth century heroes,
whom Peter Brooks describes as “desiring machines” whose presence in the text creates and
sustains narrative movement through the forward march of desire” (39), characters who love
wildly rather than conform to the requirements of the love story must experience a moment of
suspension in the space before what Bataille considers “the return of the personality”: the
moment before his “distinguished woman” ceases to resemble a mad dog and could be returned
to her place in society. Before the return of the personality, during a period of boundless
transgression, the lover instead seems to exist under the control of an explosive, uncontainable
passion. If the “love story” defined by Barthes requires that feelings of passion be constrained
through language, transgression without bounds must then exist outside of the story as well.
Susan Choi’s My Education is a novel that works to portray both transgression without
bounds and, later, the bounded state of adultery’s anti-contract. The novel is split into two
sections, each labeled simply by the year in which their contents occur. In the first, the
protagonist, a young graduate student named Regina, is quickly warned about one of her
professors, Nicholas, who is notorious for his sexual exploits with his students. The text fully
creates the framework for the expected adulterous plot. Regina begins the book enveloped in the
expected brand of lust typically reserved in narratives for relatively inexperienced young women
who desire older men in positions of power. As she slowly grows closer to Nicholas, first
becoming his teaching assistant and then coming to his house, his unhappy marriage looms
quietly in the background. Yet despite this framework, it is ultimately with Nicholas’s wife,
another professor named Martha, that Regina becomes wildly infatuated. Similarly, it is also with
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Regina that Martha enters into the sustained illicit relationship that lies at the center of the
majority of the novel.
That Martha represents a disruptive force is gestured toward early in the text though the
introduction, though not in so blatant a way that it troubles the assumptive reading of her as the
wronged wife of a chronically adulterous man. In fact, our first exposure to Martha corresponds
with the moment that Regina initially comes in closer contact to Nicholas by enrolling in one of
his courses. Heavily pregnant and coming up the stairs shortly after Regina, Martha quickly
demonstrates her ability to overpower her husband, who at the time Regina and the reader
believe to be fairly unflappable: “Without pausing, she threw a look at [Nicholas] that seemed to
land on him like a grenade. Then she passed out of sight. His voice, which I’d never heard falter
before, died off as if by the flip of a switch. In a beat he resumed, but a little past where he had
been” (13).
The violent imagery contained in this description—the grenade of her look that kills his
focus and his voice—is soon coupled with a description of Martha in the next paragraph when
Regina finds herself looking down at her through the window. Yet despite a fairly lengthy
description of Martha’s appearance, in the end Regina concludes that Martha is “impressive in
that way that preempts every other impression” (13). While Martha does not reappear in the plot
for some time, beginning in this moment the narrative slowly begins to curve away from the
expected adultery plot through the reversal of Martha and Nicholas’s expected roles. For
example, Regina learns that Nicholas is in reality shy and socially awkward (22) and that he
wanted after a child while Martha only wanted one “with an effort of will that could render
irrelevant whether she didn’t” (27).
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We find eventually that any assumptions about Martha’s domesticity are likewise
unfounded. Regina comments multiple times about the lack of decoration in Nicholas and
Martha’s house—specifically on a lack of dishtowels and of photographs—and likewise remarks
on the babysitters and nannies that ultimately take care of Martha and Nicolas’s child after he is
born. Ultimately, it becomes clear that in the married couple, Martha is the far less reserved of
the two. She is also the less desiring of reserved behavior, having “married Nicholas because she
thought he was a great deal more wicked” than he was. This last fact creates a point of similarity
between her and Regina, whose desire for Nicholas was also caused by the same inaccurate
initial impressions.
Regina’s infatuation with Martha still shocks her. Likewise, it may also surprise the
reader. It hits suddenly after Regina gets drunk at a disastrous dinner party at Nicholas and
Martha’s house. Wandering throughout the house, she ultimately happens upon Martha with two
of the other guests, and Martha’s seemingly innocent question of if Regina had been looking for
her causes her desire to strike her: “I hadn’t been, yet it came to me now that in fact I’d been
looking for her the whole evening. In the startling disorder of her kitchen, on the dining room’s
shrill battleground” (54). The adulterous relationship begins almost immediately after that, but it
does not do so using the expected plot points of a young woman infatuated by someone else’s
older, more experienced spouse. To the contrary, the contrast of Regina’s first moments alone
with Martha and the previous pages between her and Nicholas could not be sharper. Although
Regina had been shy and somewhat unsure in the face of her feelings for Nicholas, Martha, who
more closely resembles the person she thought Nicholas to be, arouses both hunger and
impatience in her. During their first moments alone, Martha almost seems to mimic Regina’s
juvenile behavior from earlier in the text, acting as though she does not recognize their mutual
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flirtations as what they are. Meanwhile, Regina, who is suddenly overcome by ravenous passion,
quickly becomes the aggressor:
Appetite knows what it craves, without cerebral embellishment. It tends not to waste any
time laying hold of its tools. That was the thing I had recognized here: appetite. I
recognized it precisely because, in a context like this, it was so unfamiliar. It had forced
me to rule out everything else. And there was a second reason for my recognition, which
because unprecedented was not recognition at all, but astounding discovery: Martha’s
face told me. I saw appetite there, even more as she dithered, even more as she festooned
our electrification with bunting and baffles and coy indirection like throwing so much
laundry onto the line. (54; emphasis added)
Appetite is a theme that threads itself throughout the ensuing affair as both women are
swept along by each other. This is especially true for Regina, whose sensibilities often seem
completely overwhelmed by the force of her passions and who frequently seems to be left a
purely desiring subject in its wake. Not completely unlike Bataille’s formerly distinguished
woman, she willingly loses herself in this state, “wallowing” in her hunger for her new lover. In
one scene, this hunger takes the form of literal consumption: Martha, still lactating after the birth
of her son, becomes engorged due to how much time she has spent with Regina and away from
her infant son. Having discovered this, Regina’s impulse is to consume the milk from both of
Martha’s breasts, in part to offer Martha relief but also on a quest to satisfy her own enduring
hunger for Martha: “I sucked on the nipple until, with a shocking mechanical suddenness, like a
showerhead being turned on, her hot milk filled my mouth. It queasily tasted of vegetation, and
of her, but mostly and sickeningly of itself, but I was so hungry for the taste it obscured, of her
flesh, that I gulped it down just to get past it” (86).
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Although the image of the lover who steals a mother’s milk from her baby draws heavily
on taboos, one could argue that the transgression—specifically the “transgression without
bounds”—of their extramarital relationship also relies on their genders and the queerness
involved in their coupling. With the exception of the formerly distinguished woman, the desiring
woman has no place as subject in Bataille’s theories of eroticism and its related transgression.
Instead, all of Bataille’s formulations involve a male subject. In fact, within the framework
Bataille creates, positioning the masculine subject in relation to a woman who is also an
independent subject represents a struggle between subjects and, as such, destruction. Thus,
Bataille focuses only on the figure of a woman who is “the dead object . . . the infinitely
available object” (124) and on whose body and reactions the masculine subject can read the
evidence of his transgression. In particular, his transgression is identified and defined in terms of
apparent negative feeling, not about the male subject but about herself. As Suzanne Guerlac
suggests, “the woman's shame, real or play-acted (jouée), is read as a sign of transgression and to
this extent signifies eroticism itself” (92).
In positioning the woman as the mirror on which transgression can be seen, Bataille
necessarily also requires that her loss of rationality and personality precede that of the masculine
subject’s. Judith Sturkis discusses this in her essay, “No Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an
Eye: Transgression and Masculinity in Bataille and Foucault,” outlining the timeline inherent in
this formulation of the erotic and transgression. She argues not only that subjecthood must be
barred from the feminine initially but that her loss of subjecthood must be complete, whereas the
masculine subject can by definition only partially lose himself in the process of transgressing:
"In order for the masculine side to lose himself, the passive, feminine side must be always
already dissolved as a continuous being: her loss initiates his fall into continuity. In the
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meantime, the masculine partner is only ‘relatively dissolved,’ remaining ‘discontinuous’ enough
to derive meaning and sense from her imaged annihilation” (20). This is required because, much
as the male witness viewed the previously distinguished woman, erotic transgression requires
that the onlooker must remain lucid enough to recognize the evidence that transgression has
occurred or is occurring. It “posits a distance and difference between partners in order to permit
the presentation of an image or ‘evidence’ of transgression” (21). This moment of presentation
and subsequent recognition, where the male subject simultaneously assigns meaning onto the
feminine object’s body and reads himself through that meaning, is a requirement of eroticism,
and therefore the woman’s total loss of self—her transition from subject into object—is also
necessary.
That their genders affect the shape of their engagement in this way is something that
Regina recognizes only long after the adulterous relationship has ended. While at the time, she
believed that their genders were irrelevant to their experience, in hindsight she recognizes that
gender was critical. It affected not the fact that she loved Martha but the shape and form of that
love:
I now see that the form our love took was fundamentally girlish. The gender-blindness I
sensed did apply to the content: I didn’t love Martha for being a woman, and I would
have loved her no less had Shakespearean whim turned her into a man. So much for the
reasons for love, if such even exist. But the way that I loved, and the way she loved me . .
. we might as well have been sylphs capering through the glade, crowned with daisy
tiaras and trailing lace rags. (60)
Apart from the importance she assigns their individual genders in the form of their love,
the fact that theirs is a queer desire could also be seen as relevant. Leo Bersani provides a
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relevant rereading of Aristophanes’s tale in Plato’s Symposium in his article, “Sociality and
Sexuality,” where he considers the significance of queerness in the forms of Aristophanes’s
original humans’ bodies. Specifically, the fact that two of the three bodily configurations in the
myth involve same sex couplings is critical to Bersani; in such cases, he argues “what the lover
lacks is identical to what he is. It is more of what he is. This is a lack based, not on difference (as
in the view of Eros desiring that which is different from it, the beautiful and the good that it is
not), but rather on the extensibility of sameness” (656). Considered in tandem with Bataille,
Bersani’s exploration of same sex love gains extra significance. Regina and Martha’s illicit
relationship is one in which there is no male gaze to impose meaning on their bodies as they
transgress taboos. Neither woman dons either of the roles in Bataille’s formulation with any
regularity. The result is that neither Regina nor Martha is reduced to the dead object on which the
transgression of eroticism can be read by the other. Instead, the significance of their actions is
gleaned from the evidence they see of their mutual hunger in the living, desiring subject opposite
them, and each woman becomes overwhelmed by her appetite for the other while also
recognizing the force of both of their desires.
Like all acts of transgression, Regina and Martha’s relationship is bounded by time. It
ends when Martha sleeps with Regina’s closest friend in a move that ultimately shatters the allconsuming relationships in this section of the novel. While this breaks the relationship, it does
not end their hunger. Indeed, while there are a few final encounters between the two of them in
“1992,” none of them are sustaining. Instead, the lovers channel the same strength of their
passion into violence: for example, a brawl on the street that results in Regina nearly being
arrested or Martha’s banging on the door in a rage when she discovers that Regina is now staying
with Nicholas. Regina suggests that her living with Nicholas is a symptom of her misplacement,
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recalling: “I misplaced myself. I was not even lost, a condition which still retains something
intended. There can be vigor in ‘lost’” (198). That it is winter, a barren season, somehow
underscores and emphasizes Regina’s condition as she ultimately loses enough weight that it
ultimately becomes remarkable.
Nicholas is, somewhat surprisingly, the one who attempts to nourish her. She and
Nicholas finally tumble into bed, passionate until the reality of their sex descends upon them. As
with Martha, Regina once again describes sex in terms of appetite: “There, in his barely
furnished, abject, wifeless sleeping loft . . . our hunger forsook us. It departed so quickly, we’d
never know what sort of hunger, whether for Martha, or vengeance, or even each other, it was”
(206). Through the description of Nicholas’s living space as “wifeless,” Martha is inserted into
the scene through her very absence. Returning to Bersani, one might suggest it is Nicholas’s very
difference that renders it impossible for Regina to maintain her sexual appetite, something that
does not return during her stay with him despite the fact that they continue to sleep with one
another throughout that time. 9
Nicholas’s main fault throughout the text appears to be in large part his difference: for
Martha, that he is dissimilar to the lovers she had sex with in the past. For Regina, his failing is
simply that he is not Martha. Each woman, however, uses him in an ultimately failed attempt to
“distract from the niggling distance she felt” (118). In the context of this failure, it is perhaps less
surprising that Martha views the state of her marriage to be the cause of her affair rather than the
affair to be the reason her marriage is in such a state. Indeed, much as the narrator in Intimacy,
Martha used a chain of sexual partners as a supplement to her marriage, attempting to combine
9

In a play on words, one might suggest that Regina finds sex with Nicholas to be particularly
unsatisfying: she recalls that she never came close to orgasm with him.
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marriage and extramarital sex as a panacea. 10 In the aftermath of the affair, Martha similarly
seems to be falling apart. The next time Martha and Regina meet, Martha is “dressed in her soursmelling pool-playing jeans and unraveling sweater and cracked bomber jacket as if she’d been
out not all night but for months, on the streets…seeing her so besmirched and exposed I felt
choked with fresh love and hatred for her, that she’d so thoroughly ruined herself in my heart, by
design and beyond all repair” (190). While this scene has struck Regina mute, her silence clears
the way for Martha to fall apart, revealing that the end to their relationship was brought about by
the intrusion of difference into Martha’s understanding of who they were and how they fit
together. She tells Regina, “I don’t think you ever understood—could have understood—how
different my life is from yours. You’re twenty-one, Regina” (191). It is this—both the difference
and the ravages it has wrought on their affair—that first brings about an unidentified emotion
that momentarily “distorted her face” and then, finally, heralds her emotional collapse, the end
point of their transgression: “She wept and raged at me…At last, solitary and wronged, she
turned her back on me. ‘I get it…No one drinks with the bitch. The bitch drinks by herself’”
(191).

The Bounding of Transgression
While there was no reunion for Regina and Martha in the first section of the novel, the
second, which takes place a decade and a half later, ultimately draws them back together. Unlike
their earlier affair, however, Regina and Martha’s reunion leads to a single sexual encounter, one
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The bounded nature of Martha’s previous transgressions is underscored by the fact that they
were explicitly sanctioned as an aspect of their relationship. It is not until Regina that there is
ultimately an issue, and this manifests itself not in Nicholas’s rage at having been cuckolded but
instead in Martha’s telling him to leave their home.
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which Martha repeats can lead to “no permanent damage” (286). This statement is layered with
meaning. While the second utterance of this promise is in result to a wound, her having split
Regina’s lip in her passion in a gesture toward the consuming nature of their passion previously,
the first is in response to discovering that Regina is in the early stages of a pregnancy, something
she senses but that no one else—including the reader—had discovered before that point. While
one might read this promise not to do lasting damage literally as a reminder that they must be
careful in order to preserve the pregnancy, it also represents a refusal to repeat history by vowing
to preserve Regina’s life outside of their tryst. Their earlier transgression 15 years ago was one
that laid waste to their way of life at the time due to its boundless destruction of contracts,
damaging everyone involved in the process.
While Regina never shares the overall state of her marriage with the reader, her husband
and son’s responses to her leaving to see Martha suggest that there are indeed cracks waiting to
be exploited. In particular, her husband, Matthew, seems to expect the impending transgression
without knowing how damning it will be. Regina recounts their parting only after flying across
the country away from Matthew, and the resulting shift in the narrative into the past perfect tense
puts him still further behind her:
Matthew had kissed me lightly, with dry lips. Neither punishment nor promise in
them, as if to say That’s up to you.
“I love you,” I’d said. “I’ll see you next week.”
“I love you,” he’d only responded, only certain that that much was true. (282,
emphasis original)
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Their son likewise seems to doubt her return, clinging to her and chanting “I want to keep
you forever. I want to keep you forever. I want to keep you forever.” While this could be a simple
reflection of the insecurities of his young age, the combination of this and Matthew’s uncertainty
creates the sense that history may be in the process of repeating itself. Strikingly, Regina’s life in
this section of the novel is not unlike Martha’s in the preceding one. Both are roughly the same
age. Both have a very young son, live a life of the mind (Martha as a professor, Regina as a
writer using a professor friend’s office), and throw a dinner party early in their respective
sections of the text. While the specific state of Regina and Matthew’s marriage is unclear—her
narration makes no value judgments on that matter—even their arguments follow a similar
pattern as those in Martha and Nicholas’s marriage.
It is from within this context that we hear Martha’s remarks on Regina’s pregnancy and
that we must later view her behavior during their singular sex act, both her refusal to aid in their
undressing and in the way she stares into Regina’s eyes. Regina recounts:
her eyes never left mine, studying [my face] with such peculiar absorption I almost as
though all the years of my life she had missed must be on display there, like a silent
movie, so that by the time we were finished, and her furnishings probably really done for,
she would have come to the end of the movie as well, and would know the whole story
far better than I could have told her. (286)
Yet when they are finished, the furnishings are not damaged. The transgression is designed to be
one that is if not acceptable within the bounds of Regina’s marriage then at least capable of
leaving the marriage in a salvageable state, and the end of the novel sees Regina returning home
to her family only 10 pages later. Much like Regina’s family life more generally, it is never made
clear what state the family will be in when she returns—whether or not there has truly been “no
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permanent damage” or if there will be consequences to her adultery. Regina’s bloodied lip will
heal, though not before she returns home to her family, a mark of evidence to make obscuring
her behavior far more difficult.
Considering once more the connections between marriage, adultery, and transgression, a
return to Phillips and Kipnis’s discussions of marriage and adultery provide some external
context for My Education’s conclusion. Recall that according to Phillips, the transgression of
infidelity promises a false danger, enticing the subject with assumptions of excitement or of an
emotional vacation into passionate interest. This is one way to supplement long term
relationships; “people have relationships not because they want to feel safe—though they often
think they do—but because they want to find out what the danger is” (Phillips 34). Catherine
Belsey comes to a similar conclusion in Desire: Love Stories in Western Culture, where she
considers the role of desire and the contract of marriage, suggesting that it is in the very nature of
desire to escape—or transgress—the structures created by society to contain it: “The vocabulary
of true love, with its vows and contracts, its controls and complacencies, suppresses this
heterogeneity, which returns as forbidden desire. Marriage, litigation, or the invocation of family
values, offers what now seems only a precarious resolution” (75). Yet, adulterous encounters like
the one Martha and Regina have later in life, in their boundedness, do not create that danger. “No
lasting damage” by definition neuters the extramarital exchange, creates a puppy out of what
was, earlier in the novel, a far more ravenous animal. Thus, even if their appetites from the 1990s
remain unsated more than a decade later, their exchange, with its rules and guidelines, is unable
to satisfy that hunger.
Desire itself is slippery and difficult to define or theorize. The process of desire—of
discovering its object, chasing it, and ultimately either succeeding or failing to attain it—is often
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at the center of the novel, which can be viewed as a text that “unfold[s] as an anatomy of human
desire . . . to theorize desire and the logical consequences of its full enactment” (Brooks, Reading
for the Plot 40). Yet despite this, something is lost in creating a narrative of desire, partially
because of the imposition of the love story but also because of the translation of intense feeling
into words. Not unlike pain, it is impossible to describe the feeling of desire in such a way that
doesn’t risk seeming to cheapen it, perhaps because desire so intense that it can be called a
hunger is a form of delirious pain regardless of how much we might revel in it. It can be gestured
toward in language but, as Belsey suggests, it remains unspoken.
Although My Education is a text that ultimately works to constrain its characters’ feelings
into narrative form, it remains one that gestures toward an experience of transgression without
bounds through Regina’s admission that language and retelling cannot accurately portray the
experiences she wants to share. Regina highlights this relatively early in the text, shortly after
describing her first sexual experiences with Martha. She despairs at what she anticipates will be
an inadequate account, unhappy with the story’s inability to accurately convey intense feelings
and history: “Even now, all these years later, I pause at the brink. Any telling seems sure to
diminish, to transpose what was so overwhelming and painful into something absurd” (60).
Perhaps it is for this reason that the story she spins contains gaps and silences, not about either of
her affairs with Martha but instead in the space around it. The narrative ends ambiguously, the
reader left unsure and, in that space, without a happy ending.
Yet in terms of narrative structure, this not only leaves the reader with a sense of realism
(after all: life is not necessarily filled with happy endings, and Regina’s return home is not
necessarily an ending at all). Instead, it potentially forces the reader to mimic Regina’s state at
the end of the text. Belsey muses in “Narrative Magic: Stories and the Ways of Desire” that it is
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the very lack of a neat, happy conclusion that enables the reader’s sustained desire (82). It is
clear, considering her engagement with Martha toward the novel’s conclusion, her own desire
had not been abandoned in the first section of the novel. If Regina’s desire is meant to go on
beyond the bounds of the book, perhaps this ambivalent ending is the closest the reader can come
to the same experience: a conclusion that is simultaneously satisfying and not, and a desire that
has room to continue after the final page has been turned.
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Trauma and Transference Love:
Refusing to Recognize the Durassian Heroine
[There are] cases in which the patient has not reacted to psychic traumas because the
nature of the trauma precluded a reaction as in the case of an irremediable loss of a
beloved person or because social relations made the reaction impossible, or because it
concerned things which the patient wished to forget.
—Sigmund Freud, “The Psychic Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena”
“I’ll forget you! I’m forgetting you already! Look how I’m forgetting you! Look at me!”
—Marguerite Duras, Hiroshima Mon Amour

Marguerite Duras writes novels that, at their center, feature women who strive to navigate around
the trauma that occurs in—and often encompasses—their lives and surroundings. Although the
narratives may involve drama that plays out on the world stage, such as the effects of colonialism
or the aftermath of World War II, for the Durassian heroine, the narrative focus remains
intensely personal and frequently romantic. Ranging from Moderato Cantabile, which opens
with the witnessing of a woman’s death at the hands of her lover, to India Song, in which the
heroine searches for meaning through a series of affairs before ultimately committing suicide, for
these women, human experience is defined by the themes of love, death, sexuality, and trauma,
the combination of which is often inherently unspeakable or is forced to remain unspoken.
Two works in particular—Hiroshima Mon Amour and The Ravishment of Lol Stein—
flesh out the effects of this thematic quartet, focusing not only on the ways in which they act
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upon the heroines themselves but also on how they affect men who desire those women. 11
Wounded frequently by love and its effects, the heroines carry the echoes of their traumas within
them like walking tombs, striving to straddle their pasts and their presents in a world that sharply
delimits the options available to them. The resulting combination of hysteric symptoms and
melancholia creates ghosts out of them, and they alternate between emotive shrieks of
desperation and the seemingly self-destructive conflict inherent in melancholia’s object relations.
In response, the male lovers in both Hiroshima Mon Amour and The Ravishment of Lol
Stein engage the women in a manner that resembles what Freud labels “wild” psychoanalysis as
they attempt to become both the analyst and a site of transference in order to grow closer to the
women they desire. However, each man ultimately circumvents any possibility of a meaningful
lasting relationship by inserting himself into his beloved’s life in such a way. While the men may
succeed in encouraging close and perhaps even loving feelings, the women they desire relate to
them only within the limits of transference love as it can be seen within psychoanalysis: a love
dedicated not to the man who encourages their speech but to the echoes they find through that
speech of their own lost loves. As a result, neither lover fully engages the other, and the texts are
left to instead highlight the futility of layering another’s identity over one’s own in order to
receive love. Considered another way, both novels demonstrate the impossibility of establishing
genuine, intimate, and lasting relationship without fully allowing oneself to recognize and be
recognized by the other.

11

Although the French title is Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, the English translation omits Lol’s
middle initial. Because I am referring to that translation, I have done the same.
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The Viewer’s Transference
While psychoanalysis’s label as “the talking cure” may encourage a view of the process
that suggests it is easy to learn and perform, Freud discusses the problem posed by untrained
individuals who attempt to practice psychoanalysis in “Concerning ‘Wild’ Psychoanalysis.” He
concludes that any physician wanting to practice psychoanalysis should not only understand the
end results of the process but should also be deeply trained in the specifics of its various
techniques (par. 16). In particular, Freud highlights the importance of repression and transference
in the analytic process, asserting that the analyst must make sure “the patient has, through
preparation, himself come into the surrounding of his repression; and secondly, . . . he has
become so attached to the physician (transference) that his feeling toward the latter would make
the newer flight impossible” (par. 13). Failing to ensure both conditions have been achieved
ultimately prevents the analyst’s intervention from reaching an ideal conclusion: a cure. Without
the first, the patient’s resistance may impede his progress, and without adequate transference the
patient might simply end the therapeutic relationship because of his resistance.
Freud suggests that as a result of this incomplete understanding, “wild” psychoanalysts
can potentially harm their patients by attempting to speed through the analytic process and press
interpretations onto the patient too early. In sharing insights before the patient’s resistance has
been adequately mitigated and their transference both understood and established, such analysts
will sometimes stall the patient’s progress and may do real harm to the patient in the process
(par. 17). At the same time, the “wild” analyst also puts himself at risk due to the mistreatment of
his own countertransference and, in being so careless, opens himself to the potential for real
emotional harm.
Yet transference is more than just a chain that binds the patient to the analyst’s couch.
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The psychoanalytic space is largely populated by the constant flow of transference and
countertransference—of the ghosts that the patient and analyst summon within each other. Both
guide and structure the path of psychoanalysis: the patient’s transference is both a resistance to
work through and a source of insight regarding his inner workings. Simultaneously, the analyst’s
countertransference is at work, exerting a force that theorists from Freud to Lacan, Bollas to
Klein, warn must be carefully monitored. Its careful examination at the hands of the analyst can
lead to unexpected insights and useful confirmations, so much so that Bollas makes the bold
claim that psychoanalysis itself is at its heart a form of countertransference (10). It is no surprise
then that an analyst who is either unaware of his countertransference or otherwise unable to
properly examine it can lead the patient astray. As Lacan suggests in “The Direction of the
Treatment and the Principles of Its Power,” such an analyst has entered into a “game [that] will
proceed without anyone knowing who is leading” (493).
Hiroshima Mon Amour adeptly illustrates the above as it follows a French woman and
Japanese man’s brief affair in Hiroshima during the aftermath of World War II. 12 Indeed, if one
must be aware of the effects of transference and countertransference in order to successfully
perform psychoanalysis, it is the lack of this awareness that proves to be the Japanese lover’s
downfall as he attempts to grow closer to the French woman. However, the film does not limit
itself to incorporating transference and countertransference into the plot. Instead, Hiroshima Mon
Amour also integrates transference into the viewer’s experience of the film through the clever use
of sight and sound. The end result aligns the experience of watching the lovers at Hiroshima

12

Although the lovers are both unnamed during the film, in the screenplay, the French woman is
sometimes referred to using the actress’s first name, Riva.
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more closely with the lovers’ experience of engaging one another in a field of unexamined
transference.
The French woman and Japanese man both find their story couched within multiple
larger narratives that extend beyond their brief affair in Hiroshima. On the world scale, World
War II serves to frame the film from its first moments via an opening sequence that introduces
both the war and transference’s role in the central relationship. Two victims of the atomic bomb
cling to each other for comfort in death, but their arms slowly become those of the two lovers
who are locked in a post-coital embrace. There is a moment when the images move in the same
space, and the viewer cannot tell if she is watching a process borne out of love or of death. In
that destabilizing instant, during the transference of meaning, the two pairs become
unidentifiable (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2. The transitional moment between the arms of the dying and those of the lovers from
Hiroshima Mon Amour. Directed by Alain Resnais, Argos Films, 1959.
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Later in the same scene, the view fades once again to a pair of arms, glistening with what could
be either sweat or dust, and for another brief moment the viewer cannot be completely certain if
they are still watching the lovers or if they have instead returned to the glittering arms of the
dying (Fig. 3). Passion and death become indistinguishable. It is only once the lovers’ voices
intrude that the audience is brought fully out of Hiroshima’s past and into its present.
The viewer’s experience of time during this scene, with its moment of indeterminate
origin, closely resembles one formulation of traumatic experience where the traumatized
individual is sometimes located in the present and sometimes in the past but also occasionally in
a place where the two influence and bleed into each other. The result is that the traumatized
individual may seem to live in the past and present near simultaneously while truly inhabiting
neither. Considering Marguerite Duras’s body of work, it is hardly surprising that Hiroshima
Mon Amour would choose such a formulation to represent the experience of a traumatic return;
her female protagonists often enact a physical or psychic return to their histories and, through
this, the sites of their traumas.
For the reader of the screenplay, the apparent shifting of the past onto the woman’s
present extends into several notations that Duras includes on the page. It is there, using a method
that is invisible to viewers of the film, that Duras gestures directly to the woman’s oscillation in
time—toward and away from Hiroshima—during the French woman’s monologue at the café. In
the information accompanying the screenplay, she specifies that the French woman’s narrative is
one which “literally transports her outside herself and carries her toward this new man” (112;
emphasis added). Duras’s use of the word “literally” in this moment would suggest actual
movement from a psychic place the French woman holds within herself, her hometown of
Nevers during the war.
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Fig. 3: The progression from the ash-covered, dying couple to the lovers’ sweat-coated arms
from Hiroshima Mon Amour. Directed by Alain Resnais, Argos Films, 1959.
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The film repeatedly indicates that for the French woman to be transported outside of
herself she must initially be brought forward into the past, first into Hiroshima’s past but later
into her own at Nevers. While some of these gestures occur through the woman’s speech acts—
as silences or vague statements when she is asked about herself—it is Duras’s description of the
scene in the café that truly troubles the reader’s sense of place, echoing the experience of the
French woman and ultimately leading to what resembles a moment of “wild” psychoanalysis
between her and the Japanese man where, if she is carried toward him, it is necessarily through
the dead body of her past German lover. There, Duras specifies that the French woman “blocks
her ears, in this café [at Hiroshima]. The café is suddenly very quiet” (55; brackets in original).
The clarification here appears to be unnecessary; the reader already knows that the café is
located in Hiroshima because the presence of the Japanese man roots the story, and therefore the
reader, in the present. However, by drawing attention to their location parenthetically, Duras
seems to suggest that they could have been together in a café in Nevers and as such in the past
instead. Such an explicit clarification therefore indicates the importance of time and underscores
the possibility of a return to the past.
This moment, where the reader is reminded of something that should seem self-evident,
closely mimics the French woman’s experience at this point in the scene: that of being in a space
that is indeterminately between the past and the present, both and neither. The film suddenly
shifts away from images of the Japanese man and French woman where they sit in Hiroshima,
instead depicting scenes of Nevers from the past like a flashback to which the viewer has been
made a witness. This shift occurs just after the French woman covers her ears in what is
portrayed as a rather quiet café, a café that the reader has been reminded is not in Nevers. In that
moment, the French woman occupies a similar position as the viewer in the beginning of the
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film, whose focus for an instant is neither fully on the past (represented by the ash-covered
bodies) nor the present (the sweat on the lovers’ arms) but instead on a third space that in
blending past with present becomes completely unrecognizable.

The “Wildly” Psychoanalytic Lover
While both the Japanese man and French woman have families to return to, and though
both seem reluctant to end their brief tryst, it is the man who repeatedly implores her to stay and
she who repeatedly insists she must leave. The aforementioned café scene occurs during the final
hours of the lovers’ time together and serves as one of their last moments of in-depth
conversation. However, rather than resembling a typical exchange, the man asks a series of
questions to prod her forward through a narration of her traumatic experience of her prior lover’s
death. She, meanwhile, uses her body to express that experience, which is overshadowed by her
complete inability to distinguish her own living body from her beloved’s corpse, the same state
of ignorance that the viewer experienced in the opening scene of the film. Although she speaks
while the Japanese man continuously supplies her with alcohol, at one point he is forced to hold
the glass to her lips, her body inert and hands curled uselessly on the table. The liquid dribbles
down her chin, leaving her apparently unable to properly drink even with assistance. Rather like
a hysteric’s, her body intrudes in order to tell the story of the moment of her trauma.
Freud quickly connects hysteria and psychic trauma in “The Psychic Mechanism of
Hysterical Phenomena,” suggesting that trauma often exists at the root of the neurosis and
ultimately claiming the connection between the two is so strong that it warrants the broader
concept of “traumatic hysteria” (para 5). In fact, while Freud separates hysterics into two main
groups, both involve psychic trauma. The first contains
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those cases in which the patient has not reacted to psychic traumas because the nature of
the trauma precluded a reaction as in the case of an irremediable loss of a beloved or
because social relations made the reaction impossible, or because it concerned things
which the patient wished to forget and which he therefore intentionally inhibited and
repressed. (para 19-20)
In the second group, the presentation of hysteria seems not to have any significance beyond its
origin in a traumatic moment. Ultimately, Freud believed the talking cure was successful because
of its interaction with the traumatic past; he supposed hypnosis was a kind of artificial hysteria
that enabled the patient, with the guidance of the analyst, to get to the root of the trauma and
therefore of the hysteria and to rectify the neurosis by fully abreacting the trauma. By giving the
root cause an outlet of expression through speech rather than the body, Freud posited one would
force the traumatic past to be faced and overcome rather than repressed.
In its barest form, the French woman’s trauma is a direct result of World War II. In love
with a German soldier, she agrees to meet him in a garden but finds him dying in the dirt when
she arrives. Although much of her narrative concerns the aftermath of their discovery, where she
is punished for having relations with the enemy, Duras’s notes at the back of the screenplay
clarify “it’s not the fact of having been shaved and disgraced that marks her life, it’s the already
mentioned defeat: the fact that she didn’t die of love on August 2, 1944, on the banks of the
Loire” (112). These notes also suggest that the act of telling is one that brings her closer to the
Japanese man; however, this is not because the story carries her out of her traumatic past (112).
Instead, rather than use this as an opportunity to guide her through a reworking of her trauma by
anchoring himself outside of it and in the present, the Japanese man gradually inserts himself
into her narrative with the goal of fully appropriating the German Soldier’s identity.
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Unlike a trained psychoanalyst, the Japanese man’s motivations for wanting to listen—or,
more, for wanting her to speak—are ultimately selfish. He defines knowing her as knowing the
story of her trauma and explains that it was because of her trauma that he risked never knowing
her. Yet his phrasing moves beyond locating the French woman’s trauma in Nevers by placing
himself there. He tells her: “It was there, I seem to have understood, that I almost… Lost you”
(51). His attempt to insert himself linguistically into the site of her trauma appears to be in
response to her statement that he does not know her experience, a claim that is particularly
significant because he has already equated knowing this experience, her trauma, with knowing
her. 13
This move—to insert himself into her history—is indicative of his behavior in much of
the scene. As she moves closer to that traumatic center, both her words and the text of the
screenplay increasingly suggest that she finds herself less located in the present and more in the
past through a flashback. This is portrayed to the viewer of the film through the combination of
images and footage of Nevers, which gradually take more of the screen time, as well as the
woman’s gradual slide into using the present tense. Throughout the exchange, the Japanese man
continues to encourage her slips into the past by shifting his questions into the present tense as
well, creating the impression that they are both exploring her history as it happens in the
moment:

13

This moment gains added significance when one considers how the Japanese man repeatedly
rejects her claims of knowing, or seeing, what happened at Hiroshima. While at first this reads
like a rejection of her attempts to relate with him, in reality it is the opposite. As he says later, he
himself was also not in Hiroshima—does not know and has not seen what happened there—
because while his family was in the city, he was away fighting the war (28). Thus, he shares with
her a trauma borne of not knowing, of not being able to witness the very moment of death. At the
moment of the bomb, he—like her—would have been unable to tell the difference between his
own body and the corpses of his loved ones who, at that moment, were still alive in his mind.
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SHE: One day, I’m twenty years old. It’s in the cellar. My mother comes and tells me I’m
twenty. (A pause, as if remembering.) My mother’s crying.
HE: You spit in your mother’s face?
SHE: Yes. (58)
However, more than this, the Japanese man directly takes on the identity of the German soldier.
In particular, he also remains in the present tense so that he can ask her questions such as: “when
you are in the cellar, am I dead?” (54). In doing this, the Japanese man attempts to cement her
transference.
Cathy Caruth’s examination of this scene in “Duras, Resnais, Hiroshima mon amour”
sheds additional light on the mechanism that he uses in order to insert himself into her past and
highlights the importance of that particular question. In asking if he is dead while she is in the
cellar, he is asking her to identify the time of that death. This is an act of identification that he is
unable to complete—even in such general terms—for his family who was at Hiroshima, and it is
from this place, which Caruth labels the “impossibility of confrontation with his own past . . . the
lack of a self,” that he speaks (40). It is through this lack that he can insert himself into her
testimony by taking on the self of another: the German soldier with whom he has much in
common—as a soldier for the Axis powers, as the French woman’s lover, and as someone for
whom the war and its aftermath determines the when and where of their meetings.
Yet the Japanese man is only able to continue this exercise until she describes the actual
moment of her trauma, a moment in which Duras states the French woman “wanders. This time.
Alone. He loses her” (64). Somewhat ironically, this moment of separation from the Japanese
man is also one of similarity with him, where the French woman reveals that she—much like
him—was unable to determine the specific instance of her loved one’s death. At this instance,
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she shifts back to describing the German soldier not only as a separate individual apart from the
man in front of her but also in the past tense:
Little by little he grew cold beneath me. Oh! how long it took him to die! When? I’m not
quite sure, I was lying on top of him…yes…the moment of his death actually escaped
me, because…because even at that very moment, and even afterward, yes, even
afterward, I can say that I couldn’t feel the slightest difference between this dead body
and mine. All I could find between this body and mine were obvious similarities, do you
understand? (Shouting.) He was my first love… (65)
While neither she nor the Japanese man were able to identify the moment of loss, their
experiences of ignorance are starkly different. For him, the issue is a distance that made
witnessing impossible but preserved his life. For her, there is an extreme lack of distance that
blinds her to the crucial distinction between her life and her dead lover’s death. It is in these
details that the Japanese man ceases to be able to understand her and therefore in this moment
that he loses her to death, to the similarities between her live body and a corpse, much as he
would have lost his family in the bombing of Hiroshima.
It is in this loss—in the impossibility of relation—that the Japanese man is relegated once
more to the position of witness, and it is no coincidence that it is in this moment that he slaps her.
Duras describes the French woman’s return to this scene in her notes: “This was her first love.
This is her first pain. We can scarcely look at Riva in this state. There’s nothing we can do for
her. Except wait. Wait until pain assumes a recognizable, decent shape in her” (94). While
slapping the French woman brings her back to a narrative that the Japanese man can recognize
and therefore in which he can participate, it also shakes her from the past and robs him of his
ability to fully appropriate the German soldier’s experience. In this way, his slap also returns
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them to a narrative of her trauma that excludes rather than includes him. Relegated once more to
the café in Nevers, he is no longer able to pretend to play a role in her past and is forced to listen
to her as she recounts it instead.
It is his lack of understanding of psychoanalysis that keeps him at this distance. Like a
“wild” psychoanalyst, the Japanese man appears to know enough about the “talking cure” to
understand that one can talk about one’s trauma in order to integrate the experience into one’s
life. However, also like a “wild” psychoanalyst, he is unaware of the psychoanalytic concepts he
toys with. In attempting to speed through the analytic process and in pushing for a specific
interpretation of events—one in which he can be positioned as a replacement for the French
woman’s dead lover—the Japanese man not only threatens her mental stability but also prevents
himself from achieving the aim of his engagement with her past.
Indeed, while the Japanese man may have told her that he almost lost her at Nevers,
ultimately it is in the aftermath of her memories becoming speakable that he loses her
completely. After this point in the film she smiles at him, looking at him clearly and more
directly than anywhere prior in the scene. He remains relegated to the position of witness, and
she never returns to the traumatic position of reliving her past in the present. Instead, the German
soldier and her love for him are settled into the past in the position of a memory, a change which
enables her to finally conclude the story of their love.

“Wild” Psychoanalyst as Storyteller
Duras’s later novel, Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein (1964), republished in English as The
Ravishing of Lol Stein in 1966, continues several of these themes. Much as in Hiroshima Mon
Amour, this novel features a male protagonist who selfishly attempts to use “wild”
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psychoanalysis to grow closer to a woman who remains caught in the space between past and
present. Indeed, this scenario is emphasized in the novel in part through the narrator, Jacques
Hold, whose point of view enables the reader to glimpse both the processes through which one
might attempt to use “wild” psychoanalysis to grow closer to the object of one’s attention as well
as the impact of transference as Hold attempts to craft meaning out of a narrative built on
shifting sand. 14
While Hold never shares his profession, existing scholarship has outlined the manner in
which his narration initially mimics case notes through its distance, tone, and deliberate
obscuring of his identity. Moreover, while Hold speaks of his career only vaguely, some scholars
have posited that he is potentially a psychologist. 15 However, regardless of his profession, Hold
does not engage Lol from the position of a clinical psychologist observing a patient’s symptoms
in a professional manner. We do not learn anything about Lol’s story that Hold does not
simultaneously believe to be part of his own. 16
In her article, “Fascinating Vision and Narrative Cure: Marguerite Duras’s The Ravishing
of Lol V. Stein,” Deborah Glassman delves into Hold’s framing of Lol and highlights his decision
to begin Lol’s story at the moment he believes constitutes the beginning of her movement toward
him. This choice, motivated by selfish desire, contrasts sharply with the requirements of proper

14

Because the narrator is renamed Jack Hold in the English translation, I will follow the lead of
some of the other scholarship on this novel and refer to him simply as “Hold.”
15
Hold defines himself only as “a member of the medical profession [who is] in Peter Beugner’s
section at the State Hospital” (66). However, multiple articles have suggested that he is indeed a
psychologist or psychiatrist. See for example Kristyn Gorton “Critical Scenes of Desire:
Marguerite Duras’s Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein and Moderato Cantable” and Joline Blais’s
“Qui Est La?: Displaced Subjects in Wide Sargasso Sea and Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein.”
16
Notably, Hold is not present to witness the events at the ball, and as a result what we learn
about the “traumatic event” comes to us from several degrees of remove: it is what Hold, who is
invested in creating a particular narrative of Lol, recounts witnesses could recall years later.
70

Freudian psychoanalysis and encourages Hold to carelessly and irresponsibly assign significance
to some of the events in Lol’s past while steadfastly ignoring others. Whereas Freudian methods
dictate that “a chronology in which repeated events in a patient’s life retroactively impart
meaning to earlier ones . . . Hold’s view of causality is more simple. Lol saw her lover leave with
another woman and has never been the same since” (82). Rather than making use of any insight
that would have been provided by psychoanalytic training, Hold’s reading of Lol’s past is not
unlike the view held by some of the more distant laypeople in her life: the ball is generally
assumed to be the trauma that causes Lol’s current behavior, and Hold likewise traces her
behavior to that point because it suits him to do so.
While both Hold and the Japanese man from Hiroshima Mon Amour hope to manipulate
the stories of the women they desire, the forms of their texts have a strong influence on how
successful each man is in this endeavor. Whereas the Japanese man must contest with both a love
object who speaks for herself and a text that—be it through visual images or authorial notes in
the screenplay—allows members of the audience to witness the woman’s story and experience
for themselves, Hold is the narrator of his text and therefore has more control over the reader’s
encounter with Lol. As a result of his intervention, we are privy not to Lol’s experiences directly
but to Hold’s fantasies of Lol, and this shapes what we learn about both her current condition and
her state’s possible causes. This unknowable distance between what is portrayed to the reader
and Lol’s actual experience complicates readings of the text and makes it impossible to know for
certain when we have learned anything about Lol rather than simply discovered more about
Hold’s desires.
In Hold’s narrative, it is the Ball that transforms Lol into the woman he meets: a passive
object to whom things happen rather than an active subject moving through life with agency. To
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support this, he begins this representation of Lol with a retelling of events that he could not have
witnessed, describing how she meets her future husband, John Bedford, during one of her walks.
During the walk, John discovers that she will follow him rather like an imprinted duckling,
stopping with him without question regardless of how long he pauses on the street (18). In
Hold’s descriptions of Lol too, she is portrayed as an abandoned object—“her hair had the same
odor as her hand, the odor of some long-unused object” (19)—and like their walk, her marriage
to John is repeatedly positioned as something that happens to her rather than something in which
she actively participates: “One day in October Lol Stein found herself married to John
Bedford…Lol Stein was thus married, without wanting to be, in the way that she wished, without
her having to resort to the grotesque incongruity of a choice” (21).
Yet this reading of Lol’s history, which positions the ball as the catalyst for all that comes
later, is thrown into question before the narrative truly begins. Even at the ball, and even
according to Hold, Lol already appears not to directly engage her surroundings. Lol’s childhood
friend, Tatiana, recollects that in school, Lol had never seemed “there” (RLS 3). Instead, she
suggests that the qualities Hold attributes to a traumatic experience are more likely part of Lol’s
personality, predating even when the two women first met as children. Hold’s response to this
challenge is initially to discount it, suggesting on the first page of the novel that he has “never
heard anything especially noteworthy about Lol Stein’s childhood, even from Tatiana Karl” (1).
When Tatiana further rebukes Hold’s reading of events, Hold labels her opinions as “false
impressions” and discards her completely in a pair of sentences set apart as their own paragraph:
“I no longer believe a word Tatiana says. I’m convinced of absolutely nothing” (4).
By refusing to delve more deeply into Lol’s past, Hold reveals his investment in crafting
a particular narrative and through this also the gulf between his behavior and the requirements of
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Freudian psychoanalysis. He needs the ball to exist as the point of reference that gives his
relationship with Lol additional meaning. Therefore, in his account, Lol notably does not appear
to be upset with the sequence of events at the ball until she can no longer witness her lover’s
affair, and it is this exclusion rather than the actual moment when she is jilted that serves as a
traumatic event and triggers her breakdown. What we hear from Lol through Hold seems to
support this; she confirms that what she wanted from the lovers at the ball was not for them to
have abandoned the affair but simply to have seen them, a desire to be able to see and know that
is not unlike the French woman’s desire to see and recognize the moment of her German lover’s
death.
However, while he accuses Tatiana of not giving an accurate history of Lol, Hold is
hardly covert about his own choice to craft a deliberate story out of Lol’s past. He admits early in
the text that he is not necessarily recounting Lol’s story so much as telling a fabricated narrative
with Lol at its center. To defend this, he at times claims that this fictionalization of Lol’s past is
both kinder than the alternative or what Lol would actually prefer, characterizing it as an attempt
“to level the terrain, to dig down into it, to open the tombs wherein Lol is feigning death” (27). 17
Yet earlier in the text, he admits he is not only uninterested in Lol’s life predating the ball but
that he would remain so even if it were to contain information that would reveal to him some
truth about her. Hold is thus transparent in this moment about his recognition that delving too
deeply into her history would risk dismantling the narrative he is working to shape:

17

Multiple scholars have parsed the original French, highlighting how Hold’s sentences
themselves underscore the narrative’s questionable veracity. Rather than claiming the story to be
fact, Hold instead prefaces his statements with “j’invente” or “j’imagine” (see, for example, EvaMaria Schulz-Jander’s “Marguerite Duras’s Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein: A Woman’s Long
Search for Absence”).
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I don’t want to because the presence of her adolescence in this story might somehow tend
to detract, in the eyes of the reader, from the overwhelming actuality of this woman in my
life. I am therefore going to look for her, I shall pick her up at that moment in time which
seems most appropriate, at that moment when it seems to me she first began to stir, to
come toward me. (4)
Hold’s careful creation of narrative also distinguishes him from the Japanese man in Hiroshima
Mon Amour. While both men use “wild” psychoanalysis for selfish reasons rather than because
of the needs of the women they target, with few exceptions the Japanese man’s role is relatively
passive; he positions himself as a witness hungry to hear the woman’s story and poses questions
to encourage her continued engagement with her past. Hold instead works feverishly to create
space for himself in Lol’s history by actively engaging in selective meaning-making. Lol’s
inability to position herself within a linear narrative of memory and current experience is critical,
but it serves a different function here than it did for the lovers in Hiroshima. Lol’s past is, after
all, the shaky foundation on which Hold crafts his story, and her inability to ground herself
neatly in history enables him to play fast and loose with the facts of her life. However, while this
is no small part of what attracts him, as it had her husband, it also prevents him from growing but
so close to her.
If Hold’s goal is to unearth her from her tomb, he needs to first find her in time, and the
ball—where for him all roads lead—seems to him to be the most sensible place. It is for this
reason that he positions the ball as the center of space and time in Lol’s life, and it is likewise
why he threads Lol’s unmoored status through the narrative he creates, beginning in the
moments before they meet. Much as how the French woman in Hiroshima Mon Amour loses her
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surroundings during her flashback in the café at Hiroshima, Hold carefully uses his creative
license to suggest Lol moves on a similar journey during her walks in South Tahla:
This one place in the world where, it was thought, she had, in time past, lived through a
painful experience, or what they had called a painful experience, is by slow degrees
erased from the very fiber of her memory. Why these rather than other places? No matter
where she is, it is as though Lol is there for the first time. She no longer experiences the
invariable distance that memory provides: she is there, in the present. Her presence
renders the town pure, unrecognizable. She begins to walk in the sumptuous palace of
South Tahla’s oblivion” (33)
Within this statement, Hold positions Lol as a kind of amnesiac time traveler. Not only is
Lol never truly “here” as Tatiana suggested, where “here” is formulated as a moment in
particular space and time, but she is also unlocatable in any timeline of her own experience. This,
then, is Hold’s justification for his reliance on the stories other people have told about her.
However, regardless of his reasoning, his behavior fits Freud’s description of the wild
psychoanalyst, who moves through the analytic process far too quickly and imposes his
interpretations onto the patient too soon. Furthermore, his parenthetical note—that they had
called the ball a painful experience as opposed to it having been painful for Lol—gestures
toward a continued truth of Lol’s experience and our experience of Lol: that in many ways, her
experience of the party during her youth is unknowable, down to the question of her pain, and
instead she is the site of a narrative written by Hold and the screen onto which his projections are
played.
The climax of Hold’s narrative occurs when Lol and Hold spend the night at T. Beach in
a scene that parallels the café in Hiroshima Mon Amour and reveals the consequences Lacan
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references in “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power,” where a lack of
examined transference and countertransference results in both the patient and the analyst going
astray. Much as how the French woman in Hiroshima loses herself in recounting her traumatic
experience, Lol’s return to memory is difficult, fraught with blurred boundaries. Yet while there
are some similarities between Lol and the French woman’s experiences, Hold’s motivation in
this moment clearly differs from the Japanese man’s. At no point in the French woman’s
narrative did the Japanese man consider the contents of her speech unimportant, but Hold is not
interested in the truth of Lol’s story. Indeed, her speech acts are coincidental to what truly
interests him: his belief that it is only after Lol regains her memory that she can continue to move
toward him. It is therefore no surprise that he is uninterested in witnessing Lol’s beginning to
recount her past. When he notices the beginning of this process while on the train ride to the
beach, Hold declares: “She is talking, talking to herself. I listen attentively to a slightly
incoherent monologue, of no importance to me. I listen to her memory beginning to function”
(163; emphasis added). Were he functioning as a psychoanalyst, the contents of her monologue
would be important to him as it would signify not only an exit from hysteria but also the
transition from melancholia to a state of mourning.
The connection between hysteria and melancholia can be traced directly to Freud who,
after initially positing that hysteria arose from childhood sexual abuse, later expanded this theory
to include other traumas and anxieties relating to sexuality. For example, due to the combination
of hysteria and an anxiety neurosis, one might have hysteric responses to suppressed sexual
desire, experiencing what he terms “virginal anxiety.” However, later Freud is careful to
expound on the full breadth of what “sexual” means in psychoanalysis. In “Concerning “wild”
Psychoanalysis,” he explains that discussions of “sexual life” are meant to include “all
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manifestations of tender feelings which originated from the source of primitive sexual emotions,
even if those emotions experience inhibition in their original sexual aim or have substituted this
aim by another no longer sexual…We use the word “sexuality” in the same broad sense as the
word “love” in the English language” (para. 5; emphasis added).
That hysteria can therefore be connected to prior traumatic experiences concerning love
or tenderness provides its first connection to melancholia. Melancholia is at its heart a problem
of a love that makes it impossible to accept one’s loss. As such, it is unsurprising to see Freud’s
discussions of the subject in “Mourning and Melancholia” are often framed within the language
of heartbreak. He describes melancholia as a “crushed state” resulting from the shattering of a
relationship and suggests that in cases where there was “a strong fixation to the loved object,”
melancholia constitutes the failure of the libido to properly displace itself onto a new object at
the end of the relationship. Instead, the libido attaches to the ego itself and treats it as though it is
the loved object that was lost (586). Doing so postpones the work of mourning; however,
because of the subject’s ambivalent feelings toward the lost object, melancholia also causes the
subject great pain: “If the love for the object—a love which cannot be given up though the object
itself is given up—takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation
on this substitutive object, abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer and deriving sadistic
satisfaction from its suffering” (588.)
Considering the language Freud uses to depict melancholia, it comes as no surprise that it
is often connected to psychic trauma. Joanne Stubley discusses this relationship in her article,
“Bearing the Unbearable: Melancholia Following Severe Trauma,” in which she discusses how
patients can descend into profound melancholia in response to psychic trauma. Describing one
case in particular, Stubley argues that a mother’s “melancholia represented the failure to mourn
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her lost children, who had been identified with, taken into the ego, and, in this way, remained
alive in her internal world” (95). It is through this that the melancholic becomes a living tomb,
housing the psychological specters of their lost loved ones.
Yet as Freud’s earlier description suggests, melancholia is also profoundly ambivalent.
At the same time that the melancholic’s loving feeling drives this pathological attachment to
one’s internal objects, hate and anger at having been abandoned encourage the individual to
release those same objects. Using language strongly reminiscent of Freud’s depiction of trauma’s
involvement in hysteria, Stubley ultimately suggests that both mourning and melancholia involve
this same desire to simultaneously hold on to and abandon the internal object of the lost loved
one. However, mourning and melancholia differ in that the progression toward healing from
one’s loss is blocked in cases of melancholia. During the process of mourning,
nothing stops the processes from proceeding into conscious awareness. Thus the work of
mourning can proceed. The path is blocked in the melancholic, either because of
‘constitutional ambivalence’ belonging by its nature to the repressed, or because of
traumatic experiences linked with the object, which may have activated other repressed
material. (90; emphasis added)
While Hold’s careful curation of information necessarily destablizes any alternative readings
about Lol, such an understanding of mourning and melancholia raises the possibility that both he
and Tatiana are partially correct in their understanding of Lol and the causes of her condition.
Recall that Tatiana suggests early in the text that Lol has always been someone who lacked, who
even as a schoolgirl seemed simultaneously not to be “there” and to be going nowhere. In
Tatiana’s opinion, it seemed also to be Lol’s heart that was not “there” as a child.
It is in this context that, Tatiana was shocked by the apparent depths of Lol’s love for
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Michael Richardson. Yet even then, “there still remained a lingering doubt: was this not a means
whereby Lol was ending the days when her heart was not yet touched completely?” (4). It is
worth considering the possibility that Lol’s heart—her feelings, emotions, attachments—wasn’t
absent but repressed, much as it would have been at the dance, when she watches Richardson
dance with the other woman “the way a woman whose heart is wholly unattached, a very old
woman, watches her children leave her: she seemed to love them” (8; emphasis added). Her
heart’s apparent lack of attachment is the reason that Richardson’s abandonment does not seem
to cause her pain for as long as she can see them. Indeed, she continues not to suffer until she can
no longer see them, at which point she lets out a “vague, emotion-filled wail” and then, when
they are out of reach—truly lost to her—she collapses (12).
That it is only after this point that Lol seems to suffer is critical, particularly when we
consider her reaction within the frame of not only hysteria but also melancholia. Hysteria might
be described being projective, as it makes plain in the external world the damage that has
occurred to one’s internal landscape. Hysteria could also be viewed as an act of translation: one
which must be retranslated through the analyst’s experiences of transference and
countertransference so that it can be understood. Initially, Lol’s reactions—the wailing,
collapsing, and the repetitious screaming in the weeks after the ball—could potentially be read as
hysterical.
After that point, however, Lol grows silent and depressive, complaining only of fatigue
and boredom before she stops speaking altogether (14). It is at this point that the people around
her “asked her to try and pull herself together. She didn’t understand why she should, she said”
(14). Freud’s later writings on melancholia help to clarify not only the timing of Lol’s suffering
but the way that it presents. Whereas Freud originally positions melancholia as an abnormal
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reaction to loss, his later work locates it as a necessary step in ego formation. The Ego and the Id
redefines melancholia, changing it from a purely pathological process to a series of steps
necessary in the creation of a self. Here the transference of a lost object onto the ego does not
constitute the failure to mourn properly but actually the opposite: it is “the sole condition under
which the id can give up its objects” (29). More than this, beginning in infancy this act of
identification creates our internal landscapes, forming the separation between the id, ego, and
superego. In the end, our personalities are formed piecemeal in part by melancholic reactions,
created using the ghosts of our un-mourned love objects.
This revision, where melancholia can be viewed as part of the creation of a self, can also
be seen in other psychoanalysts’ work on the subject. While Melanie Klein positions mourning
as an act of recovery, where the bereaved can ultimately reclaim the lost love object as well as
the original good objects, melancholia can still be read as a creative process in her configuration.
As Esther Sánchez-Pardo discusses in Cultures of the Death Drive: Melanie Klein and Modernist
Melancholia, in Klein’s theorization, recovery is blocked in melancholia because of the
melancholic’s paranoia. Sánchez-Pardo summarizes Klein’s reading, suggesting that the blank
affect sometimes exhibited during an experience of melancholia “is due to a failure in
introjection and to the infinite doubts and uncertainties that assail the subject who was unable to
firmly establish his or her good objects” (131). For Klein, mourning is productive when the
ambivalent feelings involved in loss lean strongly toward love rather than the sadism Freud
describes as being involved in melancholia. This love permits lost objects to be preserved as
internal objects, allowing the individual to move on. Klein suggests that “at this stage of
mourning, suffering can become productive” in that it can be creative, where one seeks catharsis
through artistic pursuits for example, as well as constructive as the mourning process builds and
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rebuilds the self's relations to his internal objects (111).
However, melancholia can still be viewed as having a creative role in the formation of the
self in Klein’s formulation of mourning and melancholia. In The Ego and the Id, Freud positions
melancholia as creating a self without necessarily specifying that it that repopulates one’s
internal landscape with good objects. If Klein is correct and melancholic experiences postpone
the (re)building of that internal world, this too could be viewed as participating in the creation of
a self despite melancholia’s not being “productive” in Kleinian terms. The rearranged internal
landscape, deeply changed by the loss of internal objects, would affect the ways in which the
individual views and interacts with external objects. This in turn would influence the way one’s
personality—one’s self—changes and develops, and in this way, melancholia in either view
remains creative despite not necessarily being productive.
Unlike hysteria, melancholia—even when brought on by psychic trauma—is a productive
process, one in which a psychoanalyst can be helpful in aiding the melancholic as she interacts
with the repressed aspects of her unconscious. But in both cases of melancholia and of hysteria, a
psychoanalyst’s role would be to guide the individual as she interacts with repressed responses to
her trauma and loss, a professional role that Freud in particular takes great care to highlight
requires much training and knowledge of the psychoanalytic field. Hold does not guide Lol in
her return to temporality, nor does he attempt to translate her expressions of memory. Instead, he
mines her for gems that can be used to build a narrative beginning at the ball and ending in a
relationship with him, and he continues this throughout the novel. It is only his inability to
continue in this mode that brings the text to a close.
In the final section of the text, Hold seems to be approaching his aim: a sexual encounter
with Lol. At this point, he continues to encourage Lol to exist in the overlapping space between
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past and present, despite the way she seems to be in the midst of a psychological crisis. Initially,
he does so indirectly through his silence (the phrase, “I don’t dispute her words” is repeated
twice in response to her delusions), but he ultimately also directly encourages her delusions
when he tells her the police will catch them in order to keep her in the bed. Considering Lol’s
psychological state at this moment in the novel and her earlier difficulty with making sense of
her place in narrative time, it is perhaps unsurprising that she loses track of Hold’s identity in this
moment.
More unexpected is that ultimately their tryst leads to similar confusion for Hold. They
eventually both experience moments of near simultaneous uncertainty regarding not only who
lays next to them but also who they are themselves (178). In fact, Hold appears to lose awareness
of Lol’s identity possibly before Lol does so herself; though he “recognizes[s] the smell of her,”
that scent was previously established to be that of an unused object, and after this point his
fingers recognize not Lol but the shape of a woman’s body more abstractly. She, meanwhile, also
loses herself and ultimately at Hold’s suggestion partially takes on Tatiana’s identity: “there was
no longer any difference between her and Tatiana Karl except in her eyes, free of remorse, in the
way she referred to herself…and in the two names she gave herself: Tatiana Karl and Lol Stein”
(179).
This scene is perhaps what the Japanese man in Hiroshima worked to avoid by slapping
the French woman’s face. It is also what Freud warns about when discussing wild
psychoanalysis. Hold describes it as a crisis: “The crisis is here. An attack brought on by the way
we are now, here in this room, she and I alone” (178). Rife with first with wild transference and
then with utter confusion, it underscores his ultimate failure: that while they may physically be in
the same place, they are not reaching one another. When she lies on the bed, naked in front of
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Hold, he wonders “who is there on the bed? Who does she think it is?...her eyes follow me as I
undress, as though I were a stranger. Who is it?” (178). Despite his earlier assertions otherwise,
this moment proves that Lol has not moved toward him at all in any way beyond the physical.
The scene is also the result of a gradual change that has occurred throughout the text,
which sees Hold’s narration shift slowly from that of a psychologist, however wild, to that of
someone experiencing similar difficulties tracking his position in space and time as Lol. Tara
Collington discusses this in “Self and Narrative in Le Ravissement de Lol. V. Stein,” highlighting
the manner in which this change is “embedded in the novel's narrative structure: chronology
breaks down mad descriptions of the fictional universe are both tediously repetitive and
frustratingly vague, resulting in the creation of a strangely ambiguous textual space” (125). We
are once again in the neither here nor there between Hiroshima and Nevers, the lovers and the
victims, dying and death. Because of this, there is a brief role reversal at the end of the scene,
beginning with a series of short paragraphs set apart from the rest of the narrative by blank space
on the page:
Exhausted, at the end of my strength, I ask her to help me.
She helps me. She knew. Who was it before me? I shall never know. I don’t care.
(Duras 179)
While this moment is possibly an allusion to sex, it is indeed vague in what has become typical
of Hold toward the end of the novel. Whereas early in the text, Hold carefully characterized
himself as knowledgeable—more so about Lol than even her childhood friends—here he is
positioned as ignorant, in need of assistance of whatever nature, and Lol meanwhile is the one to
come to his aid.

83

In providing that assistance, Lol finally moves into the position of subject, taking charge
of the end of their tryst by waking him and telling him it is time they go home. In contrast to how
Hold characterizes her earlier, here she makes decisions: “she would have liked to stay
longer…and yet she decided she couldn’t” (179). In these last three pages of the novel, Lol has
indeed apparently blossomed into herself, demonstrating that she is aware of her place in time by
reminding Hold, who has forgotten, about his appointment with Tatiana; laughing in response to
something he says; and sharing memories of her past fiancé at Hold’s urging. Perhaps it is
because of this transformation that Hold recognizes the approaching end to his story: so
transformed, she can no longer be forced into the space he has created for her. As a result, he
tells the reader: “It’s over, truly over. She can tell me anything, whatever she wants to about
Michael Richardson, about anything” (180). While he attempts to hold on to her for a few
moments longer, it is Lol who shuts the book on his story. That she has moved on from her past
is symbolized by our final glimpse of her, sleeping and seemingly unconcerned with Hold or his
crumbling narrative. It is clear that, in finally relegating her past to the position of memory, she
has left Hold behind as well.

Concluding through Memory and Forgetting
In his article, “Woman’s Fate: Margurite Duras,” Jacques Guicharnaud performs a
reading of women’s role in Duras’s novels that has become fairly standard in the time since.
Guicharnaud suggests that women are made “dispossessed” by society’s very structure, which
prevents them from true ownership of anything but perhaps their children, and argues that as a
consequence the world is “unlivable” for her until she ties herself to a man (107). Throughout
each of Duras’s works, Guicharnaud argues the reader is witness to the woman’s quest as she
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“either searches for or identifies with the most dispossessed, the most fallen, thus the purest of
men. Marguerite Duras’s heroines await the man who knows as much about dereliction as they
do” (109).
Guicharnaud considers Hiroshima Mon Amour to be one of two texts where the heroine’s
“adventure” can be considered complete (the other text is Moderato Cantabile), and suggests that
the conclusion of the “adventure”—that is: the story—occurs because of a willingness on the part
of both the heroine and the man she has identified to continue to the ultimate extreme: “to see the
adventure through to the end and find themselves face to face with death” and as such to
confront the death drive (111). However, while death clearly plays a role in Duras’s novels—
Hiroshima Mon Amour holds mass death and violence as a backdrop—I would suggest the
conclusion of the “adventure” in both Hiroshima Mon Amour and The Ravishing of Lol Stein is
not death but the ability to fit one’s experience of trauma and love into a story of the self through
the act of mourning. This narrative act requires the heroine be able to speak for herself: that she
move beyond hysteria’s gestures and melancholia’s ambivalence and “possess” herself more
fully.
Regardless of the outward plot of the “adventure,” this movement toward self-possession
and cure seems to constitute the true narrative journey in the texts explored in this chapter. In
particular, such a journey requires that the heroine remember her traumatic past, accept it, and
then, perhaps, allow herself to forget it again. The interplay between memory and forgetting has
been discussed in other readings of Duras’s work. For example, in “The Forgetfulness of
Memory: Jacques Lacan, Marguerite Duras, and the Text,” Mary Lydon highlights the way that
memory—the act of remembering, the failure to do so, and the failure to preserve memory for
the future—plays a key part in both Duras’s writing and in psychoanalysis as a whole. Duras
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herself has made her views of memory clear, and for her, memory is itself wrapped up in the act
of forgetting. It is: “a kind of attempt, a kind of temptation to escape the horror of
forgetting…Memory, in any case, is a failure. You know, what I deal with is always the memory
of having forgotten. You know you’ve forgotten, that’s what memory is. I reduce it to that” (qtd.
in Lydon 363).
We can see memory as something already forgotten in The Ravishment of Lol Stein,
where the veracity of Lol’s memory is thrown into question (trauma is, after all, the inability to
experience an event as it occurs—an empty or jumbled space in one’s memory of the past).
However, this memory problem is threaded throughout Hiroshima Mon Amour. Indeed, in a
strange way, it is the issue of remembering and forgetting that finally testifies to the effects of
attempting to connect to a loved one through “wild” psychoanalysis and transference. In this
way, memory in Duras’s texts generally and in Hiroshima Mon Amour in particular closely
relates to the interplay of hysteria; melancholia; and the desire to love, be loved, and serve as a
witness to love. A clear example takes place shortly after the Japanese man’s attempt use
transference to insert himself into her story has failed. At this point, the French woman addresses
her memory of her dead lover while alone:
I told our story.
I was unfaithful to you tonight with this stranger.
I told our story.
It was, you see, a story that could be told.
For fourteen years I hadn’t found . . . the taste of an impossible love again.
Since Nevers.
Look how I’m forgetting you. . . .
Look how I’ve forgotten you.
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Look at me. (73; ellipses in original)
In this moment, the second set of ellipses represents the space where memory has failed,
arguably because of the ability to reduce the experience of the soldier’s loss into words: the
possibility of representing it not through hysterical shrieks or melancholic silences but the
organized form of the love story. The French woman associates finding a second impossible
love—the scene of transference in the café but also all that came before it—as the reason she is
able to create a narrative out of her history. This requires that she be able to fully distinguish the
story of impossible love that she shared with the German soldier with this second love story
shared with the Japanese man. Thus, the Japanese man’s failure in the café was necessary in
order for the French woman to move on through this failure of memory, where forgetting
becomes an act of healing rather than of abnormal repression.
Yet we can also view this moment in terms of an exit from a melancholic state. José
Esteban Muñoz rightly suggests that melancholia enables us to “take our dead with us, to the
various battles we must wage” (74). It is in mourning that we must experience loss—a loss that
carries with it both healing the price of forgetting (Eng & Han, 670). The French woman’s
moment of transference, where she is able to address her dead lover by speaking to the Japanese
man, constitutes the ending of her story with her German lover precisely because she no longer
needs to express herself hysterically through bodily symptoms or wild attacks on the senses. She
has adequately mourned the German soldier and is able to face his death directly and accept her
loss. As a traumatic event, this loss no longer threatens to destroy her, and as such she can begin
to forget him.
Yet while it seems the Japanese man’s faux-psychoanalytic session has helped the French
woman, by taking on the German soldier’s identity in his quest to have and know her fully, the
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Japanese man condemns himself to share the same fate as the man he works to replace. He too
must be ravaged by the process of memory and forgotten. This becomes apparent when they are
once again together, shortly before their inevitable separation, and is portrayed in a single line:
SHE: [to the Japanese man] I’ll forget you! I’m forgetting you already!
Look how I’m forgetting you! Look at me! (83).
This line condenses the earlier scene where the French woman addresses the dead German,
following its framework but doing so at a quicker pace. She realizes here too that her memory
will fail her and, moments later, that it has already begun doing so. Here too is the demand that
the man in love witness this act of forgetting, which in a sense represents the true end of their
story. She, passionate but not hysteric, is able to leave the trauma of Nevers behind her in
Hiroshima. To do that, she must also leave behind the Japanese man who, by encouraging her to
grant him the dead German soldier’s identity, has come to embody the past and trauma she is in
the act of forgetting.
As both the film and the couple’s time together draw to a close, the Japanese man
repeatedly begs the woman to stay. He often speaks in terms of impossibilities as he strives to
remain with her, such as he does when he tells her it’s impossible to leave her or, later in the
final scene, that it’s impossible not to come to her in her hotel room. Yet there is also a single
moment when he frames his desire for her in terms of hopeful possibility:
Him: Maybe it’s possible for you to stay.
She: You know it’s not. Still more impossible than to leave. (77)
There are of course practical reasons why she should not stay—both are married and she
has children—but these practical reasons are not the cause of this final, fatal impossibility.
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Rather, it is the Japanese man’s relationship to her past, a past she first fights to remember and
then “bequeaths to oblivion” by remembering it only to forget it piece by piece, that largely
stands in their way. Despite the nature of their illicit relationship, they are at their most intimate
during the scene at the café, a moment when he literally is not himself but instead acts as the
voice of her past. Thus, while he is excited after hearing her narrative to be the only one who has
heard her story in full, the scene carries a different meaning for her. In order to bequeath her past
to oblivion, to leave it behind, she must leave its witness behind as well.
The end of the film therefore shows him given over to oblivion in a moment that he
knowingly helps her create. The tomb of memories that she carries and hopes to empty does not
allow her to keep him in her life as an individual, but only as a part of a place with personal and
symbolic meaning. It’s for this reason that the film ends:
He looks at her, she at him, as she would look at the city, and suddenly, very softly, she
calls him. She calls him from afar, lost in wonder. She has succeeded in drowning him in
universal oblivion. And it is a source of amazement to her.
She: Hi-ro-shi-ma. Hi-ro-shi-ma. That’s your name.
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This Was a Love Story:
False Recognition and the New Death Plot
Recognition is the misrecognition you can bear.
—Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism

I would like to tell you another love story. Two teenagers engage in a deeply passionate summer
romance regardless of their differences in social standing. Despite the strength of their love, after
the summer, the young man is forced to leave the young woman. They don’t hear from each
other for years, and when he returns, he discovers she, now an adult, has built a life of her own
with a new, happily committed partner. The woman’s heart may have been broken when her
former beau moved on from their relationship, but as the years passed, she was able to fall in
love again and is now engaged to be married.
Yet after reviving her friendship with her teenage love, the woman learns that he had
indeed reached out to her repeatedly during their separation, still in deeply love with her. The
man learns that she had not been ignoring his messages but had instead failed to receive them. It
is these realizations that open the door to a rekindled romance—one that is strong enough to
overcome the obstacles in their way: the woman’s current relationship, the lovers’ serious
illnesses, and even the fading of memory in old age. As one might expect, the story ends with the
formerly young lovers now close to the ends of their lives, still deeply in love, still married, and
still highly committed to one another.
You may have recognized the love story above as Nicholas Sparks’s 1996 novel, The
Notebook, but it could have been any number of others. This is not meant to be criticism. Love
stories, for all the excitement of their dramatic ups and downs, are also defined in no small part
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through their endings. The reader of popular romances, such as The Notebook or the various
Harlequin titles, knows the end of the story before they crack open the cover to an even greater
degree than does the reader of detective fiction. The successful popular love story—that is, the
love story that hooks the reader before concluding both happily and satisfyingly—must end with
some undeniable sign of commitment between the protagonist and the object of their affections.
Although stories about love outside of the popular genre do not share the same guarantee
of a happy ending, when unambiguously happy endings do occur, they too conclude with if not
long-term commitment then what Sternberg terms “decision.” This is the serious choice to
continue to pursue and engage the relationship, one that it is assumed will ultimately lead to
more long-term and weighty commitment with or without the social signifier of marriage to
support it. More than this, however, satisfying love stories that end happily frequently involve a
character’s realization that there has been a failure of recognition earlier in the narrative and a
subsequent move to recognize the loved one properly.
We see this in The Notebook, where Allie realizes that Noah sent her letters for a year
while enlisted in the army during World War II, information that dramatically shifts her
understanding of him and forces her to recognize him as a completely different man. We can
view this in older works of fiction as well. In Pride and Prejudice, written nearly two centuries
earlier, Elizabeth is led to believe that Mr. Darcy has not only cheated a man out of a decent
living but has also interfered with her sister’s love life by purposely lying to prevent a match.
Events throughout the remainder of the book make it clear that she has failed to recognize his
true character, and this correction in how she views him—where she now knows him for who he
truly is—enables the book to conclude with Mr. Darcy proposing to Elizabeth for a second time
and, now bolstered by proper recognition, with Elizabeth accepting his proposal. Likewise, in
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Jane Eyre, Jane realizes Rochester is not the brute she believes him to be when he rushes back
into the burning house in an attempt to rescue his wife. When Jane says, “Reader, I married
him,” she marries a man whom she has now recognized in a new way: a way which—though
problematized in more recent scholarship—seems within the boundaries of the book to be
accurate. 18
I suggest that such narratives engage a different framework than the one typically
identified as belonging to the love story. Rather than simply requiring a renunciation of passion,
they also demand the combination of an attempt to accurately recognize oneself (and, thus, to be
true to oneself) and to recognize the other in order to potentially conclude with a positive
narrative ending. A failure of either mode of recognition leads to alienation, which in turn leads
to despair and the negative narrative outcomes that accompany it: feelings of emptiness,
suicidality, and other internal catastrophes.
I am not suggesting that this framework has fully replaced the love story as Barthes
describes it—not yet, at least, just like marriage based on recognition has not yet fully obscured
the institution’s previous models. I am also not arguing that successful recognition will always
lead to a positive narrative outcome. Instead, I propose that this is a supplement to the previous
passion model: one that coexists with and sometimes overtakes the previous form of the love
story in individual narratives and one that is becoming more independent from questions of
passion as time goes on. Accurate, and increasingly mutual, recognition between characters is a
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I do not mean to minimize the importance of more recent scholarship or rewritings of this
aspect of Jane Eyre. However, those rewritings were made necessary in no small part because
Jane’s recognition of Rochester as an inherently decent and good man based on his treatment of
his first wife would be considered accurate both within the boundaries of the book and within the
time and society in which the book was written.
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requirement if we are to find ourselves witnessing the happy commitment of a successful
romance… or the cathartic release of a tragic end.
Indeed, although accurate and mutual recognition may not guarantee a happy ending (see,
for example, the 1997 film, Titanic 19), failure to recognize the other dooms the love story to
failure. This can obviously be true in the literal sense of misrecognition—take Romeo and Juliet
for example, where Romeo’s failure to recognize that Juliet is alive leads to their mutual
suicide—or the 16th-century myth of Tancred who, overcome by grief, unknowingly hacks at a
tree containing his dead lover’s soul and by doing so “murders” her. Yet employing false
recognition to craft a desired narrative likewise dooms the love story to a negative narrative
outcome.
While misrecognition and false recognition are frequently used interchangeably as terms,
I consider them to be two very different failures of recognition with two very different sets of
consequences. Misrecognition, for example, describes the moment when you believe you are
greeting a colleague but in reality have just waved to a stranger. I will use “false recognition” to
distinguish that embarrassing moment from inaccurate recognition used repeatedly and over a
period of time to create fictions of self, other, identity, and relationship. In short: while
misrecognition is a momentary experience, false recognition has the power to drive narratives in
its construction of both plot and meaning. While in the larger context of the love story, narratives
powered by false recognition often end despairingly for the characters—frequently in exile,
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In Titanic, Jack first holds his own at the first-class dinner party and then discovers not only
that Rose can match him in Irish dancing during the third-class party but that she can also hold
her liquor (as she says: “What, you think a first-class girl can’t drink?”). Jack and Rose are
therefore able to recognize each other in spite of the stereotypes about social class that stand in
their way, and it is from this point that the romance continues in earnest.
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alienation, or death—the narratives can simultaneously be successful in their “stickiness”: in the
way that they grip the reader and, sometimes, become incorporated into our larger culture.
To be clear, I am also being deliberate in my word choice when I say such narratives end
“despairingly.” Described as arising from the combination of sadness, disgust, and surprise or
from that of loneliness and surprise, despair results from a state of alienation or selfestrangement, both of which are ultimately issues of faulty recognition in that they stem from a
lack of mutuality or from the inability to adequately recognize the self. It is perhaps for this
reason that Kierkegaard labels despair a “misrelation.” While Kierkegaard’s understanding of
misrelation as “to will not to be oneself” is frequently read as equivalent to suicidality or the will
to die, 20 if one takes this desire at face value, the will not to be oneself can take other forms:
most simply the will to be someone else. Willful false recognition of the self could easily result
from such a desire. Meanwhile, Kirkegaard’s second cause of misrelation, that of being “in
despair to will to be oneself,” arises when the self has been established by another individual and
relates to a desire for autonomy and ontological independence. It can itself lead to a refusal of
mutual recognition and, therefore, the despairing narrative endings I discuss in this chapter.
Outside of written narrative, despair results in feelings of emptiness that can lead to
physical dissociation or suicide. Within the form of the novel, these feelings form narrative
endings that are not completely unlike those seen in Miller’s dysphoric plot. The primary
difference here is that in the dysphoric plot, it can be argued that these conclusions are
punishments, imposed by society through what is effectively a weaponized plot. In contrast, in
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See for example Paul D. Janz: God, the Mind’s Desire: Reference, Reason and Christian
Thinking.
94

many narratives powered by false recognition, the characters waltz, eyes open, toward their
demise. There is no punishment; only agency.
In order to further investigate this framework, this chapter will explore the way
recognition—particularly varieties of false recognition—functions in narratives of romantic
passion. While integrating theorists such as Jacques Lacan, Slavoj Žižek, and Jennifer Benjamin,
I will demonstrate how problems of recognition can lead to these despairing narrative ends at the
same time that accurate-enough recognition has the potential to break the love story’s mandate
against unconstrained passion. I will focus on three novels written in the 1990s by Josephine
Hart and Jeanette Winterson: Hart’s The Stillest Day (1998) and Damage (1991) and
Winterson’s Written on the Body (1993). There are more canonical—or more popular—novels
that could be used to explore the role of recognition in the love story; indeed, I’ve already
alluded to several earlier in this chapter. However, these novels written by two authors who
straddle the popular line illustrate the roles played by recognition and despair particularly starkly.
Through them, I will suggest that the strength of passionate feeling may not be what leads to
disaster in such texts but that instead the fact that the characters’ desires are built upon fictions of
self and other precludes genuine relationship from existing at all and closes the door on the
happy ending, sometimes on the book’s very first page.

The Self in the Mirror: Lacan’s Mirror Stage & The Stillest Day
While the texts by Duras explored in the previous chapter demonstrate the ability of false
recognition to craft a narrative or feign a relationship, false recognition does not always focus on
rewriting another person’s identity or history. Sometimes—perhaps even more often—it instead
involves the rewriting of oneself. While the violence involved in false recognition when applied
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to another person is obvious, when directed toward the self it renders one completely unable to
relate effectively to others, necessarily leading to despair and all it entails. Within the confines of
the novel, this renders the plot unable to attain a positive narrative ending. Josephine Hart’s The
Stillest Day demonstrates the creative power of false recognition turned inward, without the
desire to hurt or even manipulate anyone else, as it is instead used to construct a desired model of
the self. It also showcases the destructive power of the same by portraying the resulting inability
to form genuine relationships with others and with oneself: a devastating blow to any hope for a
successful end to a love story.
The novel’s protagonist, Bethesda Grant, is an art teacher who lives with her mother in a
small town and finds her understanding of self permanently altered when she first sees her new
neighbor, Mathew, standing in the rain. Struck by the vision, she retreats into her room to paint
his upturned face on a mirror so that she can gaze at her own face as it appears through the parts
of his body. As time passes, Bethesda continues to paint Mathew, always on the surface of
mirrors and never his full body at once. In doing so, she creates a collection out of his body: one
that she can unveil and gaze upon whenever she pleases as she attempts to create a particular
story of self and craft a unique identity that merges her self with Mathew’s in a way she knows
reality and relationship will not. Mathew is married, his wife is pregnant, and he seems to
demonstrate no passion for and little interest in Bethesda.
Although Bethesda’s focus is on the fragmented pieces of Mathew’s body, I would
suggest that her engagement with him is comparable to Lacan’s famous mirror stage and its own
moment of false recognition. While the crux of this stage may not focus on interpersonal
relationship in Lacan’s formulation, his theories delve deeply into the function and consequences
of false recognition. Lacan proposes that infants initially exist at the mercy of their various
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individual drives, which he frames as being a state of “bits and pieces.” This condition continues
from birth until the child is between 6 and 18 months old, at which point it views its reflection in
the mirror, experiences a moment of identification with its reflection, and recognizes the mirror
image as itself.
While this identification creates the sense of a unified self, the recognition through which
the child identifies and creates that sense of self is necessarily inaccurate; as Jane Gallop points
out in “‘Lacan’s Mirror Stage’: Where to Begin,” a reflection by definition is not a true depiction
of how we look, horizontally flipped as it is (214). For the child in the mirror stage—and, as we
will see, for Bethesda—identifying with one’s reflection can lead to a second, more critical
failure. The image in the mirror does not capture the reality of the self in that it gestures toward
appearance only. This failure makes it necessary for the individual who gazes in the mirror to
create a supporting narrative that explains how the image being claimed accurately represents
one’s self. For the infant, this narrative involves the “anticipat[ion of] the maturation of his
power in a mirage” (Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formation of the I Function” 76). Gallop
focuses on this point, suggesting the moment the infant anticipates will never happen because
“any ‘natural maturation’ simply proves that the self was not mature before, and since the self
was founded upon an assumption of maturity, the discovery that maturity was prematurely
assumed is the discovery that the self is built on hollow ground” (122). The combination of these
shortcomings of recognition reveals that while the self that is created by the mirror stage may be
unified, having moved beyond the body as “bits and pieces,” as an ideal it is also necessarily
inaccurate and to some degree imaginary. 21 This is an unfortunate position from which to begin a
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Lacan himself labels the mirror image as an ideal early on in his discussion in “The Mirror
Stage as Formation of the I Function.”
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quest for interpersonal relationship. If our understanding of ourselves is faulty from its inception,
our relationships with others are in reality then built upon two fictions: the one we tell about
ourselves and a second spun around the Other using our internal objects. 22
This is doubly true for Bethesda, who has done more than rely on a reflection to craft the
stories she tells herself about herself. As she paints the parts of Mathew’s body over all of the
mirrors in the house, she tells an imagined Mathew, “yours are not stranger’s eyes. Their outline
on this other mirror is familiar to me now. And I am most familiar to myself when I am reflected
through your eyes” (72). However, gazing at herself through her representations of his body
results in an image and self-concept that are even further removed from reality than those
experienced by the infant that believes it recognizes itself in the mirror. She is creating her selfimage through a deliberate act of storytelling, and her crafting of an inaccurate self through her
painted mirrors therefore constitutes an act of false recognition. No mere error, Bethesda is
working to create meaning and relationship, signifying it through the combination of paint and
reflection. In reality, however, she is ultimately alienating herself from herself as she attempts to
dissolve the boundaries between self and other using recognition and the stories she tells to
herself.
In Lacan, the recognition of the self in an inaccurate image and the resulting attachment
to that image lead to an experience of alienation, and the mirror stage owns the dubious
distinction of being the original experience of alienation that affects and infects our subsequent
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According to Klein, internal objects are the images we create of external objects that we
incorporate into our self and ultimately use to engage the external objects on which they have
been based.
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relationships. 23 In Alienation and Affect, Warren D. TenHouten suggests that self-alienation can
lead to self-estrangement and defines self-estrangement as “the indivivdual’s sense of a
discrepancy between his ideal self and his actual self-image” (qtd. in Seeman, 91). This
discrepancy leads to the loss of the self and the various ills that result from that loss: a “state of
inauthenticity, futility, discontent, depersonalization, or dissociation” (91). Bethesda is
attempting to define herself through a relationship depicted on the surface of her mirrors, but
while she desires a form of bodily union with Mathew similar to what was desired by the soul
mates in Aristophanes’s myth, her very identification with her mirror image renders it impossible
for her to achieve (or “mature” into) any form of union with Mathew at all. In the text, this is
rendered through her reaction upon seeing him, which is frequently to rush home to capture an
aspect of his form, and her focus on the parts of his body rather than on him as a unified whole
leaves her unable to relate to him effectively. Her response to sharing a dance with Mathew at a
New Year’s party is fairly emblematic her behavior throughout the text. Here her focus during
the experience remains on how she will paint a fragment of his body after the fact:
My palm, as I laid it in accepted benediction, detected a slight protrusion of bone along
the scapula. A minor defect in the structure. My eyes, which I did not raise, rested
naturally on his neck . . . A feeling on my skin of an imaginary imprint of his neck and
shoulder-bone slipped upon me, a web-like shawl . . . I now hungered for a larger surface
on which to reproduce the lines of his shoulders in their exact dimensions. (47, 49, 51)
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While I will discuss Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit later in this chapter, Timothy L.
Brownell highlights how it connects alienation and recognition: alienation arises when “people
fail to really recognize one another [because] the conception of the other whom they attempt to
recognize is incomplete and false” (378). While Hegel and Lacan differ on what gives rise to
self-consciousness (Hegel privileges the role of the interpersonal whereas for Lacan the presence
of another appears rather inconsequential), the theorists largely seem to agree about this
connection between recognition and alienation.
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Eventually, descriptions of their meetings become conspicuously absent from the text,
abandoned in favor of marking the body parts that she might paint. It is at this point that
Bethesda begins addressing her art using Mathew’s name, sharing secrets with it, making wishful
plans for the future, and going so far as rest the mirrors on her bed in order to “copulate” with
him through his painted reflection and thus merge their images when she cannot do so with their
bodies (55). It is through this progression that we can watch as she privileges her crafted selfimage over the relationship needed to make that self-image accurate. Her identification with her
mirror image requires her to focus on building the necessary narrative to support it, actions that
at the same time prevent the natural development of any sort of relationship with Mathew. Thus,
Bethesda sacrifices interpersonal interaction in favor of the position of an observer, choosing to
gather resources for the mirrored shrine hidden in her bedroom rather than engage meaningfully
with the actual object of her desire, likely because Mathew has given no sign of viewing
Bethesda in a romantic or sexual light.
However, ultimately the closeness afforded to Bethesda through her mirror images ceases
to be enough to satisfy her, and she is forced to move on to the next substitution for the true
object of her desire. While watching Mathew’s wife swell with pregnancy, Bethesda realizes that
though the mirrors enable her to “scatter herself” over him, this action is both one-sided and
limited to their surfaces. She begins to long for more: to ingest part of his body. She fantasizes
about eating a strand of his hair and so being able to incorporate him into her body as she has
attempted to incorporate herself into his. Yet at the same time that she longs for this ability, she
recognizes that even the strand of hair is unattainable, rendering her dreams of fusion
unachievable: “Simply the hair from his head. So little yet so impossible. Something of him that
would be mine not to paint or gaze upon but to ingest. I knew that the compressive force of the
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stomach as it grinds was more powerful than many machines. A hair of his head. So little. A hair
of his head to journey through me” (102).
Considering Lacan’s mirror stage, Bethesda’s realization that she cannot obtain such a
piece of Mathew’s body triggers an awareness that the self she has constructed based on her
reflection is built on the hollow ground that Gallop describes. In short, she becomes aware of her
own false recognition. This understanding is then underscored through the events of the plot
when Mathew’s pregnant wife, Mary, visits Bethesda’s mother on the titular stillest day. Mary
collapses suddenly and dies from what the doctor later pronounces to be a stroke, and Bethesda’s
mother looks for a knife in order to save the unborn child. Realizing there is none, Bethesda
makes the choice to perform what is essentially an emergency caesarian on Mary’s body,
shattering the first mirror on which she had painted Mathew’s face and using it to cut into
Mary’s womb and deliver a baby girl. Mary’s dead body is more intimate with Mathew’s
representation than Bethesda has managed, the painted shard piercing her flesh whereas
Bethesda was only able to lay herself on top of its surface. That this integration is due to
Bethesda’s efforts combined with her mother’s will only serves to make the contrast still more
poignant, particularly as the resulting scandal forces Bethesda from town and, therefore, from
both Mathew and their mirror images.
While it is tempting to consider this moment as an instance of passionate violence, the
text discourages this reading. Instead, the caesarian is positioned as being something Bethesda’s
mother demands, borne out of necessity. It is her mother who demands a knife, not once but
twice:
“Bethesda, we’ve only minutes. No more. Get me a knife.”
“What?”
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“Get me a knife. Do you have one here?”
“Yes. Yes, I do. My palette knife.”
Suddenly I knew what she would do.” (116)
Later in the scene, when Bethesda’s hands cut into Mary’s body, her mother is positioned as
directing her behavior. They lift Mary’s skirt together, and Bethesda recounts that she
“concentrated all my will and all my strength to do my mother’s bidding” (117). They work
together to cut the cord, and they deliver the baby to Mathew together. Every action in this scene
seems completely devoid of passion, underscored by Bethesda’s repeated return to describing the
events as though they are captured in a series of still paintings created by the reader: “Paint the
face of a man as he absorbs the vision of a woman’s body, blue-dressed, upon the floor. Paint, if
you can, something of the individual onto the eternal, universal contours of grief” (120). While
the community is doubtful of Bethesda’s morality, the Bishop, headmaster, and doctor all appear
to support that Bethesda behaved out of necessity rather than out of malice.
This event costs Bethesda everything. In the end, the community ostracizes her, and the
headmaster arranges a space for her in a convent. While this was likely intended as an act of
kindness, it is at this point that the effects of Bethesda’s self-alienation and estrangement take
hold, prompting her mental decline. In the final section of the novel, Bethesda is isolated at the
convent, where she is prohibited from regarding herself in the mirror. It is revealed that she has
taken to mutilating her face, cutting it in ways that pull at the skin when it heals (162). The
result, one might imagine, is that her face begins to resemble a refracted image, such as that of a
pencil in a glass of water, 24 but Bethesda explicitly defines the purpose of her self-mutilation: “I
24

Although Bethesda refers to the distortion to her face as “slight,” a glimpse of her face in
repose is enough to leave an unidentified man (assumed to be Mathew himself), pale despite the
fact that the resident doctor and Reverend Mother “thought it best that [he] should first see her
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am a study, an etude in three forms of possession, that of mind, that of soul, that of body. A
perfect, living self-portrait. In exquisite pieces. And it is in reflection that they float together to
form a whole” (177; emphasis added). As such, Bethesda has transformed herself into the
fragmentary reflection in an absent mirror—the lost mirror of Mathew’s face—and as a result
alienates herself even in the convent, where the other nuns fail to understand her actions, avoid
engaging her, and ultimately force her from the premises. Yet at the same time that her behavior
relegates her to an alienated position, until she is forced to confront her reflection—and
Mathew’s response to her reflection—it also enables her to temporarily return to a comfortable
unawareness of her inability to “naturally mature” into the expectation created by her mirror
image. She has crafted a narrative to fit the ideal object she has falsely recognized as herself.
When this narrative is broken once again, this time by Mathew’s reaction to her and her
further alienation from the people around her, she is unable to tolerate it. As a result, the novel
ends with her suicide. It is then that Bethesda reminds the reader: “I taught children once. All the
old essential lies. Life. I float away from you. At last I’m borne away. From life. Life which is
perhaps best lived as a dream” (208). Her final words reference a moment far earlier in the novel,
immediately after the first time she has gazed upon her face in a painted mirror:
I painted [Mathew’s face] as though it as a face which, disembodied, floated onto the
water of the mirror to capture my own face on his. And to capture his face as when,
moments ago, its contours had traced themselves on mine, as I gazed and gazed, reflected
and refracted, skin and hair and bones of two, shimmering into one. And my own face

sleeping. The features are less… distorted” (151 ellipses original). Bethesda herself is ultimately
given a mirror and trembles after seeing herself clearly, though she does not seem to know why.
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was suddenly a unique thing because it was reflected in this other. This only other. And
we merged together in the reality of the dreams we dream in mirrors. (32)
When viewed in combination with Lacan’s writing on the mirror stage, one might consider The
Stillest Day to be a novel that dramatizes what happens when one is forced to recognize that the
self that is constructed through misidentification with one’s reflection is not only currently
inaccurate but perpetually impossible. By willfully indulging in a chain of misidentifications and
substitutions, Bethesda ultimately renders herself literally unrecognizable and in doing so
alienates herself. When faced with Mathew at the end of the novel, forced to acknowledge the
vast difference between the fiction she has created and the reality of her relationship with the
man who stands before her, the narrative she has created cannot hold. The fractured face she sees
in the mirror does not signify union with her love object but instead the depths of her desperation
to grow closer to an unavailable man. So burdened by despair in a narrative that has been
rendered unsustainable, Bethesda slits her wrists with her final painted mirror and drowns herself
off the shore while Mathew watches from their boat, still and without trying to save her.

Damage and the Unrecognizable Symptom
Much like Bethesda’s reality, Lacan’s formulation of self-recognition in the mirror stage
is largely solitary. In that scene, the sole purpose of another person is to be she who holds the
infant in front of the mirror, and she is therefore rendered unnecessary if the child can prop itself
up under its own power or by using an inanimate object. However, there are constructions of
self-recognition that position other individuals as a critical component. Hegel’s Phenomenology
of the Spirit famously suggests that self-consciousness exists only in being acknowledged (111).
This requires that recognition be mutual in nature; if we fail to recognize the other as being self104

conscious and therefore capable of granting recognition, we cannot realize that we have been
recognized by them.
I want to put this idea into conversation with Lacan’s suggestion that “woman is a
symptom of man,” which has been repeatedly reinterpreted and reimagined within the larger
theoretical psychoanalytic discussion since he put those thoughts to paper in 1975. Most
relevantly, Slavoj Žižek explores the significance of this statement in “Rossellini: Woman as
Symptom of Man.” There, he suggests that its meaning depends on how we understand the
concept of the symptom in psychoanalysis. In short, seen through a Freudian lens, such a
statement would imply that woman does not exist in and of herself but only as the “embodiment
of man’s sin” (21). However, if we instead consider the symptom to be that which provides the
subject with a consistent nature, woman’s status as man’s symptom suggests that man cannot
exist without woman as his counterpart at the same time that woman does not rely on man to
confer her nature upon her.
Clearly, the positioning of woman in relation to man varies sharply depending on which
of the above readings one prefers. Should one privilege the more Freudian reading, woman risks
becoming formless when rejected by her male counterpart; it is her ontological basis that is
inconsistent. Should one privilege the second reading, it is his ontological basis that lacks
consistency. Regardless of which reading you choose, however, one must question if the womanas-symptom is truly being recognized as a subject in and of herself or if at best in this
construction she is the metaphorical mirror through which man can be constructed. This is
particularly clear in the Freudian reading, where woman is not an independent subject because
her existence depends on man’s attention and desire. Yet even in the second reading, where the
feminine act renders man’s ontological significance dependent on woman, assuming accuracy in
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translation, Žižek positions that in woman that escapes relation to man as “excess” (21)—that is,
that which is unrelated to man is more than is necessary—and suggests that “masculine activity
is an escape from the abysmal dimension of the feminine act,” rendering the act as something
that isn’t accomplished so much as undergone, endured, or survived. (37, emphasis original).
Further, if it is through woman and the feminine act that man can attain his “ontological
consistency” (37), then it is also through woman—as through the mirror—that man can move
beyond a formulation of “bits and pieces” toward a somewhat fictive unification of self. This is
not the same as recognizing that an equal other has recognized you. On the contrary, it is much
more akin to Virginia Woolf’s discussion of woman as man’s looking-glass in A Room of One’s
Own. Because humans are what she calls “creatures of illusion,” individuals who—like
Bethesda—craft narratives in order to create the self we desire to be, we are prone to fashioning
our sense of self-worth by positioning others as inferior to ourselves (35). Our belief in ourselves
is born at the expense of someone else’s worth. It is for this reason, Woolf argues, that “women
have served all these centuries as looking-glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of
reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size…if she begins to tell the truth, the figure in
the looking-glass shrinks; his fitness for life is diminished” (35-6). Man’s ontological
consistency therefore depends not just on woman but on the symptom of woman’s supposed
inferiority. Far from being a relation in which woman is recognized, instead it is a system in
which woman must be dominated and thereby diminished so that man can read the self he desires
in his difference from her.
Žižek highlights the femme fatale as one fictional site where the viewer can see the first
meaning of “woman as symptom” in action. Josephine Hart’s Damage, while not initially a film
nor film noir when it was subsequently made into a movie, is frequently recognized as having a
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femme fatale in the form of Anna Barton. While the plot arguably narrativizes the second
meaning of woman as symptom rather than the first, it still makes clear the lack of recognition
involved in the construct of a woman as she who gives man his ontological consistency by
occupying a similar position as the mirror in Lacan’s mirror stage. As a result, when the form of
the love story hinges on mutual and accurate-enough recognition, it is impossible for the male
protagonist’s narrative to reach a happy ending.
Damage follows the downfall of an unnamed 50-year-old man for whom everything in
life has come easily. From his career to his marriage and the birth of his children, he has lacked
true obstacles in the path of his life and therefore not needed to develop a drive to succeed. As a
result, when he considers the course of his life in the book’s early pages, he concludes “the
passion that transforms life, and art, did not seem to be mine. But in all its essentials, my life was
a good performance” (20). While this story of an absence of passion in the first 5 decades of his
life dominates the initial chapters of the book, the action of the plot truly begins with a moment
of alleged recognition when the narrator meets his son’s girlfriend, Anna Barton, at a party. Here
the narrator describes how meeting Anna, a moment during which he felt as though he had been
seen and recognized by one of his own kind, caused him to fall “deeper and deeper and [soar]
higher and higher, into a single reality—the dazzling explosion into self” (45; emphasis added).
This moment seems to unite the inherent misrecognition of Lacan’s mirror stage with Hegel’s
assertion that the birth of the self-conscious self is ushered on by the realization that we have
been recognized by another. As we see later in the text, Anna has indeed recognized the narrator.
However, despite experiencing what he terms as “the shock of recognition,” the narrator has
rewritten Anna rather than recognize her, creating through her form a figure off of which he can
read himself. It is this moment that causes him to claim outright that he was “brought into being”
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by Anna (45), but despite the significance ladled upon it, their exchange is limited to the typical
pleasantries of introduction.
Importantly, the narrator’s impression—of their meeting, and of Anna—does not match
reality. Here it would be useful to consider how James M. Mellard explicitly connects Damage
with Žižek’s reading of “woman as symptom” in “Lacan and the New Lacanians: Josephine
Hart’s Damage, Lacanian Tragedy, and the Ethics of Juissance.” Focusing in part on the role of
Anna as femme fatale, he suggests that “from every perspective except the narrator’s, Anna is
clearly the femme fatale. But from his, Anna is the woman in whom he exists” (397; emphasis
added). Through this statement, Mellard gestures toward two simultaneous aspects of false
recognition in this text. The first, and perhaps more obvious, is the narrator’s inability to
accurately recognize Anna, thereby precluding the possibility of relationship. The second,
however, gestures toward theories self and mutual recognition; if he is working to recreate
himself through his fictions of Anna—that is, without having made the attempt to recognize her
beyond how she transforms his sense of self—how can his constructions of himself be accurate?
Importantly, the narrator may position Anna as having great power, but that does not negate the
act of domination inherent in his narrative building.
Jessica Benjamin, building on Hegel, highlights the tension inherent in apparent
recognition when it is enacted purely as a way to ascertain one’s own self-hood or status. In
Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination, she suggests that we
each primarily want to establish that we are ontologically independent—or, as she phrases it, an
“absolute”—but we run into the vexing problem of both needing to be recognized as such by an
other and also needing to recognize that other as an equal in order for their recognition to fulfill
our need to be recognized (Bonds of Love 32). Benjamin specifically discusses domination as
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one way people attempt to avoid this conflict at the same time that she highlights the reasons this
method can never be successful. Originating in the subject’s inability to accept that he is
dependent on an uncontrollable and equal Other for recognition, domination is ultimately an act
of refusal. Through it, one refuses to recognize the entirety of another person. However, it is for
this very reason that functional mutual recognition cannot be obtained by these means. Instead,
as Benjamin asserts, “mutual recognition cannot be achieved through obedience, through
identification with the other’s power, or through repression. It requires, finally, contact with the
other” (4).
Anna’s farewell letter to the narrator makes the sense through such a framework. Written
after their relationship has been discovered by the narrator’s son, Martyn, leading the younger
man to back away in horror and fall over a bannister to his death, Anna tells him: “You needed
pain. It was mine you hungered for. . . . Remember you have your own pain now. It will be
‘everything, always’. Even if you found me, I would not be there. Don’t search for something you
already have” (171; emphasis added). In her statement, she equates herself to pain itself,
suggesting that this—and not her entire person—is what he recognized and sought in her. In
particular, she represents a specific kind of pain: one which is recognized, acknowledged, but
also self-affirming (it is this same pain that she refers to in the novel’s most famous line:
“Damaged people are dangerous. They know they can survive”). With his own family tragedy
and loss to endure, the narrator no longer needs to read himself against the background of Anna’s
own.
I would argue that Anna’s assessment is not inaccurate; indeed, hidden early in the novel
between statements about his placid life before Anna, the narrator admits only once to his own
pain caused by his denial of his true self: “I gently and silently smoothed the rough edges of my
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being. I hid the awkwardness and pain with which I inclined towards my chosen outline, and
tried to be what those I loved expected to be—a good husband, a good father, a good son” (2).
Anna’s advice, therefore, is to use the pain he now has, which cannot be hidden: that he
exchange his reliance on her pain for opportunity presented by his own to expand beyond the
outlines he had chosen and into himself.
However, the narrator does not find his own pain to be a suitable replacement for Anna,
and a return to the idea of woman-as-symptom can help explain one reason for his reticence. In
some configurations, man’s behavior is considered hysterical in nature, and as his symptom
woman is both the hated cause and soothing balm for this behavior. Phillip J. Barrish
summarizes this connection, stating that hysterics’ complicated relation to their symptoms exists
“not merely because symptoms help make it possible to continue repressing underlying traumas
but also because a symptom can provide for the hysteric a point of order, a focal point, even an
anchor for identity in the face of conditions that threaten individual integrity” (2; emphasis
added). Thus instead of taking Anna’s advice, the narrator behaves hysterically: consumed by his
own pain, he refuses to let go of Anna, his symptom, and instead continues to fixate on her. Not
unlike Bethesda in her moment of crisis, he too mimics copulation with an artistic representation
of the person he desires. He places a large commissioned portrait of Anna on the floor and,
“stretching out on it, in what I thought was a rage of grief, I found myself instead lost in a storm
of the body’s desperation” (175).
This tendency to fixate on Anna rather than on his own pain or trauma can also be seen
much earlier in the novel. Describing their first meeting, the narrator depicts his sense of the
overwhelming effect Anna had already had on his life just moments after they met:
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The surface remained untroubled, but the ground was beginning to be less firm under my
feet. A fault long hidden was being revealed. There was the smallest, briefest tremor,
barely worth recording. But the pain that shot through me was so intense, I knew real
damage was now being done.
I could not pinpoint what damage, or whether I would recover, or how long it would
take. Suffice to know that I was less the man I had been, and more myself… a new
strange self. (30)
While his meeting Anna is the cause of the tremor, the fault is not caused by her, nor is it caused
by passion, but instead already existed—was a pre-existing condition, corresponding with what
the narrator characterizes as an extreme lack of passion and his son later describes as a life of
“too much order… a lack of chaos and passion” (110 ellipses original). But while the narrator
claims it was being revealed, it is never examined. Instead, he focuses on Anna, and she
subsequently becomes the focal point of his newly revealed passions, anchoring him to his new,
“true” identity.
The role of woman as symptom also highlights how the femme fatale is used by such
narratives’ protagonists. The femme fatale is a female character who is said to seduce and trap
male lovers and, through this alleged action, also provides handy excuses for men’s misdeeds.
However, beneath this depiction of the characters’ relationship to their story’s male narrators,
one can view an attempt to transform them from multi-dimensional, fully formed individuals to
mirrors across which a man can read the desired version of himself. Like funhouse mirrors, the
femme fatale enlarges the parts of man that he desires—his passion, his bravery in seeking to
fulfill that passionate desire—while also obscuring those parts that he wishes to hide—in this
case his adultery and the distance between himself and his family. At best, as in the case of
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Damage, there is acknowledgement of the way the protagonist has changed (he is “less the man I
had been, and more myself”). But even here, there is a statement of authenticity: he was not his
true self before. There is also an abdication of responsibility. The nature of this self is not the
narrator’s fault and nor, therefore, is anything that he does later.
Anna ultimately has to force the narrator to recognize her as a being who exists outside of
his relation to her: as a person whose life apart from him is not merely “excess” but evidence of a
complete being. She does so years after the main events of the text, after the narrator has lost
what remained of his family and his position in British society. It is then that the narrator has a
chance encounter with Anna in an airport and finds her pregnant and with her husband and small
child. The narrator recounts that upon seeing him, “silently, she wrestles for the part of her I still
keep. She is all powerful. It is an act of repossession. My body seems to fall in on itself, to
become a song or a scream, a sound so high, so thin, that it shatters bone and tears muscle”
(177). This brief section of the text is telling for two reasons. First, Anna is positioned as active
in this encounter. In her act of repossession, she forcibly slashes through the narratives the
narrator crafted about himself through his relationship to her. 25 It is after this point in the
narrative that the protagonist can no longer maintain the narrative born from his false recognition
of her. Secondly, the result of Anna’s refusal to be dominated is the narrator’s collapse of self.
He represents this through his body, suggesting that it collapses, “fall[ing] in on itself” like a
house that has had its supports removed. In his imagery, his body ceases to even be physical
matter it is so completely obliterated by Anna’s act.
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While the narrator’s prose depicts his experience of the situation rather than Anna’s actions, in
a sense the specifics of those actions (or, Žižek might suggest, her act), are irrelevant. The end
result is that she remains unyielding, forcing him to reposition her as, at minimum, an equal
agent rather than a mirror on top of which he can construct and view the version of himself that
he desires.
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Ultimately, it is here, for the first time in the novel and on its last pages, that the narrator
is forced to truly recognize Anna as an independent subject, and the result is a collapse of his
constructed self. This scene is also the moment in the plot where Anna refuses the narrow
confines of the femme fatale’s role. Instead, she more closely resembles a woman who has
resigned herself from passion in favor of a love story’s demands: marriage with a husband and
children. In forcing him to confront the reality of her self, she has refused him his internal object
and therefore given him no choice but to him to face the full power of his loss. The result is the
breakdown of his internal landscape: a loss that is so crushing to him that he can compare it only
to psychic death. Without his fiction of Anna—the mirror for his ego formation and the symptom
through which he can anchor his identity—he is forced to recognize his lack of relationship with
her and can only fall apart:
Dying, possibly years before the idiotic mechanism of my body finally surrenders, I
whisper to myself and to the silent faces in the hall, ‘At least I am certain of the truth
now.’
For those of you who doubt it—this is a love story.
It is over. (178)
Were the narrator female, one would clearly be able to consider Barthes’s formulation of
the love story through the lens of the dysphoric plot, to see that indeed: this is a love story. The
narrator’s refusal to relinquish his passionate feelings for Anna have led to his exile, the loss of
his family, and what he himself terms as his death. However, considering the role of recognition
in this plot provides a rich alternative reading, particularly if we consider how the text ends for
both the narrator and Anna. Anna remained bluntly honest throughout the course of the novel,
outlining her desires and her requirements for their extramarital affair. When she tells the
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narrator that “damaged people are dangerous [because] they know they can survive,” she is also
telling herself that the trauma of her past forced her to recognize her own resilience.
Simultaneously, rather than attempt to dominate the narrator or use him to construct her selfidentity, her letter to him demonstrates an understanding of who the narrator is and what he
desires from her. In short: she has recognized both herself and her desired other, and the text
therefore seems to end well for her.
In contrast, the conclusion for the narrator simultaneously depicts many aspects of the
love story’s negative narrative outcomes. There is loss through his son’s death and the end of his
marriage. There is also exile: a great fall from being a doctor and an elected official to living
alone in an unspecified location without any social connections. Lastly, there is death, if a
metaphorical one. All of this is the result of being forced to recognize the truth—the only thing
he seems to have left—of Anna’s identity and through the severing of their relationship of his
own. His failure to voluntarily accept these truths, and the fact that he only recognizes them once
overpowered and forced, lead him to this negative outcome: the collapse of a narrative founded
on false recognition.
The final statement of the novel, that Damage is a love story, is perhaps meant to be
powerful in its unexpectedness. After all, the narrator addresses that statement to those who
doubt it, a population that is perhaps imagined to be a significant portion of his readership. And
without a doubt, the narrator does indeed behave poorly throughout the plot, committing adultery
with his son’s fiancée, a decision that leads to his son’s death, and not seeming to want to revise
his behavior after the fact. Yet none of this requires the narrative relinquish the title of “love
story.” To the contrary, the ending cements that status through its bold warning to the reader
about the dangers of attempting relationship without recognition.
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Recognizing the Ending in Written on the Body
In both of the previous texts in this chapter, recognition is both used and withheld in
entirely self-serving ways. Be it to redraw one’s self into a more desirable form or to locate what
has been missing from one’s life in the figure of another, the protagonists practice the narrative
power of recognition in ways that benefit no one but themselves even when they claim to be
recognizing the truth of another person. Just as false self-recognition is ultimately an act of
violence against the self, the deliberate refusal to recognize the desired other as an independent
equal is also violent; it is in reality an attempt at domination. As a result, it also precludes any
hope of genuine relationship and therefore requires the despairing narrative outcomes
exemplified by the previously-discussed novels in this chapter.
While domination is the most commonly discussed reason for failures of mutual
recognition, I would suggest that one underlying cause for such failures is the unhealthy degree
of distance that domination can both require and be used to enforce. In some cases of
domination, the connection between that mode of relation and excessive degrees of distance is
clear and straightforward. For example, one need only look at domination writ large to see this
along lines of race, gender, and sexuality; domination encoded into law often simultaneously
also encodes degrees of distance. 26 Yet as we witness through Damage, even when domination is
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Sometimes this distance is physical in nature. One need only look at Jim Crow laws or the
Trail of Tears to see particularly obvious examples of this in American history. Yet looking at
“religious freedom” bills in the contemporary moment, one can also view the encoding of
ideological or psychological distance into political power structures since it is a requirement in
order to “other” another individual. One might also suggest that laws affecting women’s bodily
autonomy encode both physical and ideological distance by making it more likely that women
who have been forced to give birth to unwanted children will be unable to enter into and move
through the workforce as easily or as prevalently.
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used in an attempt to grow closer to a loved other instead of to emphasize the difference between
individuals, the refusal to recognize the entirety of the other or to treat them like an equal is also
necessarily distancing.
Jeanette Winterson’s Written on the Body tackles the question of if we can overcome both
this excessive distance and our past failures of recognition. Through the combination of narrative
tricks and storytelling elements, it asks if we can successfully know the Other without also
knowing key details about them; that is, it investigates if recognizing that we do not know these
details can be enough. In ultimately leaving the answer to this question in the reader’s hands,
Written on the Body also leaves open the potential for a happy ending. In doing so without
requiring the renunciation of passion, the text suggests the possibility of a love story that is
divorced from previous formulations of the same and releases itself from the passion-based love
story’s requirements for form, structure, and both positive and negative narrative outcomes.
While engaging the text, the reader must grapple with their state of apparent ignorance in
spite of an abundance of knowledge. It is narrated by an individual about whom on one level we
learn very little. We know they are desperately in love with a married woman named Louise, but
their own name, sex, gender, race, age, and ethnicity are all absent from the text. 27 In this way,
we never get to know the narrator of the story, and yet the narrative’s early structure encourages
a feeling of closeness through the use of what Barthes calls “figures.” These figures, which
“occur to the lover without any order [and] depend on an (internal or external) accident,” are the
snippets that make up the lover’s discourse before it is intercepted by society and transformed
into what Barthes’s labels a love story (6). Instead of being pulled along by a plot during the first
two-thirds of the text, Written on the Body’s reader is tossed across moments in space and time
27

I explicitly reject the move to assign the narrator a gender or race based on Winterson’s.
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that are connected only by the narrator’s lovesick train of thought. It is through the lens of this
narrator’s figures that we travel from the clear water of a river to an argument with Louise in
August, from memories of one of the narrator’s past lovers back to August with Louise before
being hurled still further back in time to June. Although we dive from one past lover to another,
each sketched out only in broad strokes, we always return to Louise. She becomes our only
constant as even the text’s basic form is destabilized and we are tossed from a narrative style that
utilizes direct address to a scene written as though for a play. The narrator is aware that they
have an audience and sometimes addresses us directly, but they do not attempt to force their
narrative into a consistent shape that would be familiar to us. In this way, while they may
sometimes speak to us, they are not speaking for our benefit or out of a desire to craft a text that
we can follow or to which we can relate. They are not telling us a love story as Barthes defines it.
We quickly learn during the opening sections of the novel that despite the narrator’s
apparent devotion, they previously behaved in ways not unlike the protagonists discussed earlier
in this chapter. Like the narrator of Damage, they claim to have found their true self in the act of
meeting and falling in love with a woman who is already in a committed relationship. When the
narrator discovers that Louise has cancer, they refuse to recognize Louise’s agency, instead
conspiring with her oncologist husband to trade quality care for the dissolution of their love
triangle without first asking her what she would like to do with either her relationship or with her
body. We meet the narrator in the time after this decision, when they remain trapped at the
distance that they have chosen, convinced they have done the right thing but alienated from the
woman they love.
Seeking to bridge this emotional distance by any means necessary, the narrator uses an
anatomy textbook in an attempt to reach a deeper understanding of Louise by learning more
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about her body and her illness. The text at this point changes forms once more, now mimicking
entries snagged from the narrator’s notes or, perhaps equally likely, the narrator’s mind. Each
entry in the series is organized similarly. At the top of the page, a quotation from the anatomy
book is copied down in block letters, each defining an individual piece of human anatomy. While
each section therefore begins with the distancing language and syntax of medical discourse, the
narrator immediately undoes this linguistic trick by translating the general medical definitions
into their own words in order to relate them specifically to Louise. These notes first focus on the
aspects of Louise affected by her disease—the “red blood cells carrying oxygen to the heart,
thrombocytes making sure of proper clotting. The white cells, B and T types, just a few of them
as always whistling as they go” (115). However, by the time we reach the chapters on “The
Cells, Tissues, Systems, and Cavities of the Body,” all of the distance granted by medical
discourse has been removed. Instead, these sections become an effort to lessen the distance to the
lost Louise by naming her, imagining her body in personified terms, and addressing her directly.
Here again are the passionate figures that Barthes highlights. “The naked eye” serves as a
doorway to vivid flashes of Louise’s body. “The lining of the mouth” is the first link of a
memorial chain that spans passionate kisses, old injuries and pulled teeth, the ferocity of
Louise’s eating, and finally the wounds—visible and invisible—left on the narrator by Louise
and her absence. The narrator is able to intimately engage their memories of and feelings for
Louise through this use of language, particularly through an increasing use of metaphors, similes,
poetic language, and ultimately blunt declarations of longing. In fact, the narrator asserts that,
“within the clinical language, through the dispassionate view of the sucking, sweating, greedy,
defecating self, I found a love-poem to Louise” (111). They share this poem with the reader
when we are told that “THE SKIN IS COMPOSED OF TWO MAIN PARTS: THE DERMIS
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AND THE EPIDERMIS,” a medical fact used only as an excuse to meditate on the smell,
feeling, and taste of Louise’s skin and to reach out to her: “Rescue me. Swing me up beside you,
let me hold on to you, arms around your waist, head nodding against your back” (123). The entry
on hearing and the ear begins: “THE AURICLE IS THE EXPANDED PORTION WHICH
PROJECTS FROM THE SIDE OF THE HEAD” but ends, simply: “I wish I could hear your
voice again” (135).
As a result of this lost distance, the narrator’s use of the anatomy book is generally
framed as an abject failure in the literary criticism of the novel. For example, Antje Lindenmeyer
discusses this section of the text as an effort to appropriate the power of medical discourse over
people and their bodies, arguing that although the narrator’s “attempt at knowing Louise's body
ends in an imaginary dismemberment of the body similar to that caused by 'doctor-think'…the
narrator does not gain a position of mastery. S/he is destroyed as well in the process” (56). I
question this reading of the narrator’s intent. It is true that the narrator is scrutinizing human
anatomy—and through it Louise—through medical discourse. However, Barthes discusses
scrutiny, suggesting that it constitutes an attempt to search the love object’s body, to look at it as
though the source of one’s desire could be found in its innards and inner workings (71). As such,
while scrutiny does imply a degree of dismemberment—of looking at the pieces rather than the
whole—it is not necessarily in an attempt at mastery or domination so much as an attempt to
gain understanding. The act of looking deeper than the surface, under the skin, into the depths of
the body and mind of the love-object can be an effort to make sense out of these individual,
incomplete pieces of the self: to recognize in them a lost lover and—through that recognition—to
establish a site of relationship and connection to someone who is otherwise unavailable.
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This motivation and pre-existing unavailability are critical. Comparing the narrator’s
actions to Bethesda’s, for example, we see that Bethesda dismembers and scrutinizes the parts of
Mathew’s body instead of engaging the man directly. She does so in the service of creating the
narrative and through this the self that she desires. Meanwhile, it’s apparent through the text’s
very form that the narrator in Written on the Body is not attempting to create a coherent narrative
at this point in the book; the text’s segmented, figure-filled form makes traditional narrative
impossible.
Rather than position this section of the novel as a moment of failure to appropriate the
power of medical discourse, I would suggest the narrator succeeds in doing what they claim to
have set out to accomplish: to acknowledge their current situation and render direct engagement
with that reality less painful, not by attaining mastery over Louise but by “drowning” themselves
in her. While the textbook forms the foundation of the narrator’s project, the narrator is not
attempting to use it as it is generally intended. Instead, this is an attempt to bridge the distance
between the narrator and Louise using the impersonal medical discourse as an entry point,
pairing it with memory and metaphors in an attempt to be able to “recognize her even when her
body had long since fallen away” (111).
Notably, it is after this point in the book that the text shifts, largely adhering to a plot
organized by events’ location in time rather than through the figures that dominate elsewhere in
the novel. Having worked through their emotions using the medical text, the narrator makes the
decision to try to find Louise, and the remaining sections of the book detail this failed quest. Yet
the strength of their passion remains undiminished, and at times the narrator seems to have
become mentally unstable. This appears to have been the price they pay for their use of the
medical text. As Lindenmeyer argues, “the fleeting contact of body parts is replaced by a feeling
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of total fusion. This deeply romantic idea, however, contains a threat to the self-contained
subject” (53). In their success at eliminating the psychic distance between themselves and
Louise, the narrator seems to have difficulty recognizing themselves and Louise as independent
individuals.
While such a lack of recognition would suggest the text ought to be relegated to the
negative endings discussed previously, another character intervenes. Gail is a bar manager who
the narrator brings home but fails to have sex with, and she flatly tells the narrator that her
behavior with Louise was cowardly. The narrator seems to internalize this message in a flash of
sudden understanding: “Who do I think I am? Sir Launcelot? Louise is a Pre-Raphaelite beauty
but that doesn’t make me a mediaeval knight” (159). The pages that follow contain multiple
acknowledgements of Louise’s right to self-determination as well as the narrator’s prior
wrongheadedness (“I thought I was a safe ship for Louise. Then I threw her overboard” [162]).
Even after the narrator is unable to locate Louise in order to both apologize and, more
importantly, allow her to choose what she wants to do, conversations with Gail continuously
affirm Louise’s agency. For instance, when the narrator first returns home, they tell Gail: “I
couldn’t find her. I couldn’t even get near finding her. It’s as if Louise never existed, like a
character in a book. Did I invent her?” Gail’s response: “No, but you tried to. She wasn’t yours
for the making.”
It is important to note that therefore, at this point in the novel, the narrator has run the
gambit of refusing to recognize Louise as an independent and fully-formed agent, much like we
saw in Damage; enforcing too much distance between themselves and Louise, which as we saw
in The Stillest Day leads to alienation; and also eliminating all psychic distance between
themselves and Louise, which if maintained would lead to self-annihilation. However, at this
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point they have finally settled in a space where they recognize Louise as an independent self with
agency and desires separate from themselves—an equal in the relationship and in the world who,
as Gail said, “wasn’t [their’s] for the making”—and they have done everything they can to
rectify their mistake. Like a Goldilocks of recognition, they have finally gotten it right.
If not for that last stage of growth, I argue it would be clear how the reader should take
the final two paragraphs of the novel, but with it, the ending is ambivalent. The surreal (some
might suggest overblown) prose is not unique to this moment but is prevalent whenever the
narrator is feeling particularly strongly about Louise, and so the style provides no clues. Instead,
the text concludes:
From the kitchen door Louise’s face. Paler, thinner, but her hair still mane-wide and
the colour of blood. I put out my hand and felt her fingers, she took my fingers and put
them to her mouth. The scar under the lip burned me. Am I stark mad? She’s warm.
This is where the story starts, in this threadbare room. The walls are exploding. The
windows have turned into telescopes. Moon and stars are magnified in this room. The sun
hangs over the mantelpiece. I stretch out my hand and reach the corners of the world. The
world is bundled up in this room. Beyond the door, where the river is, where the roads
are, we shall be. We can take the world with us when we go and sling the sun under your
arm. Hurry now, it’s getting late. I don’t know if this is a happy ending but here we are
let loose in open fields.
Crucially, the novel’s conclusion therefore rests on the same issues of recognition that
power each of the narratives discussed in this chapter. If the narrator is indeed recognizing
Louise in this moment, the ending of the novel is necessarily a happy reunion. If on the other
hand this is an additional moment of false recognition, the novel has ended—much as the others
122

explored here—in some semblance of alienation and self-annihilation. Unlike the other texts,
here the reader must choose. Considered another way, the reader must ask themselves: do I
recognize a love story’s happy ending in these pages?
It must be noted that, if passion were determinative, there would be a clear ending to the
text as the narrator’s overwhelming passion for Louise is never in doubt. Instead, it is this
passion that leads to the narrator’s uncertainty and the corresponding questioning of if Louise is
real or a hallucination. Thus, it is in this ambivalence that we can see the power that recognition
has over the narrative’s end, both in terms of the plot and in terms of the reader’s response to that
plot. Both paragraphs detailing the narrator’s possible reunion leave openings for the reader to
reject a happy ending; the narrator first questions their own sanity and ultimately admits not
knowing if this is a happy ending in the novel’s final line. Those same lines also open the door
for a happier conclusion. In leaving open both possibilities, Written on the Body challenges us to
scrutinize our understanding of the love story and to question just what makes these stories
recognizable.
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Interlude: Lolita, A Case Study in Recognition
I find it most difficult to express with adequate force that flash, that shiver, that impact of
passionate recognition.
—Vladimir Nabokov, Lolita.
“No, I believe it was the cherry pies.”
—Humbert Humbert in Lolita (1962 film)

While false recognition’s influence over the course of a narrative can be seen in the texts
discussed in the previous chapter, where positive narrative outcomes rest on the back of accurate
and mutual recognition, false recognition’s power as it intersects with issues of passion,
marriage, and plot also affect the way narratives are integrated into society. In particular,
authorial decisions about which characters are recognized and how they are recognized not only
reveal much about the author’s point of view but also indicate culture’s reaction to the distortion
of false recognition. Indeed: patterns in what recognition is used to both obscure and reveal also
says much about larger society.
For a clear example of false recognition’s power over narrative impact and reception, we
need only turn to Nabokov’s Lolita. In the novel, Humbert Humbert uses the combination of
withheld recognition and narrative style to help bolster the story he has chosen to tell, and
authorial decisions are complicit in this success. That the novel itself was popular and then
transposed onto the silver screen twice, first in the 1960s and again in the 1990s, at first seems to
suggest that the novel resonated with the readership to an extensive degree. However, further
interrogation reveals that Lolita became the site of successive rewritings, each of which used
Dolores like a palimpsest, reencoding her through creative license and false recognition and
thereby writing particular love stories over the variations of her body. Lolita therefore reveals
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that the intersections of passion, recognition, and fulfillment underscore larger issues of genre
and power.
This “interlude” will explore the narrative power of false recognition over the narrative’s
form and study its effect on audience engagement through an examination of the three versions
of Lolita: the 1955 novel, 1962 film directed by Stanley Kubrick, and 1997 film directed by
Adrian Lyne. Unlike the previous chapter, my focus here is not on false recognition’s
contribution to the fates of its characters, although it must be noted that the novel ends in disaster
for all involved. Instead, I want to focus on how our viewership can be shaped by false
recognition, both when it is utilized deliberately in a skillful author’s hands and when it infects
the retelling of a story.

Recognition and the Novel’s Unreliable Narrator
Humbert Humbert’s known unreliability as a narrator rests on the back of his use of false
recognition to compellingly craft the narrative he wishes to tell in the novel. His framing of
Dolores relies primarily on two moments of alleged recognition, each of them false. 28 The first is
his invention of the nymphet, which he defines early in the text: “between the age limits of nine
and fourteen there occur maidens who, to certain bewitched travelers, twice or many times older
than they, reveal their true nature which is not human, but nymphic (that is, demoniac)” (16).
Through this definition and its authoritative voice, Humbert Humbert repositions the children he

28

I will refer to Dolores using this name because it is her birthname rather than a name
subsequently given to her as part of a way to characterize her in a particular manner. I especially
refute the use of “Lolita” in this context as it is part of the narrative I claim Humbert Humbert
creates through false recognition to literally deny Dolores’ humanity from the very first page of
the novel.
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desires as demons who victimize (“bewitch”) pedophiles. Similarly, he portrays those pedophiles
as “lone voyagers…nympholepts” (17). By using this supposed recognition and subsequent
definition of prepubescent and young teenage girls, Humbert Humbert creates a full narrative:
the children hold the power, and the pedophiles are to be pitied as they are destined through no
fault of their own to journey through life alone, tortured, possessed, and misunderstood. 29
He then uses this narrative move to reframe his fantasies of molesting children, inserting
another 12-year-old girl into this framework prior to meeting Dolores. During his trip toward the
family’s home, he “spent a fantastic night on the train, imagining in all possible detail the
enigmatic nymphet I would coach in French and fondle in Humbertish” (35). It is easy for us,
reading carefully, to see he could not have possibly recognized the girl as a nymphet on his trip
to meet her. He has not met her, nor does he know much about her, and he has already clarified
that not all girls in the specified age range are nymphets (15). The result is a transparency to the
true purpose of the structure Humbert Humbert has crafted: his claim of having recognized the
girl as a nymphet is in reality little more than an attempt to position her as a demonic temptress
and he as a victim of her charms, thereby justifying her molestation before it has occurred. That
he met 12-year-old Dolores instead raises the question of if she was simply in the wrong place at
the wrong time: if any girl within Humbert Humbert’s chosen age range would have become
Lolita.

29

By using “nympholept” to describe himself and men like him, Humbert Humbert is making
use of an obsolete term that once defined the frenzied possession that nymphs afflicted upon
men. Interestingly enough, this term—as well as “nymphet”—is now part of the psychiatric
canon and is included in Campbell’s Psychiatric Dictionary: “1. A form of pedophilia consisting
of obsessive craving for ‘nymphets’; Lolita complex” (679). I am not attempting to demonize
pedophiles, though I imagine my stance on the actual act of adults having sex with prepubescent
children is by this point transparent. Instead, I wish to highlight this as one piece of evidence of
the way fictional false recognition has had great consequences for the way we think about and
represent important aspects of the real world.
126

Humbert Humbert has more time to craft this narrative around Dolores—an entire book
to be precise—and he wastes no time in proposing a second justification for his actions, this one
also built on the back of false recognition. Upon first viewing her, he immediately claims to
recognize his first love, Annabel, who died when they were teenagers:
It was the same child—the same frail, honey-hued shoulders, the same silky subtle bare
back, the same chestnut head of hair. A polka-dotted black kerchief tied around her chest
hid from my aging ape eyes, but not from the gaze of young memory, the juvenile breasts
I had fondled one immortal day. And, as if I were the fairy-tale nurse of some little
princess (lost, kidnapped, covered in gypsy rags through which her nakedness smiled at
the king and his hounds), I recognized the tiny dark-brown mole on her side. . . .The
twenty-five years I had lived since tapered to a palpitating point, and vanished. (39)
Humbert Humbert emphasizes the idea of recognition twice on this page: first with specificity to
the mole as evidence and then a second time in an attempt to highlight the reason for the
moment’s influence over him. He does so both by referencing its inexpressibility and by
appealing to the senses, saying: “I find it most difficult to express with adequate force that flash,
that shiver, that impact of passionate recognition” (39). In this sentence, he positions the power
of recognition as quick and blinding, like a physical blow with lingering effects. More than this,
however, this formulation allows Humbert Humbert to craft his narrative entirely on the basis of
the associations he makes between Dolores, his past, and his fantasies while simultaneously
using the inexpressibility of his supposed recognition to explain any missteps in his retelling.
After all, stories are at their heart largely about expression and communication; they are the
recounting of events in a form that is hopefully understandable to others. By suggesting that the
power of his recognition is most difficult to express, he crafts an excuse for his behavior: if the
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reader does not find his actions understandable, that is not a reflection on the actions themselves.
It is only because he failed to adequately describe the impact of his first sighting of Dolores.
Although Humbert Humbert positions this moment as a sort of resurrection of a lost love,
what we have is in reality a warped variation of what René Girard discusses as mimetic desire
and mimetic crisis. Girard uses the concept of mimetic desire to describe the way human desire
is unknowingly copied, or mimicked, from others. The objects of our desire become more
valuable because others also want them, and this creates rivals out of the very people after whom
we have modeled our longing. Importantly, the key relationship here isn’t that between the
subject and the object of desire but between the subject and the model.
Girard discusses this in more depth in Evolution and Conversion, describing the “mimetic
crisis” as the result of continued and escalating mimicry between the subject and the model as
each copies or ultimately “doubles” the other in an attempt to win the object. Ultimately, the two
become rivals, more concerned with defeating each other than with obtaining the object. Thus,
Girard says the mimetic crisis is one of “undifferentiation that erupts when the roles of subject
and model are reduced to that of rivals,” and it requires (and is heralded by) the disappearance of
the object (57).
Although there are later rivals for Dolores’s affection, these are not the models involved
in the supposed formation of Humbert Humbert’s desire. Instead, according to the narration, at
the birth of Humbert Humbert’s desire, the model is a previous object, Annabel. If he is to be
believed, his desire for Dolores is, in that moment, displaced or subverted desire for Annabel,
funneled through the traits he claims the two girls share. Yet many of the overall steps toward
mimetic crisis that Girard describes can be seen here in slightly skewed terms as a crisis of
recognition. In this case, the model, Annabel, is used to shape the object of desire, Dolores,
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rather than the desiring self. While the doubling is therefore not between rivals but between love
objects, the crisis remains one of undifferentiation. It occurs when Dolores ceases to be
recognized as herself but instead only as Lolita, and the novel unfurls from that point.
We see the effects of this crisis on multiple levels. Most obvious is that all of Lolita’s
main characters die, with Dolores’s death nestled somewhat trickily in the book’s “Forward.”
Yet for Dolores, the crisis extends even further through the long reach of Humbert Humbert’s
narrative: beyond the covers of the book itself and into the subsequent films (both 1962 and
1997). Both films demonstrate the success of the narrative Humbert Humbert crafts around his
false recognition, ultimately transforming her in society’s eyes into the nymphet that he labels
her: Lolita.

The 1962 Film as Crisis of Recognition
While the 1962 film is perhaps the less scandalous of the two by present-day standards, it
portrays Dolores through a gaze that aligns the viewer with Humbert Humbert’s version of
events and, as a result, encourages some degree of understanding and sympathy for him and his
actions. The film’s original trailer clearly demonstrates the desired position of the viewer with
regard to Dolores and Humbert Humbert. It opens with the written question, “how did they ever
make a movie of Lolita?” that is then repeated throughout the second half of the trailer via the
often-overlapping voices of various men and women. Between these points, Dolores’s body is
presented to the viewer in fragments through a series of film stills. First, we see her hands
gripping the outlined shape of a coke bottle. Then, only her legs in recline are featured in a still
from when Humbert Humbert first spies her, an image that reappears with further emphasis
several seconds later. Indeed, the vast majority of stills featured in the trailer are either of
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isolated parts of Dolores’s body or of her body in recline; if one counts the still of most of her
face in heart-shaped sunglasses in this number, only 1 of the 11 stills in the initial section of the
trailer do not fit this pattern.
Clips of Dolores and her mother, Charlotte Haze, as they separately interact with
Humbert Humbert are twice paired toward the end of the trailer while the voices clamber over
each other to chant “Lolita.” In the second of these, Dolores is first seen struggling to get away
from him before getting paired with Charlotte’s willingly being pulled toward him by the strings
of her dressing gown, her arms open in invitation. Through these methods, the trailer carefully
introduces a story that centers on Dolores’s adolescent body and frames her behavior as
flirtatious whenever possible while also hiding Humbert Humbert’s actions from view. In short,
it repeats the work of Humbert Humbert’s narrative voice in the text. We are, for example,
quickly shown a man’s lap, his hands on his thighs as two feminine hands reach down to grip his
tightly. The significance of the clip changes with the knowledge of where it fits within the larger
narrative. Taken from the scene at the drive through, Dolores and Charlotte reach for Humbert
Humbert’s hands in a frightened response to Frankenstein. Using the ruse of scratching his nose,
he slips his hand from under Charlotte’s and places it on top of Dolores’s instead. Both Dolores
and Charlotte seem to be reacting out of honest fear, but Humbert Humbert’s machinations of the
situation in support of his desire are hidden by the careful cutting of film for the trailer.
While these moves are particularly notable in the trailer, the full film is no less guilty of
adopting much of Humbert Humbert’s “recognition” of Dolores and presenting it to the viewer
as fact. Beginning in the scene where they first meet, she is portrayed not as explicitly sexual as
much as assured, knowing, and powerful. During the scene where she is introduced, she lounges,
not unlike a Hollywood starlet, in a bikini on her lawn. She regards Humbert Humbert from
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through and then over her sunglasses as Charlotte offers Humbert Humbert “my cherry pies” to
entice him to stay (Fig. 4). 30 The books and binders by her other hand—the main evidence of her
youth—are somewhat easily ignored. He is portrayed as shell-shocked. She, meanwhile, seems
to be assessing him.

Fig. 4: Dolores regarding Humbert Humbert from Lolita. Directed by Stanley Kubrick, MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, 1962.

This portrayal of Dolores, lounging and assured, is repeated later in the film, significantly
in a still chosen as a movie poster. Here, Dolores reclines on a bed, facing the camera while
Humbert Humbert gives her a pedicure, an act also depicted during the opening credits. The
30

Significantly, when asked what convinced him to stay, Humbert Humbert cites those same
cherry pies. This is a change from the novel.
131

overall image painted by scenes like these is one that emphasizes the power relation Humbert
Humbert claims exists between nymphets and their bewitched nympholepts. Dolores is
repeatedly positioned as someone who knows what she is doing, and Humbert Humbert is
bespelled into servitude, a framework that would transform the way one views scenes such as
one early in the film where he loses himself in staring at her while she hula-hoops.
The deliberate nature of this portrayal of Dolores in the film is evidenced by the
surviving archival materials of Stanley Kubrick’s writing and direction in the early stages of the
film’s development. Karyn Stuckey explores these materials in “Re-Writing Nabokov’s Lolita:
Kubrick, the Creative Adaptor” and surmises that “Kubrick, from the outset, considered Lolita to
be a love story and a tragicomedy” (118). This is not mere conjecture on Stuckey’s part;
Kubrick’s own words attest to it in a letter he wrote to Peter Ustinov in May 1960 when the
script was being developed. In the letter, Kubrick writes: “I think the most important thing . . . is
that it is a love story. A sad, tender, eventually heartbreaking story of passion-love” (qtd. in
Stuckey 119). Kubrick’s decisions with regard to both the script and the shooting of the film are
all in the service of transforming Nabokov’s novel into a “heartbreaking” tragicomedy. The
viewer is meant to both sympathize and empathize with Humbert Humbert.
In order to achieve this aim, Kubrick must simultaneously alter Humbert Humbert and
Dolores’s characters and also adopt Humbert Humbert’s view of events as an objective or at least
commonly agreed-upon truth. This is an endeavor that was also supported by (and is sometimes
attributed to) the need to usher the film past the censors. For example, Kubrick employed Martin
Quigley, who had been deeply involved in the creation of the Production Code and who, working
for Kubrick, suggested changes to the screenplay in order to avoid moments where “Humbert
may appear like a beast and disgust [the] audience” (Biltereyst 144). Kubrick also focused on
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emphasizing humor in moments that might otherwise allude to Humbert Humbert’s darker
nature. Humor is added to the seduction scene in the motel, an addition that Stuckey accurately
suggests “serves as an aid to the audience, encouraging them to forget the age gap and moral
implications of the situation. It instead enables them to concentrate on the coming together of
two lovers” (122).
Crucially, Kubrick takes still more dramatic steps with regard to Humbert Humbert’s
portrayal in erasing his background from the film, removing all but the barest mention of
nymphets and obliterating his history with Annabel. While Stuckey suggests that this is in order
to create a more mysterious version of the character, these erasures also purposely remove the
source and context of Humbert Humbert’s false recognition of Dolores, enabling Kubrick to then
reposition her as seducer rather than victim. This repositioning also played a key role in the
film’s casting, with Kubrick noting to Ustinov that although the Lolita of the text was “not above
average looking,” the film’s version must be “a very quickly recognizable sex object” (qtd. in
Stuckey 126).
Nabokov comments on the difference between the 1962 film and his text, suggesting that
even his screenplay was nearly independent from the book and that the film itself was “as
unfaithful to the original script as an American poet’s translation from Rimbaud or Pasternak”
(135). Some reviews also picked up on this change. The New York Times, in their 1962 review of
the movie, suggested that the answer to the question posed by the film’s trailer—“how did they
ever make a movie of Lolita?”—is a simple “they didn’t.” Author Bosley Crowther justifies this
answer on the basis of the changes to Dolores and the effects that those alterations have on the
central issues of the novel: “She is definitely not a ‘nymphet.’ . . . This removes the factor of
perverted desire that is in the book and renders the passion of the hero more normal and
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understandable” (23). Although Crowther seems to intend this as criticism, in reality he is
identifying Kubrick’s deliberate artistic decision. Recall that Kubrick labeled Lolita a love story.
More than this, Kubrick also considered Dolores to have seduced Humbert Humbert in the novel,
suggesting in a letter that “indeed she does . . . in the book and in our film” (qtd. in Stuckey 122).
Interestingly, Kubrick reads Dolores as seducer even while acknowledging that
Nabokov’s Dolores is a “grubby” 12 year old; he placates Nabokov about his decision to cast
Sue Lyon by suggesting they could “grubby her up,” though he ultimately fails to do so. This
decision should be understood through Kubrick’s statements on the role of dramatization when
moving from novel to film. Although he later reflected that “Lolita is a major example of how
there are great books that don’t make great films” (qtd. in Biltereyst 139), he had earlier admitted
that he was not particularly interested in remaining faithful to the style of the novel when
adapting the narrative for film:
style is what the artist uses to fascinate the beholder in order to convey to him his feelings
and emotions and thoughts. These are what have to be dramatised [sic] not the style. The
dramatising has to find a style of its own, as it will do if it really grasps the content.
(Kubrick, Sight and Sound; emphasis added)
Thus, the film reflects the feelings, emotions, and thoughts that Kubrick had upon reading Lolita
the novel—that it was a love story and a tragicomedy, that Dolores was a seducer and an agent
rather than a victim—and Kubrick’s decisions regarding the screenplay as well as the film’s
direction are each in the aim of conveying those very impressions: of making them recognizable.
Yet recognition can only be intelligible when the viewer knows what to look for, and in this case
it necessitated an older, more physically developed actress. It also required the removal of the
specter of child abuse from the novel.
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By changing Dolores as he does and working to transform the narrative into a less
complicated love story, Kubrick attempts to reposition the audience into alignment with not only
his own view of the text but also with Humbert Humbert’s view of Dolores. By raising Dolores’s
age to 15, Kubrick encourages the audience (as well as the censors) to be more ambivalent about
the moral implications of the sexual relationship. In portraying Dolores as acting on her
desires—as the seducer rather than the abused or even the seduced—the film infects the viewer
with the same impression of Dolores that the book’s Humbert Humbert claims he has of all
nymphets: she has “the fey grace, the elusive, shifty, soul-shattering, insidious charm that
separates the nymphet from . . . provisionally plain, or just nice, or ‘cute,’ or even ‘sweet’ and
‘attractive,’ ordinary, plumpish, formless, cold-skinned, essentially human little girls” (Nabokov
17). Through creating a sex object out of Dolores using the easily-recognizable cues of a sexual
seducer, Kubrick has effectively erased her and replaced her with an older version of “nymphet”
Lolita, even as the concept of the nymphet is erased from the narrative. In short, by guiding the
audience’s recognition as he does, Kubrick has picked up where Humbert Humbert left off.

Recuperating Lolita? The 1997 Film
If as Jessica Benjamin asserts, “recognition makes action into communication” (Beyond
Doer and Done to, 9), Lolita’s integration into more contemporary society through successive
retellings demonstrates the cyclical nature of the relationship between recognition,
communication, and action, particularly when we consider the reader or viewer as a witness who
recognizes (or misrecognizes) the communicated meaning and responds accordingly. The 1997
film version of Lolita is the most recent addition to the narrative’s cultural imprint. Released 35
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years after the Kubrick version, it must grapple not only with Nabokov’s original text but with
the deliberate changes Kubrick made to how its characters and relationship are recognized.
The author of the screenplay, Stephen Schiff, makes it clear that those involved in the film
were not only aware of the impact of Kubrick’s portrayal but also that they deliberately chose how
to position their work in relation to it, opting to attempt a return to the text rather than to revisit
the previous film. In an interview with Suellen Stringer-Hye, Schiff recalls: “Right from the
beginning, it was clear to all of us that this movie was not a ‘remake’ of Kubrick's film. Rather,
we were out to make a new adaptation of a very great novel. Some of the filmmakers involved
actually looked upon the Kubrick version as a kind of ‘what not to do’” (Stringer-Hye). This view
of the Kubrick film is one that Schiff is careful to admit he did not share, suggesting that he
remembered being fond of the film though he had not seen it for more than a decade.
Despite this, he does not hesitate to criticize the Kubrick film, in particular as related to its
portrayal of Dolores. Choosing to remain close to the novel in his screenplay, Schiff is blunt about
his view of Dolores as an ordinary if charming and likely “sexually precocious” little girl, and he
acknowledges that Lolita is largely a product of Humbert Humbert’s imagination. As a result,
while the 1997 film is, in Schiff’s words, “sexually much franker than the Kubrick version,” its
portrayal of Dolores does not sexually objectify her to the same degree. In fact, Schiff identifies
Dolores’s objectification as one of the odder things about the previous film adaptation:
The other strange choice in the Kubrick film, of course, is Sue Lyon, who, even though
she was only fifteen when she played Lolita—he same age as our Dominique Swain—
could easily have passed for a twenty-year-old porno star. Dominique can easily pass for
a twelve-year-old, which we all think is a very good thing. (Stringer-Hye)
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When Caryn James reviewed the 1997 film for the The New York Times, her article,
“Revisiting a Dangerous Obsession,” seems to appreciate the film’s return to the novel as its
source, particularly in her suggestion that “the film's master stroke is its understanding that this is
Humbert’s story, told in his own lyrical voice, from his own passionate, sad, tortured
perspective” (James). More than this, however, James highlights that this understanding enables
the film to portray a more complicated and ambivalent version of Dolores. Instead of a sex
object, the 1997 version of Dolores “is within sight of womanhood yet remains, definitely, a
schoolgirl. . . . There are flashes of seduction from Lolita that are, intentionally, hard to
distinguish from a schoolgirl crush (the better for Humbert to misinterpret)” (emphasis added). 31
Yet other reviews of the film were far less charitable. 32 New York Magazine published
two reviews of Lolita: one under “movies” and a second under “television review” to reflect that
the film first reached mass audiences on Showtime. While the television review suggests the film
“is almost too loyal to Nabokov’s printed page,” it highlights that Jeremy Irons’s Humbert
Humbert is not at all the likable version from the Kubrick film; “We’re never in danger of
identifying with his Humbert, despite voice-overs with a plummy English accent, because we
wouldn't want Jeremy anywhere near our children” (Leonard). This does not appear to be a
compliment; within the review, Leonard labels the film morose and “a sorry burlesque,”
suggesting that it’s the result of a director who pines too much for an exacting novelist’s
approval.

31

Importantly, James’s statement that Humbert Humbert misinterprets Dolores’s behavior
throws any claims of recognition on his part into doubt. That there is room for such a reading of
the film is in stark contrast to the Kubrick version, where Humbert Humbert’s interpretations are
transformed into truth.
32
It may be worth noting that of the three reviewers I discuss here, James is both the only
woman and the only reviewer who appears to favor this version of the film over the Kubrick
adaptation.
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The movie review is still more critical. Beginning with its byline—“Adrian Lyne’s sober
‘Lolita’ misses Nabokov’s joke”—David Denby argues that Kubrick’s balance of comedy to
tragedy was true to the novel and that, by diminishing the comedy, Lyne has removed the fun
from the film:
What we see is not a sui generis erotic comedy about a very specialized kind of obsession
but a recognizable descendant of European films in which a poor sap falls into allencompassing love and is tormented by an unreachable bitch. Humbert is no longer an
ironic hero—a haughty and hypocritical creep who is redeemed—but a very earnest man
who loves too much. The joke has vanished. (Denby)
While one might argue that there is a kind of dramatic irony inherent in the novel’s portrayal of
Humbert Humbert’s behavior—irony that is complicated by his unreliability and the likelihood
that he is indeed aware of the true significance of his actions—I would argue he was never a hero
anywhere but within the Kubrick adaptation. Humbert Humbert is, certainly, the text’s main
character, and he could potentially be viewed as the protagonist who grows and changes over the
course of the novel. Yet to call him a “hero” reveals much about the relation between the reader
and the text. It suggests the desire to see the character succeed when his one aim in the novel is
to successfully molest a child.
However, in the 35 years between the film adaptations, Kubrick’s version of the text had
already shifted the cultural understanding of Lolita and of Dolores in particular away from the
original versions portrayed in the novel. This shift, where Dolores is in some ways transformed
into Humbert Humbert’s Lolita, affected among other things the way the 1997 film was
discussed in popular magazines. Despite the more complicated portrayal in the Lyne film, when
the February 1997 issue of Esquire places Dominique Swain on its cover, she is suggestively
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licking her finger while gazing directly at the camera and, through it, the assumed male reader of
this “magazine for men” (Fig 5). The text: “Who’s Afraid of Lolita?” reads boldly over her
shoulder, effectively repositioning her once again from 12-year-old abuse victim to a figure that
inspires fear with her sexual suggestiveness.
The article itself continues this trend, proclaiming “Lolita comes again” in its very title
and asking: “The book was banned, its author reviled, the first film version censored. Is there
anything more about a lustful twelve-year-old nymphet that can shock American Sensibilities?”
(Kaye 51). Yet as Ellen Pifer suggests in “Reinventing Nabokov: Lyn and Kubrick Parse Lolita,”
the sexual suggestion inherent in both the title and the question that follows is further evidence
that Humbert Humbert’s narrative has held, buoyed by not only the first but also the second film
adaptation. The 1997 film may depict Dolores orgasming in response to Humbert Humbert’s
attentions, but the book specifically states this does not happen: “Never did she vibrate under my
touch” (Nabokov 166). 33
More than held, the narrative created by Humbert Humbert’s false recognition of Dolores
has taken on a life of its own through these cycles of action, false recognition, and communicated
meaning, not only in its entries into pop culture and psychiatric lexicon but also by the way it has
eclipsed and obscured Humbert Humbert’s own account. In such a way, society—the ultimate
audience—has used the figure of Lolita against the novel’s Humbert Humbert just as he used
Lolita against Dolores: to overwrite and, at least at times, silence him. However, because Lolita
was constructed to excuse Humbert Humbert’s behavior, this does not victimize him. Instead, the
figure of Lolita has defended him far more adequately than he has defended himself. By
33

While Dolores’ orgasm in the 1997 film adaptation is part of a larger portrayal of Lolita-astruth, it must still be asserted that orgasmic response to abuse should not be used as a sign that
the victim is “lustful.”
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representing Dolores as powerful, sexual, or aggressive, the films, like Humbert Humbert, work
to obscure her victimization and, in some viewers’ eyes, throw it into question. Lolita has
therefore transformed the figure of Dolores into a metaphorical palimpsest, with Humbert
Humbert’s initial narration rewritten in each successive film but each iteration serving only to
further obscure Dolores’s character.

Fig. 5: Cover image of Dominique Swain as Lolita from Esquire Magazine, 1, Feb. 1997.

Humbert Humbert was ultimately successful in telling a narrative based on false
recognition. The Lolita complex is inscribed in our culture, but it is based on a story that a
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fictional man told himself to justify his criminal behavior, a fantasy that isn’t recognized as such
and that ignores Dolores Haze, who was left destitute by the end of her narrator’s story and dead
before it began. Trying to craft some semblance of relationship on the back of false recognition
ruined all lives involved, but it left us with Lolita, a figure projected: onto Dolores, onto the big
screen twice, and onto the bodies of girls and young teens in the world.
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Recognizing the Black Heroine
To love blackness is dangerous in a white supremacist culture—so threatening, so
serious a breach in the fabric of the social order, that death is the punishment.
—bell hooks, Black Looks: Race and Representation
As a matter of hard historical fact, the true story of Black love—love colored by, love
blackened by the Black experience—is the exact opposite of the traditional myth. There
is, moreover, plenty of evidence to show that Black men and women—despite slavery,
despite segregation, despite everything—created a modern love song in life and art that
is the loveliest thing dreamed or sung this side of the seas.
—Lerone Bennett Jr, “The Roots of Black Love”

When the prospectus for this project was approved, one reader raised a concern: “Where,” she
said, “are the minorities?” Where, indeed. As we’ve seen, post-war novelists (including those
from North America, Great Britain, and France) have worked to trouble the dual formulations of
the marriage and death plots that have existed for desiring heroines since the 18th century. While
they have done so by either manipulating the plot of the “love story” along lines of recognition
or placing men rather than women under the story’s proverbial thumb, these interventions
frequently center around white protagonists. While one could read the narrator of Written on the
Body as a minority figure, there have been no explicitly raced subjects in this dissertation up to
this point. It is relevant to ask what this means in terms of the argument proposed by this project.
If the moves toward privileging passion and the muddling of the narrative ground around it do
not hold true for raced individuals, is the theory put forth in this dissertation inherently flawed?
The challenge this chapter confronts is to explore what happens to raced—and
specifically to black American—protagonists. In particular, this chapter questions how the
historical context of primarily black women in North America precludes much of their inclusion
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as heroines in the aforementioned narrative movement. Drawing upon feminist interdisciplinary
insights, it argues that early African American heroines were relegated to the death plot and
excluded from the “euphoric” marriage plot by virtue of their birth and the passion assumed to be
in their black blood. Further, I argue this explains why novels written by African American
women and centering around black American heroines might not participate in the same schema
discussed in the rest of this project. Specifically, this chapter is an attempt to investigate some of
the ways that the history of slavery, segregation, and racial prejudice has created a separate track
followed by women’s African American fiction—one that renders passion problematic and
therefore often a less popular object of reclaiming endeavor at the same time as, more recently, it
also elevates the call in the conclusion of José Esteban Muñoz’s Cruising Utopia to “take ecstasy
with me.”
In the process, this chapter will explore the subtle differences in how primarily African
American women writers engage the conflict between personal desire and the demands of the
larger community. Using novels written by Frances E. W. Harper, Nella Larsen, James Weldon
Johnson, Toni Morrison, and Zora Neale Hurston, it suggests that the historical context of race
relations in the United States, beginning with slavery but continuing to the contemporary
moment, have created slightly different requirements for euphoric and dysphoric plots. Much of
this is tied to the fact that earlier black authors first needed to demonstrate that African
Americans were capable of love, something that was taken for granted in the case of white
subjects. Particularly during the Harlem Renaissance, mulatto/a characters needed to demonstrate
not just their observance to the larger black community by choosing blackness but also their
active dedication to and participation in the advancement of the black race. In short, their choice
is not only personal but also explicitly political, and while choosing the personal over the

143

political may lead to a character’s death rather than physical exile imposed on them by society,
characters who make this choice not only out of passionate desire but also out of the desire for
safety, affluence, or traditional married life are instead left with the knowledge that they have
exiled themselves, ignoring a higher calling and sacrificing a birthright.

Choosing Blackness
In African American novels that focus particularly on romance, the dynamic between
passion and cultural restraints often leads to a tug of war between the urge to pursue more selfish
desires and the responsibility to promote the black race. Belinda Edmondson describes how this
mandate continues in the present day in both novels and film. Whereas currently passion is
something to be renounced, Edmondson suggests that on the case of earlier novels, passion could
not even be entered into the equation, with black women consistently being barred from serving
as the desiring subject as well as the object of that desire. As she writes,
In these [early black] narratives, black women stand in for the Community: even when
they are romantic heroines, they are never romantic objects, never the subject of intense
sexual desire (unless it be the problematic desire of white slave owners). So black-onblack erotic love, if you will, is a problem for early African American nationalists, both
male and female, one that always must be subsumed within collective responsibility and
restraint. (198; emphasis added)
The reason for this is clear when one considers the historical significance of the loving black
body. As Angelo Rich Robinson highlights in “Does the Slave Ever Love? The Subject of
Romance Revisited in the Neoslave Narrative,” it was widely believed that black slaves lacked

144

the delicate/spiritual sensibilities necessary for love and instead had only the sexual, animalistic
passion evident in mating. Partially to prevent additional roadblocks to romantic relationships,
earlier slave narratives did not often discuss romance and instead placed their focus on freedom,
the ills of slavery, and discounting the portrayal of African Americans as uncultured and
uncouth.
The echoes of this can be seen in more recent black literature and particularly in
romances, which continue to navigate the apparent conflict between following one’s own desire
and working to uplift the community (Edmondson 194). Neoslave narratives and many novels
written during the Harlem Renaissance focus on this more intensely than more current novels
and films, emphasizing the very lack of a conflict between one’s own passions and one’s debt to
the community as a way to demonstrate and claim the enslaved individual’s humanity. Thus,
within earlier African American novels, the requirements for the euphoric conclusion are
frequently a variation of what Miller describes. It is not enough to participate in larger society’s
norms. Instead, these texts also required the often-political act of choosing blackness. In the case
of novels focused on a mulatto/a, this may literally mean choosing to represent oneself as a black
individual rather than attempting to pass as white. However, beyond this it frequently also
requires that the protagonist dedicate themselves to the uplift of their community in some way.
While for mulatta heroines, this does not always lead to her getting what she desires or even
necessarily to her survival, it permits her to live a rich life and to die on her own terms, a
conclusion that may constitute a euphoric plot for a segment of American society that was
historically prohibited from exactly that.
It is against the complicated backdrop of the desires of the individual in opposition to the
good of the community, as well as that of the trope of the tragic mulatta, that Frances E. W.
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Harper wrote Iola Leroy, Shadows Uplifted. That the titular character is an octoroon is
unsurprising; Harper had to consider her audience, who would likely find a blue eyed, fairskinned heroine to be more acceptable. 34 Furthermore, Iola Leroy’s position in the novel is one
often seen in stories about a tragic mulatta: she is an octoroon, cultured, well-educated, and
initially unaware of her black blood, who is sold into slavery once her heritage is discovered. It is
only the combination of her choices in the aftermath of this upheaval that prevent the novel from
ending in tragedy. Unlike the figure of the tragic mulatta, discovering that she is of mixed race
shocks but does not ultimately upset Iola, who instead dedicates herself to bettering the position
of the race. Though she faces tragic circumstances, Iola’s ultimate reaction to the new knowledge
of her racial background is to unequivocally accept her blackness and dedicate her life to service,
pledging to help less fortunate African Americans. Indeed, rather than exist in the positions of inbetweenness that characterize the tragic mulatto\a, who is considered to be neither black nor
white, the interracial characters in Iola Leroy each accept their blackness not as a burden but as a
truth and often a privilege. In turn, the unambiguously black men and women around them
recognize these mixed-raced characters as part of their community and integrate them inside of
it, neutralizing the source of tragedy behind this popular trope.
However, because Iola must be positioned in the novel as being morally good despite her
mixed race, it is imperative that she move beyond simply claiming her blackness. Instead, she
must also work to better the conditions of the other black men and women around her. While Iola
first does this while she focuses on reuniting her family, which had been scattered across the
country, her moral goodness is ultimately established through the actions she takes in order to

34

Harper acknowledges in the forward that she wrote for a mixed audience of both black and
white readers.
146

choose blackness and dedicate her life to the uplift of the black community: her refusal to pass
purposely, her rejection of a white suitor in favor of a similarly-minded light-skinned black man,
and ultimately her explicit dedication of her life to the uplifting of the race.
Although Iola begins the novel fully believing she is a white woman, once she learns of
her black heritage, she does not seem to consider passing. Instead, she willfully simultaneously
discloses and elevates her blackness despite its very real effect on her economic prospects. When
it is suggested that she perhaps ought to pass for her own sake, Iola proclaims: “I see no
necessity for proclaiming [my color] on the house-top. Yet I am resolved that nothing shall tempt
me to deny it. The best blood in my veins is African blood, and I am not ashamed of it” (162;
emphasis added). While Iola does eventually find employment as an openly black woman, this
moment in the text demonstrates her dedication to the black race extends beyond speech and into
action where the potential effects on her own life are high. Not only has she accepted her fate as
a black woman; she is proud of it even in the face of adversity. Through this moment, the novel
“elevates the acceptance of black womanhood and the importance of the African-American
community” (Rosenthal 516).
Harper also uses Iola’s choice of romantic partner as a political tool to further
demonstrate the significance of a biracial woman choosing blackness of her own free will in
order to work to transform and uplift the black community. Dr. Gresham, a white man, proposes
to her twice in the course of the novel. While her initial refusal is couched in terms of her need to
find her mother, her second rebuke explicitly signifies her full commitment to the betterment of
her race and positions that purpose as the cause of her refusal. Gresham’s proposal is initially
couched in terms of Iola abandoning her black heritage. He tells her: “I see no use in your
persisting that you are colored when your eyes are as blue and complexion as white as mine”
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(Harper 181). When Iola rejects this idea and restates her dedication to live as a black woman,
Gresham instead pleads with her not to sacrifice her happiness for the good of the community
she has claimed: “if you love your race, as you call it, work for it, live for it, suffer for it, and, if
need be, die for it; but don’t marry for it” (182). With this plea, Gresham positions marrying in
order to uplift the race as a more tragic decision than giving up one’s life in the service of that
aim. In this formulation then, Iola’s refusal to marry someone who does not improve the lot of
African Americans is seen as the ultimate demonstration of her dedication: “No, Doctor, I don’t
think that I could best serve my race by forsaking them and marrying you” (182). Unsaid in her
refusal of Gresham’s proposal is what he acknowledges in this final plea: Iola is indeed willing
to work, live, suffer, and if necessary die for the sake of her community.
Beyond this refusal to pass in order to live an easier life as a white woman, there is also
rich symbolism in this decision. As Michelle Bimbaum suggests in Race, Work, and Desire in
American Literature, 1860-1930, Gresham’s proposal is problematically phrased in terms of
ownership: he pleads with her to “be mine as nothing else on earth is mine” (Harper 179). The
formulation of marriage as ownership here is reminiscent of Iola’s past status as a slave. In
refusing such a proposal, Iola also signifies her refusal to be limited or purchased, even if the
proposal would ultimately make her life easier. In contrast to Gresham, Dr. Latimer, a similarly
mixed-raced man, suggests that any attempt for Iola to disown her mixed blood in order to ease
her life would be futile. While he claims that her psychological pain is related to her racial
heritage, describing her as “morbid and nervous” (269), his diagnosis flies in the face of
Gresham’s. It is not her race that he describes as the cause of her ills but the social consequences
of racism around her.
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It is with Dr. Latimer that Iola eventually falls in love, but this love is depicted in
different terms than Gresham’s for Iola. Instead, Iola and Latimer’s feelings for one another are
described in a manner that makes it clear this is a gentle, romantic emotion rather than a
passionate one. When Iola thinks of him, “her heart quietly [throbs] with a delicious sense of joy
and love” (210). More than this, their love is framed as stemming not from the base physical
attraction but from their more noble desires. Thus, while accepting Gresham’s proposal would
have required that Iola renounce her black blood, Iola and Latimer are united by their claims of
blackness over the possibility of passing and by their concern for the community:
Kindred hopes and tastes had knit their hearts; grand and noble purposes were lighting up
their lives; and they esteemed it a blessed privilege to stand on the threshold of a new era
and labor for those who had passed from the old oligarchy of slavery into the new
commonwealth of freedom. (210)
This love, therefore, stems not from the passionate desires of the self but from the very lack of it,
an absence that makes room for a union built upon responsibility and righteousness rather than
lasciviousness and that therefore refutes the claims of African Americans’ having a baser nature.
Importantly, the same acts of claiming blackness and consequently dedicating her life to
the upliftment of the race that draw Iola and Latimer together also enable Iola to avoid the trope
of the tragic mulatta. Like the tragic mulatta, Iola is beautiful, educated, pious, and kind. She
meets the standards of respectability held by Harper’s white readers, much as the tragic mulatta
does. This enables Harper to use the tragic mulatta trope for her own purposes, using Iola’s
visible whiteness to grant her “the sensibilities and personal dignity that have conventionally
been attributed to white women even as it has permitted them to drive home the horrendous
injustice of slavery” (Fox-Genovese 795). She also positions the work of black women as
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necessary to this community building. In one sense, this can be seen in Iola’s determination to
find employment—and to do so as a black woman despite the difficulties it poses in a still racist
North. However, this can also be viewed in her choice of husband. Unlike the marriage that she
rejects, her union with Dr. Latimer is a union of equals, and through this Harper makes a larger
statement about the role of women. Rather than being “the objects of patriarchal exchange, the
women [in the novel] have become participants in a system that stresses the relationships of
equality” (Elkins 51).
Iola Leroy demonstrates that it is not simply enough in these novels to reject passion. The
tragic mulatta is after all often portrayed as morally good, traits that were associated with their
whiteness, and yet pious mulatta characters nonetheless are killed or destitute at the end of their
respective novels. It is the tragic mulatta’s rejection of her racial status and through it the black
community that lends the character its tragic nature. For example, in Nella Larsen’s Passing,
biracial Clare Kendry passes for white in order to maintain her relationship with her wealthy and
unsuspecting husband, Jack, and thereby protect their family unit. To do this, she must accept her
husband’s racist views of black people in silence, a decision that contrasts sharply with Iola’s
dedication of her life to act on behalf of the community. While Clare ultimately spends an
increasing amount of time in Harlem after finding she enjoyed herself at a party there, it is out of
a desire for more excitement and personal enjoyment rather than in an attempt to integrate
herself into the community. In contrast to her double life, the narrator, Irene, refuses to pass,
instead living in Harlem and serving on the committee for the Negro Welfare League, signifying
her full membership in the black community and her active work to improve its standing. The
final, tragic results of Clare’s duplicity occur at a party, when Jack confronts her and accuses her
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of being a “damned dirty nigger.” Clare falls out the window, almost as though the force of
Jack’s accusation has pushed her, and is pronounced dead at the scene.
While my focus here is on black heroines, I must acknowledge that the dual plots—claim
blackness and uplift the community or face tragedy—do not only affect women. The conclusion
of Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man follows a similar pattern. There the male biracial
protagonist chooses to pass as white and ultimately privileges his relative safety and his white
beloved over the possibility of becoming an important leader in the African American
community. The protagonist is forced to choose which society to join and, in the process, which
kind of life he wants to live. As Belinda Edmondson suggests, this plot effectively categorizes
“romantic love with selfishness, individualism, and desires for whiteness [and] seems to be a
consistent thread in early African American literature” (196). More than simply needing to
choose between loving passionate feeling and the norms of society, romantic love is imbued with
additional, often race-based meanings. Additionally, here as in Iola Leroy and Passing, the two
options are positioned as mutually exclusive.
As in Passing, this novel also presents a contrast between the narrator’s decision and that
of a childhood friend, who becomes a professor at a historically black college and so actively
participates in black society. Although the narrator is not himself punished for his choices in the
narrative with death, his wife ultimately does die, and he is left with regret as a result of his
choices. Looking back over his life and comparing himself with the black men who fought
openly for equality, he finds his life lacking:
Beside them I feel small and selfish. I am an ordinarily successful white man who has
made a little money. They are men who are making history and a race. I, too, might have
taken part in a work so glorious.
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My love for my children makes me glad that I am what I am and keeps me from
desiring to be otherwise; and yet, when I sometimes open a little box in which I still keep
my fast yellowing manuscripts…I cannot repress the thought that, after all, I have chosen
the lesser part, that I have sold my birthright for a mess of pottage. (269)
While the yellowing manuscripts are often the trigger for the narrator’s complex feelings of
regret, he is not elevating a potential career over his life as a so-called average white man.
Instead, it is when he compares his life to the work of the black men who strive to improve the
standing of the black race that he falls into this melancholy state and wonders if he has, perhaps,
chosen to take the wrong road in his life. It is the realization that he has favored an empty
individualism, aligned with whiteness, over “the larger love for the black community, and the
corresponding love that the community might give back” (Edmondson 207).
bell hooks suggests in her 1990 book Black Looks: Race and Representation that
frequently “the narcissistic-based individual pursuit of self and identity subsumes the possibility
of sustained commitment to radical politics” (50), and it is against that desire that these plots are
formed. The requirement involved in such a construct is not simply that one must declare
membership as part of the black community. Instead it represents a call to radicalism and
demands that one work for the community. In Passing, Irene—like Iola—satisfies this mandate
through her sustained participation in the Negro Welfare Fund. Such an activity represents more
than just a glancing involvement with black uplift, and her choice to participate on the council, a
highly visible position, rather than to pass as white is in itself a fairly radical decision. At the
same time, there remains in Passing the ban on the black female protagonist serving as the object
of intense sexual desire, illustrated through the fact that Irene and her husband sleep in different
beds. In contrast, both Clare and the nameless ex-colored man chose to instead focus on issues of
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the self rather than of the community. Regardless of if they do so in the pursuit of desire or of
safety, they must in the process also align themselves with whiteness through the act of passing,
and they thereby forfeit the possibility of taking a political stand for civil rights. While the stakes
in these examples are not equivalent, with the female protagonists facing death and the male
protagonist instead left with regret, their texts make sure to demonstrate that such a decision is a
tragic one and one that should be rejected.

The Unavailable Community
Whereas the aforementioned novels grapple with the morality and consequences of
passing as an abandonment of the black community, Larsen’s first novel Quicksand instead
focuses directly on the conflict hooks describes between the search for one’s own identity and
their participation in the larger community. It also troubles the more simplistic portrayal of
community from the aforementioned novels, where such racial belonging is available to
everyone as they are should they choose to accept it. Instead, the protagonist, Helga Crane, is
born largely without a community, her black father having abandoned the family and her mixed
race serving as a barrier between her and much of her American family. Thus, while Helga
begins the novel as an instructor at Naxos, a black college, the narration makes it clear that this
position does not automatically make her a part of the community. Instead, much is made of her
style of dress and the colors she chooses to wear, negative attention that she attributes to her lack
of family:
No Family. That was the crux of the whole matter…If you couldn’t prove your ancestry
or connections, you were tolerated, but you didn’t ‘belong.’ You could be queer, or even
attractive, or bad, or brilliant, or even love beauty or some such nonsense if you were a
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Rankin, or a Leslie, or a Scoville; in other words, if you had a family. But if you were
just plain Helga Crane, of whom nobody had ever heard, it was presumptuous of you to
be anything but inconspicuous and conformable. (Larsen 8)
As Johanna M. Wagner suggests in “(Be)Longing in Quicksand: Framing Kinship and
Desire More Queerly,” it is true that there is a sense of yearning within this moment of the text,
but it is not necessarily for family or community. Instead, it is the ability to be herself that she
desires: to be different, and not to conform to a larger group. Helga is fully aware of her
difference, recognizing that “it wasn’t simply a matter of color. It was something broader,
deeper, that made folks kin” (51) Yet for her, color is consistently what sets her apart.
In addition to the discussions of racial identity in the novel, the color and style of Helga’s
clothing is sometimes as a stand-in for the larger issues of community that she alludes to here. In
Naxos, it is the rich jewel tones that she wears, her fashion disquieting the community around
her: “her faultless, slim shoes made them uncomfortable and her small plain hats seemed to them
positively indecent” (18). In Harlem, it is her ultimate refusal to wear white or green—colors that
others would be sure to wear—shortly before leaving the community, opting to wear a
“cobwebby black net touched with orange” instead of the colors and styles privileged by the
people around her (56). While Helga’s trip to Denmark is an attempt to acknowledge and revel in
her inescapable difference, it is there that she is robbed of her self-fashioning. There, she is
provided with bright, exotic clothing and dressed in a way that explicitly meant to highlight her
Otherness, her blackness, and her separation. Set apart from others by virtue of her blackness and
her dress, “Helga is quite literally draped with exoticism” (Barnett 584). Her difference, rendered
visible in part through her clothing, is therefore not an assertion of self but of the abstract ethnic,
sexualized other.
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Her garments—which continuously indicate her separation from each community and
assert her individuality—also ultimately help lead to her death. The scarlet dress she wears when
stumbling upon the preacher and his flock draws their attention, and they label her a Jezebel
before she is swept up in the act of worship. This moment is arguably the closest Helga comes to
being part of a community at the same time that the dress and its religious associations signal
that she still does not belong. This also marks the first time that Helga desires community more
than she does the ability to fashion herself. Instead, she yearns to be swept up, to be part of the
group, a member of the small community. While it is here that Helga meets the Reverend Green,
whom she will marry and whose children she will continue to bear until her death, she never
becomes a part of that community, labeled a Yankee in the south as a sign of her difference.
Helga’s death is not a result of passionate, sexual desire as she is never a desiring subject.
Though she is at desired by individual men, she rejects each suitor who would tie her more
closely to the community to which he belongs due to her lack of and aversion to desire. This
begins in Naxos, where thinking of her fiancé’s sexual attraction to her leaves her acutely
nauseated (24). Her final refusal is of Axel Olsen, the artist who paints a portrait of her where the
prevalent sexuality repels her, leaving her to reject it as she does Axel’s suggestion that she be
his mistress and then, ultimately, his wife. When she returns to Harlem, ultimately running into
Reverend Green’s congregation, they see her much as she saw herself reflected in the portrait: as
an object of sexuality and temptation. However, their response to her is not sexual desire but the
desire to replace her assumed worldliness with righteousness. They include her without
accepting her.
Hazel Carby discusses one potential cause for the rejection of desire seen in both Helga
and Iola’s stories. In her book, Reconstructing Womanhood: The Emergence of the Afro-
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American Woman Novelist, she suggests that novelists such as Harper and Larsen aimed to create
what would be “a discourse of black womanhood which would not only address their exclusion
from the ideology of true womanhood but that would, as a consequence of this exclusion, also
rescue their bodies from a persistent association with illicit sexuality” (32). It is only in the final
lines of Quicksand that Helga deliberately elicits a response sexual response, revealing the shape
of her breast through the thin fabric of her nightgown, but as it is from her husband, it is hardly
illicit. Still, it is a moment of resistance.
Fulfilling the proscribed role for women (married, with children, and being connected to
the Christian community) leads to Helga’s death rather than to a euphoric conclusion precisely
because action is not enough; her final thoughts reveal her to be the same woman who walked
through Naxos in bright colors, valuing her individuality over her inclusion into a community
that does not want her and demonstrating it through her clothing. Yet it is worth considering if
Helga’s persistent dissatisfaction is a sign of some internal failing or if, instead, it is the
inevitable result of her position in a world where the communities available—if not fully open—
to her are all bounded by race. Anne Cheng writes in “The Melancholy of Race” that
“racialization—as an act of self-constitution through denying and re-assimilating the Other—
must be conceived of as a wholly melancholic activity” (54). Cheng highlights the way that the
presence of the raced individual can be always marked as a transgression just as Helga’s clothing
is frequently a mark of her transgressive nature when it isn’t itself integrated into the projected
definition of her race placed on her by others. In looking for a community in which she can be
her authentic, full, mixed-race self, Helga is running into the issue of seeking a way to be an
authentic self in the face of what Cheng calls melancholic racialization, specifically that the
“notion of racial authenticity is thus finally a cultural judgment which itself disguises the
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identificatory assimilation that has already taken place in melancholic racialization: ‘I am
constituted by an other who finally must, and must not, be me’” (55, emphasis original). Helga
rejects her family in Denmark because she does not like the way they construct her racial
identity, but in each community she visits, she is forced to grapple with similar acts of
construction, not the least the ones she engages in herself. In such a state, then, her continued
dissatisfaction is unsurprising, and it leads to her inability to wholeheartedly assume the roles
necessary by any community, including the one in which she is trapped at the novel’s
conclusion.
The significance of the novel’s title has been connected to its conclusion, where Helga
appears to be stuck in the south, birthing children until her ultimate death. However, I would
suggest that instead, Helga is mired in quicksand from the moment we are introduced to her in
Naxos. She is trapped between her impossible desire to fully fashion herself as a mixed raced
woman and the community that she does not accept and that does not accept her in return. Just as
moving in quicksand causes you to sink more quickly, each move that Helga makes sinks her
deeper—into dissatisfaction with the limitations of community, the desire to fashion a true
representation of herself, and the ultimate consequences of being unable to accept and be
accepted by the societies by which she is surrounded.

Balancing Self and Society
Whereas earlier novels by African American authors that contained examples of black
love were often attempts to respond to accusations of black passion as animalistic and therefore
rejected passion as a whole, some more recent texts instead repeal this earlier mandate created by
their predecessors. As a result, an increasing number of black romances focus on the idea that
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black men and women can be both passionate and morally righteous, portraying the idea that
there is no need to choose between the two. Instead, as Edmondson suggests, “in the new black
romance, we too are lovers, we too are erotic—and professionals. The black romance allows eros
and agape to inhabit a space together, and in a form that is most associated with convention and
the status quo” (207).
While Edmondson focuses on texts and movies that demonstrate the coexistence of
unpunished eroticism and romantic love such as How Stella Got Her Groove Back, novels such
as Toni Morrison’s Sula outline the way in which it is not enough to be either unabashedly
sexual or carefully observant of society’s norms. Instead, the ideal is to be both: to participate in
and support larger society while also maintaining one’s individuality, passions and all. Within
Sula the characters of Nel and Sula demonstrate the path to enjoying a fulfilling life requires that
one straddle the line between engaging one’s society and privileging one’s passions.
From childhood, Nel’s mother Helene raises her to follow as many of the mores of white
society as possible. As a child, Nel briefly meets her grandmother Rochelle who speaks to her in
creole, and although Helene clearly understands the dialect, upon Nel’s questioning she lies: “’I
don’t speak creole.’ She gazed at her daughter’s wet buttocks. ‘And neither do you’” (27).
Helene’s gaze is significant in the aftermath of Rochelle’s presence, a woman who she describes
as a “much handled thing” (27). It is clear here that to Helene creole is a symbol of the
stereotypical hypersexuality of black people and black women in particular, and by refusing to
teach Nel the dialect, she hopes to also raise her daughter to be acceptable with regard to white
society’s norms and judgments. Helene’s desire to distance Nel from her blackness can also be
seen in her attempts to narrow the girl’s nose by pinching it with a clothespin every night and her
religiously straightening Nel’s hair each Saturday.
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Not unlike Iola, Nel as a child is uninterested in attempting to disguise her blackness,
hiding the clothespin under her blanket and remaining unimpressed with her straightened hair.
Unlike Iola, who unknowingly passed as white before learning of her heritage, Nel is clearly
biracial, with skin “the color of wet sandpaper—just dark enough to escape the blows of the
pitch-black truebloods and the contempt of old women who worried about such things as bad
blood mixtures and knew that the origins of a mule and a mulatto were one and the same” (52).
Nel is therefore trapped between a mother who wants her to observe the norms and values of
white society and a smaller black community that accepts her because of her very blackness.
While Nel cannot choose her skin color, her complete lack of interest in her mother’s
attempts to refashion her still amount to choosing blackness at the same time that her mother
fights to raise her in a way that people outside the Bottom would find acceptable. However,
despite Nel’s resistance as a child, Helene ultimately achieves some degree of success. By the
time Nel is married in 1927, she is a woman transformed. At that point, “she had no aggression.
Her parents had succeeded in rubbing down to a dull glow any sparkle or sputter she had.” When
she marries Jude Green, a man who sings in the church, it is in a church wedding and is followed
by a reception, neither of which often happened in the black community of the Bottom but which
were more aligned with life outside of it (80).
Nel’s transformation draws her into sharp contrast with her friend, the titular character,
Sula. Criticism about the novel frequently positions Nel as the one who is able to live a fuller life
and achieve the happier ending—after all, Sula dies over the course of the novel—and such
scholarship suggests it is Sula’s “selfish” perusal of pleasure that leads to her downfall. In these
readings, Sula is the anti-hero who “dies failing to progress toward genuine identity” (Salvatore
155). However, the fact is that neither Nel nor Sula successfully navigate what Diane Matza
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labels the conflict between self-exploration and society’s need for stability and control (43).
Instead, each character overly privileges one side of that conflict. In short, “Nel casts her visions
in traditional romantic fantasies and sacrifices her independence to conventionality, while Sula,
insisting on her independence, becomes isolated from society; she is free but directionless”
(Stein 147). After she marries, Nel falls into a “tiny life” (141), fulfilling the expected role of
housewife and mother, one who sought to help and soothe her husband (83), attends prayer
meetings (94), bears three children (96), and lives a life free of passion, her love for her husband
being described as one “which over the years had spun a steady gray web around her heart” (95).
This is a life that can be compared to the conclusion of Helga Crane’s. Though marriage is not
literally deadly for Nel—perhaps because adultery leads to its death first—it drastically shrinks
the totality of her self into being a part of her husband.
This is a life that Sula explicitly rejects when Eva suggests it to her. Indeed, at the very
moment that Nel cements herself as Jude’s wife, a position Jude describes as existing to enable
“the two of them together [to] make one Jude” (71), Sula leaves the community without a word.
She does not return for 10 years, and even then expresses disinterest in being half of a husband,
instead wanting to “make” herself. When it comes to this goal, scholarship frequently positions
Sula as unsuccessful. Her quest is deemed a failure (Stein 147), and her actions are a “futile
pursuit of independence and power” (Salvatore 162). Sula’s behavior is derided within the text
as well, where she is rejected from the community because of her sexual exploits. Unlike the
other women in her family, who made men feel valued through their sexuality, Sula instead uses
hers as a tool in her quest for self-discovery. Her exploits are motivated by an understanding of
gender roles in the community, where men—as represented by Jude—looked at their wives as a
way to complete themselves. Sula recognizes that “a total union is possible only when each
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perceives the other as possibly being his or her self. Since woman is not usually perceived by
man in that total sense, Sula abandons any attempt at union and seeks only herself” (Christian
167). Somewhat ironically, then, Sula’s behavior is motivated by the very qualities that make it
intolerable to the community around her.
Nel, in contrast, is often portrayed as exhibiting growth at the end of the novel, where she
realizes it is Sula that she has missed rather than Jude. While Sula does die before the end of the
novel, I would suggest that death is complicated by Sula’s stance toward and experience of that
death. She does not view it as a punishment but as an adventure about which she is excited to tell
Nel. Similarly, Nel yearns to reach out to Sula at the end of her story, but she is the one for
whom that experience is accompanied by regret. Just as they were children, when “their
friendship was so close they themselves had difficulty distinguishing one’s thoughts from the
other’s” (Morrison 72), one must consider Nel and Sula to each be one half of a whole that when
combined represent balance through a blossoming into oneself and into communion with the
community.
That said, Nel’s ability to begin the process of mourning Sula does represent growth from
her state earlier in the novel, when she refused to look at the gray ball that hovered in the air just
out of view. That “ball of muddy strings, . . . without weight, fluffy but terrible in its
malevolence,” remains at the edge of her vision, where she could examine it if she chose to do
so, but it remains carefully unexamined throughout the summer, relegated to the position of
something that “always floating in the light near her but which she did not see because she never
looked” (109). While the significance of the ball is never made explicit, Nel fears that, if she
were to look, she might be tempted to touch it, something she thought might lead to a fate worse
than death.
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While there are many readings of the significance of this ball, I would suggest that it best
represents the painful sum of her grief and loss. It appears as she waits to be overtaken by her
pain and loss in the aftermath of Sula and Jude’s tryst, and after it does so she pulls herself up
from where she was “twisted . . . into a curve on the floor and flayed” by grief and instead,
somewhat numbly, questions why her lilacs haven’t yet bloomed. The ball appears at the very
moment of her repression, and like repressed feelings, remains there simultaneously in view and
brushed to the side. It is only at the end of the novel, when Nel recognizes her deepest loss is
Sula rather than Jude, that the small, gray ball of fur “broke and scattered like dandelion spores
on the breeze” and Nel is finally able to cry out (174). The years Nel spends carefully not
examining the gray ball are years she spends not examining herself, her feelings, or her desires.
It is in contrast to this that I would position Sula’s death in the novel. Despite the
meaning of the other deaths featured within this project, I would suggest that Sula’s death not
only demonstrates growth but also provides her with the experience of connection that she had
previously been looking for through sex with men. In fact, Sula smiles in the aftermath of her
death, thinking: “well I’ll be damned . . . it didn’t even hurt. Wait’ll I tell Nel” (149). That this
smile and its accompanying sense of connection to Nel occurs after death rather than before it
nullifies death’s significance as a negative, dysphoric symbol. Instead, it signifies that Sula’s
experience is not one of disconnectedness but the very opposite: a deep connection to her
childhood friend despite her own willful independence that endures even past her last breath. As
a result, Sula ends her role in the novel from a position of power: power that stems from a sense
of self that not even death can diminish, from living her life gazing fearlessly at her own gray
ball.
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The Positive Melancholy of Ecstasy
In the conclusion of his book, Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity,
José Muñoz’s discusses a Magnetic Fields song that calls for the listener to “take ecstasy with
me.” Muñoz reads this as a powerful call to the queer community. Beyond simply describing
“stepping out” for an enjoyable evening, in Muñoz’s reading, the song instead invites the listener
to move outside of heterosexual “time and place” in favor of what he suggests is a “queer
futurity”:
Take ecstasy with me thus becomes a request to stand out of time together, to resist the
stultifying temporality of a time that is not ours, that is saturated with violence both
visceral and emotional…That means going beyond the singular shattering that a version
of jouissance suggests or the transport of Christian rapture. Taking ecstasy with one
another, in as many ways as possible, can perhaps be our best way of enacting a queer
time that is not yet here but always potentially dawning. (Muñoz 187)
While Muñoz is reading this song for its application to the queer community, it is worth
investigating how this imagery might be applicable to African American heroines and the black
community within the context of the trajectory portrayed in this chapter. In particular, I would
like to explore why this act of taking ecstasy with another person, rather than the more solitary
pursuit of passion, might be significant within the context of African American life and briefly
consider how it might look in African American literature.
Like passion, ecstasy—the overwhelming feeling of joy—is of course a strong emotional
state, but the formulation of ecstasy that Muñoz and the Magnetic Fields song focus on is very
different from passionate feeling more generally. This is due in no small part to the explicit
inclusion of community or the loved Other as a partner in the experience rather than as an object
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on which one’s private experience is built. Within Muñoz’s reading, this can be seen in the
repetition of terms of community, such as “with one another,” “together,” and “ours.” This
construction of community, built under pressure from outside actors, this is especially clear in
the second stanza:
You had a black snowmobile
We drove out under the northern lights
A vodka bottle gave you those raccoon eyes
We got beat up just for holding hands
Here there is an attempt to get away: to drive in the cold, toward something beautiful. Yet even
there, the addressee was seriously injured, a sign that the larger community cannot be escaped so
easily. While both the speaker and the “you” of the song suffer physical violence for the simplest
manifestations of affection, the focus is on the “you” who has been injured. Even in this moment,
the singer pleads that the addressee “take ecstasy with me.”
Fulfilling this request—the taking of something with a loved other—requires
collaborative action on the part of the subjects who must necessarily recognize each other as
subjects. In this moment of the song, nothing is being given to them by society. Instead, ecstasy
must be jointly claimed—or taken—both from the more distant past, when one could move
without fear, and the more violent recent past, where there is assault from outside because of the
nature of one’s love. Muñoz highlights the contrast between the first and second verses, honing
in on the transition from distant, idealized past to painful present and questioning what it means
for the singer to call the other to take ecstasy after both. He argues that to take ecstasy is in part
to remove yourself from linear time: “taking ecstasy with one another is an invitation, a call, to a
then-and-there, a not-yet-here” (Muñoz 187). In this way, it is also a call back to a melancholic
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state, akin to what we see in the café in Hiroshima Mon Amour during the moments when the
French woman is neither in the past nor the present: that aspect of melancholia that, in response
to trauma, enables us to bring forth who and what we have lost at the moment that we need it.
Thus perhaps a requirement of taking ecstasy is that one be a melancholic subject. The
song pleads with the person being addressed to take ecstasy from both the distant past and the
painful past-present, but more than this it asks for the opportunity “stand out of time together, to
resist the stultifying temporality and time that is not ours, that is saturated with violence both
visceral and emotional” (187). In short, it pleads for a collective experience of melancholia: one
that may be rooted in trauma but that remains creative and productive, as discussed in Chapter 2.
By standing in that melancholic space together, recognizing each other as subjects, a shared
experience of melancholia could then used to strengthen the bonds of relationship—between
individuals as well as within segments of society.
While this undoubtedly describes the striving of queer populations in the contemporary
moment, it also applies to minorities in the United States and, in particular, to black Americans.
As bell hooks writes, “To love blackness is dangerous in a white supremacist culture—so
threatening, so serious a breach in the fabric of the social order, that death is the punishment” (9).
To love blackness is not the same as to love the black community because blackness itself is not
necessarily tied to a sense of community. For example, Zora Neale Hurston somewhat
controversially used vernacular language in order to imbue her texts with “blackness,” alluding
to the fact that there is an inherent quality of blackness, of the culture, that is not necessarily tied
to the grouping of black bodies.
What might it look like, then, to “take ecstasy with me”? What is required here is not
necessarily sexual or romantic, just as all sources of ecstasy are not sexual or romantic, but
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instead a willingness to simultaneously recognize the person you are with and to enter “a mode
of contemplation or consciousness that is not self-enclosed, particularly in regard to being
conscious of the other” (186). Therefore, I would argue that when Morrison herself suggests “if
they [Sula and Nel] were one woman, they would be complete” (Bakerman 60), she alludes to a
missed opportunity for such activity. Sula’s alleged failure is that she takes her ecstasy alone,
even as she pulls it from the bodies of the men she sleeps with. Her endeavor during much of the
novel is a solitary one, without any sense of community. Nel, meanwhile, is concerned with the
community at least nominally, participating in the church and visiting Eva in the retirement
home. Had Nel and Sula been combined like one of Aristophanes’s original humans, they might
have fit the bill. More importantly, however: if the taking of ecstasy constitutes the movement
“from shared critical dissatisfaction [to] collective potentiality” (189), Nel’s refusal to confront
the gray ball that always hovers at the edges of her vision prevents her from making this jump
before it is too late for her to share either her dissatisfaction or any sort of potentiality with Sula.
This is perhaps the source of the pain behind her wailing at the end of the text, her cry for her
best friend, which “had no bottom and it had no top, just circles and circles of sorrow.”
Their Eyes Were Watching God concludes quite differently. The novel consists of Janie
Crawford’s recollection of her life as she recounts it to her best friend, Pheoby. Significantly,
Janie is the product of generations of rape and, as a result, is obviously biracial; however, unlike
Iola, she does not purposely elevate blackness in order to make a political point. Instead, Janie
focuses on finding love, a quest that takes her through multiple varied relationships. Not unlike
as in Quicksand, many of these relationships—as well as their associated communities—are poor
fits for her desires either because of differing ideals about marriage and partnership or because
the marriage itself positions her as a mixed-race trophy, a situation that resembles Helga’s
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experience in Copenhagen. However, unlike Helga, who fails to find love during her narrative,
Janie ultimately falls in love with Tea Cake.
Her marriage to Tea Cake is far from perfect. It is, in fact, abusive. Yet it represents a
period during which Janie both achieves her personal desires and participates as part of a
community. This period of relative happiness ends when a hurricane strikes, destroying the
neighborhood. During the resulting flood, Tea Cake is bitten by a rabid dog and, ultimately
overcome by his illness, he attempts to shoot her. Janie is forced to kill him first in self-defense
in a scene that marks the loss of community for her. She is tried for murder and acquitted by a
white jury despite the protests of black men from her neighborhood. Although they ultimately
apologize for their actions and ask Janie to stay, she instead opts to return to her previous home,
where everyone but her best friend gossips about her rather than engaging her or welcoming her
back.
Despite the way the community she returns to shuns her at the end of the text, Janie’s
focus remains on the opportunity to connect with Pheoby, who travels with her through the past
by listening attentively to her narrative. That the full novel takes the form of a flashback
inherently brings it out of time, as is demanded by the construct of “taking ecstasy with me.” In
the end, our journey through Janie’s history reveals the ways in which she succeeds where the
other heroines in this chapter had failed. She is able to love and appreciate selfhood unlike Iola,
who sacrifices her all to the cause in order to prove her dedication to the larger community of
black people she barely knows. She can content herself with an imperfect community and can
balance her role in it with the fulfillment of her own desires.
It is not clear how life ends for Janie; the text concludes shortly after the end of her story
to Pheoby. However, it is apparent that this moment of connection with Pheoby opens up the
167

potential for a different type of relationship than the ones seen elsewhere in this chapter and even
throughout in this project as a whole. Pheoby is an attentive witness to Janie’s story, listening for
no apparent reason beyond a genuine desire to know about her friend’s past. This presence of
such a witness combined with Janie’s secure sense of self allows Janie to disregard the larger
community’s opinion. As she tells Pheoby, "Ah don’t mean to bother wid tellin’ ‘em nothin’,
Pheoby. ‘Tain’t worth the trouble. You can tell ‘em what I say if you wants to. Dat’s just de
same as me ‘cause mah tongue is in mah friend’s mouf" (6). It is here—in the beginning of the
novel, even before we ourselves have been told Janie’s story—that we see the recognition and an
acceptance of the complicated, flawed relationship between self, other, and community, where
passion is neither abandoned nor used as an excuse to overwrite the selfhood of others. This
more than anything else is what was—and perhaps what remains—revolutionary.
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Epilogue
I, too, overflow; my desires have invented new desires, my body knows unheard-of songs.
Time and again I, too, have felt so full of luminous torrents that I could burst—burst with
forms much more beautiful than those which are put up in frames and sold for a stinking
fortune. And I, too, said nothing, showed nothing; I didn’t open my mouth, I didn’t
repaint my half of the world.
—Hélène Cixous, “The Laugh of the Medusa”

This project was largely concerned with answering the question of what is happening to the love
story’s form rather than delving into why it is happening. This focus is not caused by a judgment
that the “why” is somehow less important; far from it, it is simply a result of the way the project
grew and developed over the last decade of my graduate education. In fact, my initial focus when
I first began to write about love was not about recognition at all. Instead, I was interested in
recuperating passion, an element of love that seemed to me to have an unfairly negative
reputation. I believed that, for all that we highlight the ways one can act out of character because
of passion—the ways in which we can sometimes behave badly when in passionate love—we
should also acknowledge how passionate desire can encourage us to behave well. Surely we
ought to note the ways lovers engage the world in a state of limerence, as though it were a bit
better or a bit brighter, or how they might be more deliberate in their celebration of the ones they
love, purposely behaving as though the loved other is precious and valued.
I initially stumbled upon the role of recognition in these texts through a happy accident:
the coincidence of having reread both Lolita and Damage in close enough proximity to realize
the parallels in the way supposed recognition functioned in the novels and to note the similarity
of the language used to describe those moments of recognition as a flash, impact, or shock. In
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each case, recognition is depicted like a lightning bolt, striking suddenly and violently, and its
position vis-à-vis the lover is not unlike the way the passions were previously portrayed as an
external force that attacks the lover, leaving them helplessly out of themselves.
However, it is important to question why we might be motivating the creation of love
stories that hinge on recognition either as it intersects with passion or, alternatively, as a solitary
influence. In this context, it is particularly significant to note that the overwhelming majority of
authors featured within this dissertation are female. This was not deliberate. Indeed, the two texts
featured in this study that are authored by men either focus not on a love story but on its
aftermath or themselves become the site of willful, deliberate layers of misrecognition by
characters, authors, and collaborators. Although a more deliberate investigation would be needed
to say so definitively, one might wonder if this imbalance exists beyond the collection of texts
that are featured within this dissertation: if there is indeed something that would encourage
women writers to write texts that more closely link recognition—false, mutual, or otherwise—
with the outcomes of the love story itself.
This epilogue will very briefly explore the possibility that what we see here is related to
Hélène Cixous’s l'écriture féminine, not in an attempt to argue that men cannot or do not ever
write narratives about love in this way but to instead suggest that what we witness in these
stories is one potential way that women’s writing can manifest itself as a revision to a preexisting narrative form. To be blunt, I do believe that the love story as represented by Barthes is
a tool that is useful in attempts to reinforce certain aspects of patriarchal power. It seems not to
be a coincidence that both he and Bataille use masculine pronouns to depict their lovers,
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particularly when Bataille makes a point to use a woman to exemplify boundless transgression. 35
Thus, the shifts to this structure may be both evidence of and a result of so called feminine
writing.
Cixous discusses writing in terms of masculinity within “The Laugh of the Medusa”
(1976), and her description of masculine writing closely fits the previously-discussed aspects of
Barthes’s format for the love story. Cixous suggests that up until that point in the mid-seventies,
a review of writing more generally would reveal that
far more extensively and repressively than is ever suspected or admitted, writing has been
run by a libidinal and cultural—hence political, typically masculine—economy; that this
is a locus where the repression of women has been perpetuated, over and over, more or
less consciously, and in a manner that’s frightening since it’s often hidden or adorned
with the mystifying charms of fiction. (879)
The connections to the love story are multiple. For instance, one might view the repression of
women encoded in Miller’s dysphoric plots, which themselves require a form of the love story
that mandates the renunciation of passionate desire. Furthermore, the requirement that
passionate outbursts be shaped into a story using the traditional requirements of linear plot and
consistency in style also relate to the “pointedness” of masculine writing.
While Cixous suggests it is impossible to define l'écriture féminine due to its very nature,
she does allude to some of its qualities. Such writing is meant to be largely uncontained,
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Here as in the introduction to this project, I recognize the possibility that Barthes’s sexuality
may have had an impact on his pronoun choice while he wrote about something so personal as
love; however, I reject the easy conclusion that his sexual identity can be used to completely
explain away his gendering of the loving subject.
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expansive and cyclical rather than bounded by chronological requirements of plot. Far from
being dedicated to making the contents recognizable to the other, such writing instead enables
the author to “carry out the indispensable ruptures and transformations in her history” (880). In
this capacity, it also exists in direct opposition to the love story as Barthes describes it, which is
the medium through which the lover can “reduce the great imaginary current, the orderless,
endless stream which is passing through him, to a painful morbid crisis of which he must be
cured” (7). Cixous, too, discusses the self as being consumed by what she defines as powerful,
luminous torrents that she silences rather than allowing them to “burst” forth having been given
voice. Yet “The Laugh of the Medusa” is a plea to other women that they stop silencing those
currents and, by engaging in l'écriture féminine, allow not just the contents but also the form of
their writing to bear witness to those currents.
It is for this reason that we witness a refusal to allow passion to be consumed by the love
story, to instead enable writing influenced by the lover’s “figures” to persist despite Barthes’s
claims. Such “outbursts of language” that explode onto the scene, repeat, and reappear cyclically
“like a perpetual calendar” fit fairly neatly into Cixous’s description of l'écriture féminine.
Furthermore, writing dominated by a lover’s figures—such as portions of Written on the Body—
would fulfill the requirement that Mary Jacobus argues women’s writing must: to work within
male discourse at the same time that it strives “ceaselessly to deconstruct it: to write what cannot
be written” (12). In particular, the fact that Written on the Body’s figures are most evident
through the repurposing of a medical text truly underscores just how such deconstruction might
appear in a text.
While this potentially explains why texts like the ones featured within this project move
outside the boundaries set by Barthes’s love story, it does not necessarily account for the
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importance placed on recognition in such narratives. I posit one potential cause early in this
project, when I discuss the shift in how we think about love that more closely equates loving the
other with granting them genuine recognition. However, I also want to turn to Berlant’s brief
discussion of recognition within the introduction of Cruel Optimism in order to suggest an
additional reason that is more closely tied to this concept of l'écriture féminine. There, Berlant
notes the impossibility of truly recognizing the other with 100% accuracy, instead highlighting
the way that what we label “recognition is the misrecognition that you can bear” (26). That is to
say, none of us are ever truly fully recognized accurately, but some acts of recognition are simply
close enough either to who we believe we are or alternatively to the version of ourselves that we
want to be.
Subjects who are recognized in a “bearable” manner and on a consistent basis may not
have these same issues of recognition looming large in their lives. However, a part of what lays
at the heart of the sort of writing depicted in “The Laugh of the Medusa” is the sense that some
aspects of women’s internal lives are going unexpressed and, as a result, unrecognized, due to
the restrictions placed on how one can craft a written narrative and what aspects of the self can
be expressed at all. If you combine this with the aforementioned shift in the importance of
recognition in relationship, it only makes sense that issues of recognition loom large in this
alternative form of the love story. Similarly, this begins to clarify one potential reason why it is
frequently the male characters in these novels who are punished by the texts’ end. Just as past
heroines were punished for refusing to play by the rules of the love stories they were in, here it is
the male character that must grapple with having a love that does not take the acceptable form,
that is: does not recognize the loved other in a bearable way.
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And so: one final but crucial difference that distinguishes the narratives explored in this
project from the love story as Barthes defines it concerns the lover’s debt. Within Barthes’s
conception of the love story, the lover’s debt is to society. It is to society that he must sacrifice
his passion with the aim of being welcomed back to the larger collective. Yet within the
formulation I have discussed within this project, the debt is not one owed to society but instead
to the loved other. We pay the tithe of recognition to one another in order to accurately engage
one another: to relate rather than to dominate and therefore to be recognized by the one we love
in return. In short, it is the cost of intimacy and thus, in the present moment, of love itself.
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